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Abstract  
 
This thesis is exploring interactions of Japanese NGOs to be influential in official foreign aid 
from outside of the exclusive Japanese decision-making process. Three case studies have been 
undertaken to examine how Japanese NGOs have developed or adopted various means to exert 
influence on the government.   
 
Japanese NGOs have emerged as powerful actors in foreign aid under a policy of “Kao no 
Mieru Enjyo (visible Japanese aid)” in the 1990s following some domestic incidents and an 
international trend in development. However, the Japanese government has maintained a hostile 
attitude toward NGOs despite its official claim of regarding NGOs as ‘partners’. The 
government’s awkward reaction to NGOs comes from Japan’s traditional idea of extreme 
respect for the government and looking down on citizenry. This traditional political culture of 
“Kan Son Min Pi (supremacy of bureaucracy)” has dominated Japan and that has made the 
government hostile to powerful outsiders such as NGOs, which may threaten their supremacy. 
The exclusive decision-making system, “the Iron Triangle”, has also contributed to distance 
NGOs from the government. By this means, an atmosphere between NGOs and the government 
in Japan has been far from ‘partnership’.    
 
Against this hostile environment, Japanese NGOs have developed and adopted interactions to 
exert influence. Various means have been used by each NGO in accordance with each speciality 
and operation field. The thesis has focused on three areas of Japan’s foreign aid – development, 
anti-personnel landmines and environment – and undertaken three case studies. Four NGOs 
have been analysed – Japan International Volunteer Center (JVC), Japanese Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (JCBL), Greenpeace Japan and Friends of the Earth (FoE) Japan. Some NGOs have 
developed their own interactions and others have been adopted from international partners and 
authorities. On a whole, they have all crafted these interactions to suit the Japanese political 
culture.  
 
Among several interactions, building international networks and personal relationships with 
powerful individuals such as politicians have appeared to be most useful. These two interactions 
work effectively on Japan’s reactive and highly personalised aspects of politics, which is 
reactive to external pressure (Gai-atsu) and rely heavily on the personality and ability of 
individual leaders. The case studies reveal that Japanese NGOs have exerted influence 
effectively by making use of these valuable interactions.  
 
However, Japanese NGOs are at a crossroad because of high turn-over of staff and a 
focus-shifting in Japan’s foreign policy to sending Self-Defence Forces (SDF) overseas. NGOs 
also need to obtain solid financial source which is getting difficult after a downturn in the 
Japanese economy. These will be the issues that Japanese NGOs need to tackle soon in order to 
be true ‘partner’.        
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to this Study 
Japan’s Humiliation and Trauma which required NGOs’ involvement 
Japan’s foreign policy has long been criticised by the international community as 
being ‘faceless’ or ‘check book diplomacy’, meaning that Japan has only provided 
financial assistance, without contributing human resources. Especially after the Cold 
War when the world began experiencing a number of crises such as violent internal 
conflicts, Japan’s passive participation with regard to the contribution of human 
resources in international peace making and peace keeping has received severe 
criticism.  
The most prominent example was during the Gulf War of 1991. Instead of 
contributing military personnel to the multinational force defending Kuwait, Japan 
provided about a quarter of the war expenditure. 1  By doing so, the Japanese 
government felt it had fulfilled its obligations with regard to sharing the burdens of the 
multinational force. However, this turned out to be a most humiliating period for the 
government. Despite the large amount of financial assistance that Japan provided the 
US-led coalition force which liberated Kuwait from its Iraqi invaders, the Kuwaiti 
government expressed no appreciation to Japan for its contribution to the liberation 
effort. It seemed that recognition of Japan, one of the biggest economic powers and a 
major monetary funding provider for the war, was neglected by the international 
                                                   
1 The Japanese government often calls this event the ‘Gulf Crisis’ instead of the ‘Gulf War’. The 
reason for this name is not known but it is assumed that the government intends to legitimise Japan’s 
financial contribution. By referring to it as a ‘crisis’ avoids breaching the terms of Article 9 of the 
Japanese Constitution. 
 2 
community.  
This incident has remained a source of severe humiliation for Japan and it is now 
commonly called the ‘Gulf War trauma’. In the Diplomatic Bluebook 1991, an official 
annual of Japan’s foreign policy, Japan’s contribution to the Gulf War was described in 
a bitter tone: 
  
Various cooperative efforts made by Japan on the problems arising from the Gulf 
Crisis, including the large amount of financial contributions, are gaining international 
praise with the passage of time. However, during the course of the Gulf Crisis when 
the immediate situation dominated the attention of the international community, there 
was criticism against Japan’s cooperation being “too little, too late” and that it did not 
include cooperation making use of its human resources.2  
 
After this humiliating experience, the Japanese government deemed it necessary to 
highlight Japan’s presence in the international community through not only money but 
with something else as well. A new foreign aid strategy incorporating 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) arose as a means to boost the visibility of 
Japan’s presence. Before moving on to discuss its new aid strategy, it is necessary to 
understand why Japan had not previously made human resource contributions available 
during international crises when the need for such arose.  
   Based on this background, the purpose of this thesis is to examine how Japanese 
NGOs have exerted their influence on Japan’s foreign aid policy in the 1990s from the 
outside of the exclusive decision-making system. This is an important area of study 
                                                   
2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) of Japan. Diplomatic Blue Book: Japan’s Diplomatic 
Activities, 1991 (Tokyo: MOFA, 1991), 51.  
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because importance of NGOs at the present is globally understood, however, very few 
research on Japanese NGOs have been conducted so far (See Chapter 2 for more detail). 
Reason for this scarceness will be described in detail later in this thesis but it comes 
from Japan’s unique political culture of Kan-Son Min-Pi (Supremacy of bureaucracy), 
which means the government (Kan) makes all decisions and people (Min) are only to 
follow without question. This culture hugely contributes a struggle of Japanese NGOs to 
obtain access to the decision-making process to exert direct influence and that is why 
they group for ways to be influential from outside. This thesis deals mainly with this 
aspect in order to reveal Japan’s odd political culture around NGOs and NGOs’ 
challenge and struggle to be “partner” to the government. These problems and objects 
will be presented in detail for further analysis in this chapter. The following section will 
study why the Japanese government required NGOs’ participation in foreign aid and it 
will be a solid foundation for further analysis of NGOs’ interactions with the 
government.     
 
Why does Japan not make a “human resources” contribution? 
Japan, under its Peace Constitution, may not possess any military force for the 
settlement of international conflict. The well-known Article 9 of the constitution states 
Japan’s position as follows:  
 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese 
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of 
force as means of settling international disputes.  
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air force, as 
well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the 
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state will not be recognised.3  
 
In adhering to this Article, Japan is not supposed to use any military force to settle 
“international conflicts”.  
This obligation stemmed from Japan’s aggression during the Second World War. 
However, with the change in nature of armed conflict from international to regional and 
with the increased levels of civilian casualties, Japan started receiving international 
requests to participate in settling these regional conflicts. Many recent conflicts have 
been caused not by territorial or ideological desires among states but by religious and 
ethnic disagreements within existing states. In this context, settling disputes can be 
interpreted as creating peace among the affected peoples. To facilitate this, Japan, as 
one of the wealthiest states in the world, has been called upon to help resolve these 
conflicts.       
However, the Japanese Constitution has remained the same, despite these changes in 
the world situation. Article 9 is often perceived as a ‘sacred precept’, and as one 
necessary to maintain friendly relations with neighbouring Asian states, all of which 
have bitter memories of Japan’s past aggression. For this reason, being unable to use 
military force as a backup in conducting its foreign affairs, a huge amount of financial 
assistance to other countries in the form of foreign aid has been a major foreign policy 
tool for maintaining friendly relations. This has been criticised as ‘buying votes’ or 
‘check book diplomacy’, but it is undeniable that this has been a major and an 
influential foreign policy tool for Japan. Japan was the top aid donor state in 1989, 
followed by the United States. However, despite this level, Japan’s foreign aid policy 
                                                   
3 Setsuko Tsuneoka, ed., “Renunciation of War,” The Constitution of Japan (Tokyo: Kashiwa Syobo, 
1993), 28. 
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has been criticised as being ‘faceless’ nonetheless.  
 
Visible Japanese Aid (VJA)  
In order to counter international criticism, the Japanese government adopted a new 
strategy in 1989. The strategy was later known as, ‘Visible Japanese Aid (VJA)’ or Kao 
no Mieru Enjyo in Japanese, which aims to highlight Japan’s international presence and 
contribution.4 This new aid policy constitutes a major part of Japan’s overall foreign 
policy with an increased focus on providing personnel. Several actions have been 
undertaken to support this new policy, such as posting expressions of gratitude from aid 
recipients on the website of Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Likewise, the official 
annual report on Japan’s foreign aid, Japan’s ODA, frequently includes articles on this 
topic such as “A Dream Bridge – Grant Aid Project for Construction of the Meghna 
Gumti Bridge [which was named Japan-Bangladesh Friendship Bridge”5, “A Letter of 
Thanks from a Junior High School Student in Papua New Guinea”6, and “Hand-over 
Ceremony for Adult Literacy School in Keur Moussa, Senegal”.7 The annual report in 
1995 even had a chart which showed in what form expression of thanks were received 
for Japan’s official disaster relief activities.8 These articles display how sensitive Japan 
is to receiving appreciation from aid receiving states. The humiliation after the Gulf 
War seemed to have impacted hugely on the Japanese government.  
In addition to the above efforts, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) came to 
                                                   
4 Mitsuhiro Saotome, Ambassador for Civil Society in Japan, calls new means in aid to promote 
Japan’s presence as “visibility of Japanese aid” (MOFA, Japan’s ODA 2002: 120). The new strategy 
in aid is called “Visible Japanese Aid” in order to emphasise it as a new strategy. 
5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), Japan’s ODA 1995 (Tokyo: Association for 
Promotion of International Cooperation [APIC]), 21.  
6 MOFA, Japan’s ODA, 1996 (Tokyo: APIC, 1997), 83. 
7 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1998 (Tokyo: APIC, 1999), 100. 
8 MOFA, Japan’s ODA, 1995 (Tokyo: APIC, 1996), 86.  
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be recognised by the Japanese government as useful tools for increasing the visibility of 
Japan’s contribution to international aid effort. A number of NGOs already had 
experience in grassroots operations and had built up good reputations among the local 
populations in which they worked. The Japanese government has made active 
engagement with NGOs a part of its new aid strategy, VJA. The NGOs appear to have 
been used as a ‘name-carrier’ to highlight Japan’s international human resource 
contribution and to bolster Japan’s image as a ‘good international citizen’.  
This strategy was developed throughout the 1990s and had an unexpected influence 
on Japan’s official aid work during this period. This resulted from the government and 
NGOs having different viewpoints with regard to how foreign aid should be delivered. 
The government aimed to strengthen Japan’s presence in the international community 
through its aid policy, while the NGOs emphasised the humanitarian aspects of aid 
policy and were critical of the focus on infrastructure development rather than on the 
social and human development in the receiving states. This lack of a humanitarian 
aspect to its aid was also criticised by the international community as well as the 
‘faceless’ nature of Japan’s aid delivery.  
These two different viewpoints towards aid policy had a major impact on Japan’s 
foreign aid during the 1990s – not just on foreign aid policy itself, but also in terms of 
the role of NGOs in aid policy and their relationship with the central government. Some 
scholars such as Uemura (1995), Takayanaghi (1997, 1998, 2001), Shigetomi (2001), 
and Hirata (2002 and 2004) have examined these issues. However, the number of 
studies of Japanese NGOs is far smaller than is the case with Europe, North America 
and South America. While there have been numerous studies on NGOs in Asia, their 
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main focus has been on aid receiving states.9 What is noticeably lacking in the literature 
is an examination of how NGOs have interacted engaged in Japan’s foreign aid 
policy-making as outsiders to the traditional decision-making process. Drawing on the 
above background, this thesis set the following problem statements for further analysis. 
  
1. 2 Problem Statements and Objective of the Study 
Problem Statements 
   The following four problem statements are presented and addressed in this thesis. 
Firstly, what is the role of Japanese NGOs in delivering Japan’s aid policy, especially 
the ‘Visible Japanese Aid (VJA)’ strategy of the 1990s? Have Japanese NGOs been 
outgrowing the bounds of the government’s original expectation? Or have they been 
used merely as supplementary actors in official aid policy as the government originally 
intended? Answering these questions requires an examination of why the Japanese 
government needed NGO participation in its aid strategy in the 1990s, which, as 
described, focused more on highlighting Japan’s presence in the international arena. 
Scholars have posited a number of reasons for this but this thesis pays particular 
attention to the role of Japanese NGOs in terms of the extent to which they are acting 
merely as ‘name carriers’ for the government.   
Secondly, what are the actual modes of operation adopted by Japanese NGOs in 
their attempt to be more influential from outside the established official 
decision-making process? Are these types of interactions with governments that are 
unique to Japanese NGOs or are they closer in nature to either Northern/European or 
Southern/Asian NGOs?10 
                                                   
9 The literatures on NGOs will be examined in detail in Chapter 2.  
10 These terms will be examined in the “Definition of Terms” but Northern/European refers to 
Western aid-giving states and Southern/Asian refers to aid receiving Asian states.   
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Some existing research, such as that of Hirata (2002), has analysed the modes of 
interaction of Japanese NGOs. Most analyses were undertaken from the perspective of 
defining Japanese NGOs as a unique type of entity. However, NGOs operate and 
interact individually in each different aid category, and different responses from the 
government can reasonably be expected in each category. It can be argued that there are 
nuanced variations in interactions with each NGO in the different aid areas in which 
they operate. Clark (1997) states as “a paramount factor [in determining NGO 
behaviours] is the nature of the relationship between the NGO sector and the state. 
Government policies, practices and even attitudes can have a pivotal influence on the 
capacity of NGOs to operate and grow.”11 Based upon this assumption, this thesis 
undertakes a much deeper examination of NGO-government relationships, 
characterising the different modes of operation of four Japanese NGOs with different 
target areas. A clear difference in styles of operations by each NGO will be shown in 
this thesis. Yet, it can be stated here that some NGOs have taken active means such as 
hosting large public campaigns but some have undertaken quiet means such as private 
discussions with decision-makers in Japan. The analysis will be crucial in the research 
field since this aspect of operations of Japanese NGOs has not been studied in the past 
research.   
There is a significant lack of existing research on the influence of the environment 
in which Japanese NGOs operate. This is significant because knowing the surrounding 
environment enables the re-definition of Japanese political culture and the measurement 
of the level of non-governmental aid agency participation, supposedly represented by 
                                                   
11 John Clark, “The State, Popular Participation and the Voluntary Sector,” in NGOs, States and 
Donors: Too Close for Comfort?, ed. David Hulme and Michael Edwards (Houndmilles: Macmillan 
Press, 1997), 47. 
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NGOs, in the decision-making process.12  
The third problem statement will address the relationship between the government 
and NGOs in Japan. This relates to the second question in that it is based on the 
assumption that these NGOs will likely behave differently if their target areas in aid 
policy are different. Thus, this thesis will analyse each NGO separately and closely to 
search for nuanced variations in the respective government-NGO relationships.   
Fourthly and lastly, this thesis will analyse the future potential of Japanese NGOs, 
especially after the involvement of the Self Defence Force (SDF) in Japan’s foreign aid. 
That the SDF has been given a part in carrying out Japan’s foreign aid activities in 
conflict affected areas since 2004 represented a drastic change. The annual report of 
Japanese foreign aid in 2004 stated:  
 
Japan considers that humanitarian assistance and ODA should go hand in 
hand like “two wheels at both ends of an axle” and is thus providing Iraq 
with both types of assistance under the Law Concerning the Special 
Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq such as the 
dispatch of Self-Defence Forces to Iraq in consideration of the local security 
situation.13  
 
The inclusion of SDF into Japan’s official aid activities is still an on-going steaming 
debate issue including a possible breach of the Constitution. Therefore, analysing this 
topic solely at too deep a level would take up a whole thesis. Thus, this thesis will 
                                                   
12 “Citizen participation” here indicates NGO participation since NGOs supposedly represents the 
voices of citizens.  
13 MOFA, Japan’s ODA White Paper 2004: Accomplishments and Progress of 50 years, 2004 
(Tokyo: MOFA, 2005), 127. 
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examine the impact of SDF inclusion on the future role of NGOs.   
In closing, some policy recommendations regarding operational strategies for 
Japanese NGOs will be provided.   
 
Objectives of the Study of Government-NGO Relations 
   As it is impossible to cover the whole area relating to Japanese NGOs in this thesis, 
the following three specific objectives are set for close analysis. The objective will be 
to present more detailed and narrowed focus of the above problem statements that this 
thesis will undertake.   
 
1) How far have the government-NGO relations changed since the new foreign aid 
policy of Japan? 
   Before the VJA policy, the general recognition of NGOs by the Japanese 
government was only supplementary to government-led aid activities. In other words, 
NGOs were purely sub-contractors for the government. However, throughout the 1990s, 
the government attitude transformed and NGOs were accepted as effective actors 
worthy of cooperation. This thesis will examine the degree and impact of this change. 
2) How do NGOs exercise their influence over aid policy from outside the 
decision-making process? 
   Japanese NGOs are hardly able to exert influence directly on the established 
decision-making process, which only allows for very limited participation from external 
actors. Instead, Japanese NGOs utilise other unofficial means of exerting influence. 
Examples which allow NGOs to become influential are the application of public 
pressure, use of the media, and international support. However, it is not yet clear how 
these correlate to each other. This thesis will refer to this topic, but only to provide a 
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basic background as this topic by itself is very broad, and would require a whole thesis 
itself in order to properly examine it meaningfully.   
3) Where does the mode of operation of Japan’s NGOs fit with regard existing 
NGO theories? 
   Japanese NGOs do not appear to conform to the same model as NGOs from other 
regions such as Europe, North and South America, and Asia in terms of 
government-NGO relations. They are not as institutionalised as NGOs in the Western 
model, nor do they conform with the strict government-NGOs relational framework 
typical of the Asian model. Morris-Suzuki (1998) referred to the uniqueness of 
Japanese organisations, which is also applicable to Japanese NGOs, as follows. 
 
The argument was that, although Japan had adopted Western institutional formats, 
the inner workings of these organisations [factory, the bureaucracy and corporate 
management hierarchy] were shaped by older indigenous forms of behaviour 
inherited from the traditional family and rural village.14 
 
It is important to note again that the focus of this thesis is on the 1990s and beyond. 
This period witnessed the rise of Japanese NGOs and a fast-changing Japanese aid 
policy resulting in Visible Japanese Aid (VJA). It is also important to note that 
previously there was a strong decision-making system in Japan - the so-called “Iron 
Triangle”. This triangular decision-making process was supposedly dissolved and 
transformed during the 1990s with new participatory actors, such as powerful media 
players and new companies such as those relating to information technology. But the 
                                                   
14 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation, (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 
174. 
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“Iron Triangle” was still influential in the 1990s and this impacted on the ways in 
which Japanese NGOs could exercise influence from outside the system.    
 
1.3 Methodology – Case Study Approach 
In order to successfully analyse these three study objectives, the author has adopted 
the case study approach. Four different Japanese NGOs, which had a definite impact on 
the Japanese government in the 1990s, are examined. ?  
The majority of NGO research has been conducted via case studies. This is because 
each NGO has its own unique operational method and impact. Only case studies are 
able to reveal these characteristics and the surrounding conditions which affect the 
mode of operation of NGOs, such as social and cultural norms. A holistic and 
qualitative method of research is required, based on archives, documents and personal 
communications. 
   The following four NGOs have been chosen for analysis: the Japan International 
Volunteer Centre (JVC), Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), and two 
environmental NGOs, Greenpeace Japan and Friends of the Earth Japan (FoE Japan)15. 
These four NGOs were selected because they exerted an influence on Japan’s aid policy 
in the 1990s. It has been estimated that there were more than 300 NGOs operating in 
Japan in the 1990s and this number has been growing ever since.16 However, there 
were only a few NGOs that actually influenced the government in its aid policy making. 
As the features of the four chosen NGOs will be analysed and compared in depth in the 
case studies which follow a brief introduction to each of the four will suffice at this 
point.  
                                                   
15 For a detailed description of fieldwork, refer to “Description of Fieldwork” (Appendix 1) at the 
end of this thesis. 
16 MOFA, Japan’s ODA ,1994 (Tokyo: APIC, 1995), 227. 
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   Some may concern that three NGOs other than JVC are not purely Japanese NGOs 
but national branches of international NGOs such as International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines, Greenpeace International and Friends of the Earth International. Although 
they are indeed Japanese branches but they operate their own activities within a realm 
of Japanese political culture, which is very different from Western political culture 
where their head offices operate. In this sense, it is assumed that behaviours of these 
Japanese branches are strongly influenced by Japanese political culture in order to act 
effectively within the norm. By this mean, these three NGOs are considered as 
‘Japanese’ NGOs, which possess strong characters in modes of operations to be 
influ17ential in Japanese politics.  
   There is one prominent Japanese NGO that can be regarded as making the most 
suitable case for this thesis. The organisation is called Peace Winds Japan (PWJ) and it 
is one of most powerful and purely Japan-origin NGO specialising in emergency relief. 
The author has given a thought to this option but decided not to include the organisation 
as a case in this thesis. There are several reasons but main reasons were the difference 
in fundraising system and attitude of the organisation. PWJ possess a strong and 
sustainable financial source which comes from spouse of the director. Possessing solid 
financial foundation allows PWJ being more independent from the government and 
more to say, to allow it to be indifference to the government’s control. The Japanese 
government uses financial subsidy system as one of means to control NGOs’ 
behaviours (See Chapter 4 for more detail) and that cause ‘tag of war’ interactions 
between the government and NGOs, which this thesis aims to analyse. The other reason 
is that a director of PWJ clearly shows that he conducts the organisation in Western 
way which he learnt at British university. By this mean, PWJ deliberately has 
                                                   
17 It is an annual donation from large private corporation.  
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non-Japanese character in its operations and this does not make a common example of 
Japanese NGO community. For these reasons, the author does not include PWJ as a 
case but often refer to it in several parts to reveal comparison with other four NGOs.                 ?  
Detail of each selected four NGOs is appeared in each case study but overall review 
will be given in the following parts. Japan International Volunteer Center (JVC) is one 
of largest and strongest development NGOs in Japan and has carried out numerous 
overseas projects. It is often seen as a model for Japanese NGOs operating in the 
development field. In the early 1990s, JVC also adopted an advocacy role, bringing up 
important issues regarding Japan’s aid policy.  
Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL) focuses on the landmine issue which 
caught international attention at the Ottawa conference in 1997, which declared a total 
ban on Anti-Personnel (AP) landmines. Japan has signed the Ottawa Treaty with no 
reservations but it had to come a long way to achieve this. JCBL operated effectively 
behind the scenes to encourage ratification. As well as this success, JCBL also raised a 
numbers of the issues such as the difficulty of maintaining popularity in the topic of 
Japan’s foreign aid policy. This will also be examined in the case study.  
Greenpeace (GP) Japan and Friends of the Earth (FoE) Japan are two leading 
environmental NGOs although both have their origins outside Japan. They have exerted 
a considerable impact on Japan’s environmental policy and have brought several 
favourable changes to the field of NGOs operation. The most significant outcome of 
their activities was the introduction of new guidelines for environmental assessment for 
the Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC) which deals with Yen Loans in 
Official Development Assistance (ODA). 
Three different aid fields - development, landmines and environmental conservation 
issues - have thus been chosen for the following reasons. Firstly, each field reflects a 
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different area of interest of the Japanese government. For instance, the government saw 
environmental issues as valuable for Japan. This is because it could not maintain 
military power, but could show Japan’s contribution to environmental issues. This 
explains why the government gave much support to environmental NGOs in the 1990s. 
Hirata (2002) categorised the mode of operation of Japanese NGOs as ‘critical 
cooperation’ and ‘co-optation’18. While this is generally correct, it tends to class 
Japanese NGOs as being one type of entity and risks over-generalisation. In contrast, 
this thesis focuses on each different aid field and the mode of operations of NGOs in 
these different fields.  
Secondly, each issue comes under a different ODA category. Development comes 
under the grant scheme, the landmine issue under the special aid scheme and the 
environmental conservation issue often appears in bilateral loan projects (A detailed 
explanation of each category will be provided in Chapter 3). Each ODA category has 
different key actors and decision-making processes. Therefore, by analysing a different 
case in each field, this thesis will make it possible to identify different characteristics of 
government-NGO relations. 
In order to carry out the analysis, several months of intensive fieldwork has been 
undertaken by the author. As well as interviews and data collection, day-to-day 
personal interactions were gained through working in NGOs. This is important because 
Japanese NGOs, due to the competitiveness of their operating environment can be quite 
secretive and wary of outsiders. They also tend to be cautious because they often handle 
sensitive data such as interviews with people expressing anti-government sentiments. 
This intensive fieldwork conducted for this thesis was necessary in order to collect 
                                                   
18 Keiko Hirata, Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Role of NGOs in Tokyo’s Aid and 
Development Policy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 141. 
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primary data beyond that produced for public relations purposes.  
A further concern is that NGOs may exaggerate their effectiveness in order to gain 
public support and increased funding. There is a need to go further than simply 
analysing reports provided by NGOs. The same is also true regarding an over-reliance 
on governmental resources. For these reasons, the author carried out personal 
communications in a more informal and relaxed way to learn about the NGOs’ actual 
day-to-day modes of operation.  
Apart from the fieldwork, primary data has been collected via post, telephone, fax 
and email. An exhaustive list of these personal communications can be found in the 
Bibliography. Those sources which wished to remain anonymous have been marked. 
  
1. 4 Definition of Terms and Concepts (in alphabetical order) 
   There are numerous terms requiring definition in this thesis, especially as some of 
these are relatively new terms in this field of study.  
Aid policy: Policy concerning aid. Each agencies involved with aid activities possess 
their own aid policies and strategies. Aid policy in this thesis is defined as “foreign aid 
policy of the Japanese government to developing countries, through their governments 
for the purpose of economic development and social welfare.”19 Japan’s Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) is a part of this foreign policy. 
Development issues: The Japanese government considers ‘development issues’ to 
relate to the building of the social and economic foundations of a state. These include 
political institutions, security institutions such as police administrations, and the 
re-activation of the economy and society through the development of basic 
                                                   
19 MOFA, “Policy line: ODA Charter,” ODA Charter, 30 June 1992, 
<www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/index.html> (22 September 2002) 
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infrastructure and economic infrastructures.20 There is a difference between these two 
terms with basic infrastructure focussing on ‘hardware’ development, and economic 
infrastructure focussing on ‘software’. (See p.16 for definition of hardware/ software.)  
Foreign aid: Aid itself is defined as “help, especially money, food or other gifts given 
to people living in difficult conditions21” by Dictionary of Politics and Government, so 
Foreign aid means the help from one actor to less fortunate others. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan describes the rationale of Japan’s foreign aid as follows: “these 
countries are impoverished and are in need of assistance from richer nations, including 
Japan.”22 Therefore, foreign aid is defined as a process whereby “financial assistance 
officially flows from a donor state to a recipient state in means of providing grant, loan 
and technical assistance.” In a case of Japan, its official foreign aid is often referred to 
as Official Development Assistance (ODA).   
Hardware/Software aid: Hardware aid is often used to describe the traditional 
Japanese aid style involving the provision of physical construction and equipment and is 
often funded by a huge budget. Software aid, on the other hand, is an aid style that 
focuses more on developing human resources, building institutions and providing 
technology and expertise for the social development of the recipient country. These two 
terms are commonly used, including by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, as 
follows. Hardware development means implementing visible projects such as 
infrastructure. Software means supporting invisible projects such as improving human 
rights.  
Humanitarian Assistance: This refers to “help in the form of essential basic food and 
                                                   
20 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), “JICA’s work toward development,” JICA’s 
Activities, n.d. <www.jica.go.jp/global/peace/index.html> (27 September 2002). 
21 P.H. Collin, (2004) Dictionary of Politics and Government, 3rd ed., s.v. “foreign aid.” 8. 
22 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1990, (Tokyo: APIC, 1991), 3. 
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medicines sent to countries suffering from famine or other disasters”.23 Other forms of 
‘help’ include providing humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected areas for the 
purpose of Peace Building.  
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs): There are numerous definitions of this 
term. NGOs, such as those put forward by the World Bank, the United Nations, and 
researchers like Nerfin (1971), Clark (1991), Korten (1993), and Cleary (1997) to name 
but a few. The Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC) defines NGOs 
as “citizen-based organizations active in international cooperation” which differentiates 
between NGOs and Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs). In this research, analysis will be 
undertaken of the government-NGO relations. There is also a separate category of 
organisations known as NPO, which is often confused with the NGO category, which 
generally refers to non-profit making organisations working domestically in areas such 
as hospitals and schools. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) uses the 
following definition: “NGOs are non-profit, non-governmental organisations working in 
terms of global issues such as development, economy, human rights, humanitarian, and 
environment.”24  
North/Northern and South/Southern (states, NGOs): In this thesis, North refers to 
Western aid donor countries and South refers to aid receiving countries and regions. 
Frequently, South/ Southern also means Asia/ Asian in this thesis. Other areas such as 
Africa and Latin America are excluded even though they are considered ‘Southern’ 
because they are beyond the scope of this thesis.     
Peace Building: This is a new concept of the Japanese government in its official aid 
strategy. The Japanese government described the background for this strategy as 
                                                   
23 Dictionary of Politics and Government, 3rd ed., s.v. “humanitarian assistance” 116.  
24 MOFA, “Cooperation with NGOs,” MOFA’s Cooperation, n.d.,  
<www.mofa.go.jp/mofa/gaiko/seisaku/seisaku_4/sei_4f.html> (22 September 2002) 
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follows: “After a conflict ends, the international community needs to work together to 
provide recovery and reconstruction aid quickly…To achieve these goals, the gap 
between emergency humanitarian assistance and development assistance must be 
bridged.”25 Under this strategy, the Japanese government dispatched the Self-Defence 
Force (SDF) to Iraq in 2004. According to David Charles-Philippe, this definition 
reflects Japan’s own ideas in Peace Building: “1) the process of rehabilitation, 
reconstruction, reconciliation, 2) the creation of the security, political and/or 
socio-economic mechanisms, 3) an external intervention to assist creating condition 
conducive to building peace”.26 
Quantity and quality of Aid: The “quantity of aid” refers to the amount of aid 
distribution and “quality of aid” refers to the level of quality as defined by several 
measurements, such as the contribution to social development and the level of 
repayment obligation.     
Visible Japanese Aid (VJA): Though this term is not officially used in Japan’s annual 
report on foreign aid, this thesis defines Japan’s new aid strategy in the 1990s, as VJA. 
This new strategy has aimed to highlight Japan’s active contribution to the international 
community through aid and other means. It seeks to counter criticism for contributing 
money but not human resources.  
 
1.5 Chapter Breakdown 
   Chapter 2 will examine the existing literature on topics related to this thesis such as 
the role of NGOs and relations between NGOs and governments. The chapter seeks to 
identify where there is a lack of research, and outline the portion of the field which this 
                                                   
25 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 2001 (Tokyo: APIC 2002), 28. 
26 David Charles-Philippe, “Does Peacebuilding Build Peace?” in Approach to Peace Building, ed. 
Ho-Won Jeong (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 20-21.  
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thesis will cover.  
Chapter 3 will analyse Japan’s development assistance from a historical 
perspective. It will focus on Japan’s aid allocation and its results. The chapter will 
address any existing problems in traditional aid administration that has brought a 
change in Japan’s aid strategy.  
   Chapter 4 examines relations between NGOs and major aid administrations such as 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA). In this chapter, an analysis and comparison of official interactions and 
‘unofficial interactions’ is undertaken. ‘Official interaction’ refers to such aspects as 
official meetings with authorities and NGO representatives attending government 
meetings to express their opinions. ‘Unofficial interactions’ refers unofficial talks, 
personal relationships with authorities and utilising international/domestic networks to 
create broad pressure to move the government in the directions that the NGOs desire. 
   Three chapters of case studies, from Chapter 5 to Chapter7, will follow with 
Chapter 5 focusing on the Japanese development NGO, Chapter 6 focusing on the 
anti-landmine NGO and Chapter 7 focusing on two environmental NGOs. In each case 
the interactions with the government are evaluated to reveal which methods are more 
influential.  
   Based on analysis of the three case studies, Chapter 8 offers an overall observation 
on Japanese NGOs in terms of ‘how have they interacted with the government to make 
a change in Japan’s foreign aid policy’. In this chapter, new findings which have arisen 
regarding modes of operation of Japanese NGOs will be presented to add to those 
defined in Chapter 4.  
   Chapter 9, as a concluding chapter, answers the questions that were posed in 
Chapter 1. The author will also provide policy recommendations for the future direction 
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of Japan’s aid policy and effective means for government-NGO cooperation in the 
‘Visible Japanese Aid’ scheme.  
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Chapter 2 
Existing Research on Non-Governmental Organisations:  
Clarifying a Missing Part 
 
2.1 Introduction?  
   There is already a large number of studies on Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs), indicating the popularity of this field of study. Existing literature ranges from 
NGO practitioners’ on-the-spot reports to academic analyses of organisations. The early 
focus was on Western (Northern/European) NGOs, but recently local NGOs in 
developing countries - frequently called Southern NGOs – have also come under 
examination. As the field of study evolves, the theory that NGOs are important actors 
in development has remained unchanged. For example, several significant researchers 
contributed their articles on NGOs in Exploring Civil Society: Political and cultural 
contexts (2004) and Kalder presents her theory of NGOs’ ever-glowing importance in 
globalisation era.1 Ulrich Beck (2005) discusses role of civil societies including NGOs 
in Power in the Global Age.2 However, they all miss out on Japanese NGOs. Even 
when they refer to Asian NGOs, Japanese NGOs are excluded.   
   Major international literatures often overlook Japanese NGOs but there are several 
works on them. The trouble is that most of them are on-the-spot reports by development 
and aid practitioners. Despite the fact that Japanese NGOs are becoming more 
influential in the making of Japan’s foreign aid policy, academic examination has been 
surprisingly scarce. Many prominent studies have been produced on Japan’s foreign aid 
                                                   
1 Kalder, Mary (2004) “Globalization and civil society,” Marlies Glasius, David Lewis and Hakan 
Seckinelgin (ed.) Exploring Civil Society: Political and cultural contexts, London: Routledge, 
pp.191-198. 
2 See Ulrich, Beck, translated by Kathleen Cross (2005) Power in the Global Age, London: Polity. 
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strategy itself, but only a few of them refer to NGOs3 despite extensive research by 
Takayanaghi (1996, 1997) and Hirata (2002). 
Three reasons for the lack of research on Japanese NGOs are considered in this 
chapter. Firstly, the history of Japanese NGOs is not as long as that of others, 
particularly in Western states. Therefore, there are fewer resources to examine. 
Secondly, Japanese NGOs only began to gain the attention of the domestic media in the 
early 1990s as a result of their relief activities, such as the 1995 Great Hanshin 
Earthquake and an oil leak incident from Russian ship in 1997. Prior to this, although 
Japanese NGOs had been operating their own aid activities, they were seldom in the 
public eye. The third and final reason is that the study of NGOs has not been recognised 
as a valid academic topic in Japan until very recently. The Japanese academic circles 
had not taken much notice of them because they regarded them as ‘amateur’ in aid 
activities unlike governmental agencies, which were considered as ‘official staff’. 
Japan has had a reputation as having a government that provided good welfare 
services so there was not much necessity for NGOs to grow. However, the protracted 
economic recession beginning in the 1990s disrupted the welfare system. Non-state 
actors, including NGOs, emerged to ’take up the slack’ where government welfare was 
lacking. A budget cut in Official Development Assistance (ODA), Japan’s official 
foreign aid, was also included in this recession period, which created a space for NGOs 
to act as if subcontractors to the government in foreign aid policy.4 It was at this time 
that the Japanese academic circle began to recognise NGOs as crucial actors in 
Japanese politics; before this they were merely ‘amateurs’. There are several studies 
                                                   
3 Examples are, Sumi (1989), Mainichi Simbun (1990), Igarashi (1990), Kubota (ed.) (1992)Kusano 
(1993), Kohama (1993), Nishigaki and Shimomura (1993), Shiratori (1994), Shimomura, Nakagawa, 
and Saito (1999), Watanabe and Miura (2003). 
4 ODA’s budget increased until the early 2000s but it began decreasing as the Japanese economy 
struggled to recover. 
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which recognised NGOs as important such as Rix (1993) and Takamine (1999) but 
most of them also defined them as ineffective in Japan’s political environment despite 
their importance in Japan’s foreign aid practice.5    
Good information about and analysis of Japanese NGOs are lacking in the existing 
field of NGO study. This chapter will ascertain what knowledge is missing by 
reviewing the existing material on NGOs. This will provide the framework for the 
practical analysis of Japanese NGOs in this thesis. The literature review will address 
the roles of NGOs, Western NGOs, Southern/Asian NGOs6, the Government-NGO 
relationship in both the West and Asia, and Japanese NGOs.  
      
2.2 Review of Existing Research 
Roles of NGOs      
   The emergence of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) has significantly 
weakened the dominance of states in the provision of foreign aid over the last few 
decades. This trend owes much to the advancement of information technology such as 
fax and email, which became available in the 1990s. On the emergence of NGOs 
Mathews (1997) has commented as follows: 
 
The most powerful engine of change in the relative decline of states and the rise of 
nonstate actors is the computer and telecommunications revolution…Widely 
accessible and affordable technology has broken governments’ monopoly on the 
                                                   
5 Examples are Alan Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, (London: Routledge, 1993), 70, and 
Dennis T. Yasutomo, The New Multilateralism in Japan’s Foreign Policy, (London: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1995), 39. 
6 Local NGOs in developing states are often called “Southern” in comparison to “Northern NGOs” 
in developed countries. This thesis set its focus on Japanese NGOs so “Southern” NGOs in the Asian 
region are often used for comparison. Therefore, these NGOs are called “Southern/Asian NGOs” in 
this thesis. 
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collection and management of larger amounts of information and deprived 
governments of the defence they enjoyed because of it.7  
 
This decreasing influence of state governments is also evident in international 
development and foreign aid studies. Despite continued efforts, states have been unable 
to resolve the perplexing problems of international development. A view was emerging 
that huge-budget governmental aid hardly helped those in need. When NGOs emerged 
as a major force in development they seemed to provide an alternative and ultimate 
answer for tackling development issues that governments around the world had failed 
to solve.  
Some Western governments and international agencies such as the United Nations 
are now recognising NGOs as important and effective in grassroots development aid 
activities. Western governments view them as efficient actors and have started inviting 
them to conferences and involving them in policy decision making. The importance and 
impact of NGOs in international development fields have also caught academic 
attention. Several prominent studies have been produced. Examples include Korten 
(1991), Clark (1991), Fisher (1993), Edwards and Hulme (1993, 1997) Smillie and 
Helmich (1993), Smillie (1998) and Van Rooy (1998, 2001), whose works analyse the 
role of NGOs in development.  
Scholars focused on Western NGOs because the vast majority of international aid 
was provided by Western nations and their NGOs as aid implementers. Foreign aid was 
used as a strategic tool for both Western and Eastern bloc states to maintain the status 
quo during the Cold War. The Western states provided much aid to these developing 
states in an effort to stop them from falling under the influence of the Eastern bloc. 
                                                   
7 Jessica T. Mathews, “Power Shift”, Foreign Affairs 76, no.1 Jan/Feb (1997): 51.  
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Thus most of aid issues existed between East and West during this period.  
 However, with the end of the Cold War system and the rise of the North-South issue 
between developed and developing countries, the nature of NGO activities has changed. 
Probably the most significant change was the rapid growth of local NGOs in aid 
receiving countries. Their role has changed from being purely beneficiaries of aid 
activities by Western states and NGOs to acting as independent development 
implementers. This change in practice has also affected the nature of NGO study. 
   Recent NGO studies have analysed this change in depth.8 The change also brings 
new challenges that both Northern/Western NGOs and Southern/Asian NGOs are 
facing. The former are struggling for their raison d’être while the latter face their 
community gradually being divided into two different social groups, elites and 
non-elites, due to NGO activities. Local NGOs’ activities in developing countries are 
considered likely to benefit only elites who run them.9 Based on this new change in the 
study of the role of NGOs, the following section will review the literature on the 
functions of both Northern/Western and Southern/Asian NGOs.  
 
Role of Northern/Western NGOs 
   Beginning in the 1980s when NGOs first started gaining academic attention 
internationally, a number of practitioner-based studies were produced on Western 
NGOs. Examples include those by Korten (1990), Clark (1991), Smillie and Helmich 
(1993) and Fisher (1993). Korten gave a general perspective on NGOs in his work and 
debated the roots of the crisis that human beings were facing at that time. Unlike 
                                                   
8 A few researches have been undertaken on this topic. For instance, Barghouthi (1997) examined 
issues that Southern NGOs have encountered and Smilie (1995) studied problems of Northern 
NGOs.  
9 It is common for working for international (Western) NGOs to be popular among these local elites 
because they would enjoy far better working and living conditions than most people.  
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existing state-centred common views which often defined states as the major actor in 
development work, he stated that the leadership for the work must come through 
voluntary action, which often meant NGOs.10  
   The history of Western NGOs has been covered by many studies, such as Smillie’s, 
which focused on NGOs as providers of emergency relief with the support of Christian 
missionaries. After the two World Wars, and the extensive suffering of civilian 
populations, NGOs began dealing with some of the causes and consequences of war in 
affected regions by using development as a new approach and answer for aid providers. 
This concept of aid has not changed to this day, as the causes of wars and disputes in 
the post-Cold War era are often rooted in developmental issues such as poverty and 
insufficient resource delivery.   
   After the Second World War, most governments were inclined to ignore, or were 
simply ill equipped, to help the people affected by the war, because of the time and 
resources required. Instead, NGOs became an alternative which responded to 
improving development. The strengths of NGOs in development work have often been 
discussed and they are summarised as follows; pursuing local level or grassroots 
development, carrying out small-scale projects, adopting an integrated approach and 
creating a participatory relationship between aid implementers and local populations. 
These four elements are in direct contrast to the top-down, large-scale governmental aid 
style, which is most commonly known as Overseas Development Assistance or Official 
Development Assistance (ODA). Western NGOs, in particular, possess another 
advantage in their easy access to their central governments. For example, Edwards 
(2002) states that the “…real strength of Northern NGOs lies in their simultaneous 
                                                   
10 David Korten, Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda, 
(Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1990), Chapter 11 and 12.  
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access to grassroots experience in the South, and to decision-makers in the North.”11  
   Of course, NGOs have also been criticised for their local-level, small-scale style of 
aid provision. Sheldon (1988) develops controversial arguments regarding the four 
aspects of NGOs’ activities: First, “small-scale” can merely mean “insignificant”. 
Second, “politically independent” can mean “powerless” or “disconnected”. Third, 
“low-cost” can mean “underfinanced” or “poor quality”, and finally, it is said that 
“innovative” can mean “temporary” or “unsustainable”.12 Edwards (2002) points out 
four problems that NGOs were facing: 1) an overall absence of clear strategy, 2) a 
failure to build strong alliances, 3) a failure to develop credible alternatives to current 
orthodoxies and 4) the dilemma of relations with donor agencies.13  
These are valid criticisms but even so, aid activities by NGOs have gained a strong 
reputation over decades. They are seen as effective and capable of reaching people in 
need. Up to the present, this recognition has remained as main stream in international 
development study.  
   Existing researches such as Korten, identified NGOs as becoming more involved in 
decision-making processes from the early 1990s. As mentioned earlier, some 
governments and international organisations began acknowledging NGOs as 
development actors by inviting them to international decision-making fora, sometimes 
as observers and sometimes as official delegations. The Earth Summit held in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992, which was an international conference to discuss the environment and 
                                                   
11 Michael Edwards “Does the doormat influence the boots?: Critical thought on UK NGOs and 
international advocacy” in Development and Advocacy, ed. Deborah Eade (London: Oxfam Great 
Britain, 2002), 98. 
12 Annis Sheldon “Can Small-Scale Development Be Large-Scale Policy?” in Direct to the Poor: 
Grassroots Development in Latin America, ed. Annis, Sheldon and Peter Hakim (Boulder: Lynne 
Rinner Publisher, 1988), 209.  
13 Michael Edwards, “Does the doormat influence the boot?: Critical thought on UK NGOs and 
international advocacy,” in Development and Advocacy, ed. Deborah Eade (London: Oxfam Great 
Britain, 2002), 101 - 102.  
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development, is a good example of this. In these fora, NGOs have exercised their 
influence over policy-making through lobbying, reporting on the issues and mobilising 
public support.14 Feres (2000) describes these activities of NGOs in the European 
Union as follows: 
 
The IGC (Intergovernmental Conference) working group met at least a dozen times, 
and together with the LC (Liaison Committee of Development NGOs) staff 
produced various documents, lobbying letters, and position papers and in addition 
to a policy pamphlet, “Action Plan for World Leaders”, meetings were held with a 
large number of commission officials, members and officials of the European 
Parliament.15 
 
Through these activities, Western NGOs have become ’representatives’ of those who 
are in need of aid. As such, NGOs are categorised as citizens in the classic 
classification used by Nerfin (1986), Korten (1991) and others. It has been said that, 
“the prince represents governmental power and the maintenance of public order; the 
merchant symbolises economic power and the production of goods and services; and 
the citizen stands for people’s power.”16 Being classified as a “citizen”, NGOs often 
take the opposite position from that taken by government and big-business. Korten 
(1991) gives a more detailed description of NGOs. He identifies them as the integration 
of the peoples’ power to compete and cooperate with state power and the business 
                                                   
14 Refer to Elizabeth T. Boris and C. Eugene Steuerle, Nonprofits and Government: Collaboration 
and conflict, (Washington D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1999) for detailed advocacy activities.  
15 Christian L. Feres “Striving for Influence in a Complex Environment: NGO Advocacy in the 
European Union,” in New Roles and Relevance: Development NGOs and the Challenge of Change, 
ed. David Lewis and Tina Wallace (Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 2000), 135 - 136.   
16 Marc Nerfin, Quoted in Thomas G Weiss. NGOs, The UN & Global Governance, (Boulder: 
Lynne Rinner Publishers, 1996), 19.   
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sector in order to represent the people’s interests. 17  In this context, NGOs are 
recognised as representatives of an unheard voice, allowing it to be heard. But do they 
really represent this unheard voice?  
   The rise of the North-South issue throws into question existing NGO studies that 
posited Western NGOs as being representatives of the poor. The question arises as to 
whether that which Western NGOs do for people in developing countries is always 
what these local people really want. Oxfam Great Britain, an international NGO, has 
produced several works on this issue. A number of scholars and practitioners have also 
contributed differing perspectives on the literature. Tegean (1997) for example, argues 
that development has been perceived as equal to modernisation and to industrialisation 
“in a nut shell”18 and that “political issues such as democracy, human rights, and 
women’s rights are luxuries that only the ‘developed’ and ‘civilised’ North can 
afford.”19 Barghonthi (1997) states that the “participatory approach” and “training”, 
which Western NGOs prefer were creating more contradictions than solutions in 
developing countries. “If huge numbers of people in the South are trained, but the 
facilities or money necessary to employ them are not available, eventually they will 
either leave for the North or be unemployed”.20  
   In light of this North-South issue, which questions whether activities provided by 
Western NGOs are fully appreciated by the aid beneficiaries, Japanese NGOs are in an 
interesting position as they fall between the North/West and South/Asia divide. 
Warrener (2002) argues the effectiveness of Japanese NGOs’ activities compared to 
                                                   
17 Korten, Chapter 9 
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20 Mustafa Barghouthi “North-South relations and the question of aid,” in Development and 
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Northern/Western NGOs in terms of North-South and East-West relations.  
 
Japan has been a significant ‘other’ for the West for a long time…it is believed that 
despite their [Japanese NGOs] small numbers, there may be something unique in 
their approach to development…that their position as an ‘other’ may enable them to 
offer insights into the work of WNGOs [Western NGOs]that WNGOs may be 
reluctant to admit.21 
 
In Warrener’s work, three advantages of Japanese NGOs over Western NGOs were 
suggested. First, because of their pacifist nature, Japanese NGOs could build good 
relationships in areas where Japan did not fight. Second, Japan’s non-Western nature 
made Japanese NGOs’ nature more palatable. Third, cultural similarities to aid 
receiving countries were also seen as advantageous. These were advantages often 
overlooked in the literature. 
Japan also shows interesting characteristics in terms of protecting human rights, one 
of the most important issues in development at present. Japan stands out among 
Northern/Western states in this particular area. Although it is a member of the 
Northern/Western bloc of nations, Japan took an Asian approach to the human rights 
debate of the early 1990s. Some Asian governments were opposed to the Western 
concept of ‘global human rights’ because they were not guaranteeing them to their own 
people. In order to oppose the concept, some Asian states’ leaders have come up with 
the idea that the Asian human right is the right to live. Japan sided with this Asian 
                                                   
21 Deborah J. Warrener, “Is there a unique contribution of Japanese NGOs to development?”, 
Master’s diss., School of Oriental and Asian Studies (SOAS), 2002,  
<www.japan-uk-ngolink.org/PDFagain/archive/FINALDDccj.pdf> (15 October 2004).  
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concept by showing passive sign of supporting ‘global’ human rights.22 This is partly 
why Japan can be seen as a ‘favourable’ aid donor state, since its aid has not been 
conditional on the protection of global human rights or promotion of ‘good governance’. 
Japan is more concerned with technically dominated project operations.23   
 
 
 
Southern/ Asian NGOs 
   The study of NGOs formerly focused mainly on Western NGOs because of their 
strong presence in developing countries, which were aid beneficiaries. Smillie (1995) 
comments as follows on the relationship between aid provider and aid receiver NGOs: 
“Until about 1980, the most prominent non-governmental organisations operating in 
Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America, were foreign, rather than local”24. 
However, with the growing desire of aid receiving Southern/Asian NGOs, to represent 
their own people, quite a few studies have been produced focusing on Southern (Asian) 
NGOs as sub-contractors to Northern/Western NGOs. Southern/Asian NGOs started 
purely as aid receivers or sub-contractors but after a decade they are increasingly 
becoming important partners to Northern/Western NGOs and independent development 
actors in their own right. 
   There are also studies focusing on Southern (Asian) NGOs25 such as Eldridge 
(1989), Carroll (1992), Holmen and Jistrom (1994), Heston (1997), Heyzer and Riker 
                                                   
22 Refer to Fumitaka Furuoka, “Challenges for Japanese Diplomacy After the End of the Cold War,” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, no.1, (April 2002): 72 - 77. 
23 Liz Makintyer, interview by the author, 3 December 2002.  
24 Ian Smillie, Alms Bazaar: Altruism Under Fire: Non-Profit organisations and International 
Development (London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1995), 60 
25 ‘Southern’ here means NGOs in aid receiving countries and so that involves Asian NGOs as well.  
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(1997) and Smillie (1998). Overall, these studies discuss the relative advantages 
Southern/Asian NGOs have over their Northern counterparts such as their closeness to 
local people and their needs, and understanding their own cultural background which 
help them to see the roots of problems. Smillie (1995), however, states that the clarity 
of Southern NGOs was not so different from that of Northern NGOs.26 One point of 
difference of interest here is that Southern/Asian NGOs are said to have taken a 
‘self-help’ approach. The approach is to train people in need to help themselves and 
ultimately encourage them to solve their problems by themselves. This is different from 
Northern/Western NGOs which tend to become purely ‘providers’ of aid. 
Wicramaratch (1987), drawing on his case study in Sri Lanka, concludes local NGOs 
should encourage ‘self-help’ among local populations which will eventually free them 
from donor countries.27 This reflects the old saying of Maimonides; “Give a man a fish 
and you feed him for a day; teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime.” It is 
interesting to note that Japan has long taken a ‘self-help’ approach toward aid recipients. 
Japan has acted in this way based on its own experience moving from aid recipient to 
major aid donor. However, meanings contained in the term ‘self-help’ are different 
when the term is used by the Japanese government from when it is used by local NGOs 
in developing countries (this will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.) Another 
advantage of Southern/Asian NGOs lies in their closeness to local people and their 
ability to reflect direct local will in development strategy.  
   Counter to these advantages of Southern/Asian NGOs operating in developing 
countries, there is the negative impact of their work. Because working for 
                                                   
26 Smillie, 61. Smillie argues that both North and South have altruism, conscience, fear, service, 
self-interest and organising imperative in other NGOs.  
27 S.P. Wikramarachi, “Overthrowing the Money-Lenders,” in Doing Development: Government, 
NGOs and the Rural Poor in Asia, ed. Richard Holloway (London: Earthscan Publication, 1987), 
82-95.  
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Northern/Western NGOs is considered to be prestigious, local elites in developing 
countries often seek to work with them. As they enjoy better working and living 
conditions because of their NGO work, a divide between these people and others has 
been created in these societies.  
In addition, as aid donors now expect fast and tangible outcomes there is more 
pressure on Southern (Asian) NGOs to produce immediate results. This is true of both 
Northern/Western and Southern/Asian NGOs. However, Southern/Asian NGOs have a 
greater role in aid implementation than Northern/Western NGOs so it has affected them  
most. This pressure from donors is described as follows: ?  
 
…many donors have begun to move away from output targets, placing greater 
emphasis on ‘result’…The heightening donor desire for concrete measurables 
may also serve to diminish some of the fundamental NGO hallmarks: 
innovation, experimentation, risk-taking. And it could move NGOs away from 
poorer people and communities where success is more difficult, more 
expensive and more time-consuming.28  
 
In order to gain the immediate results demanded of their operations, NGOs are pouring 
much more energy into short-term emergency relief than long-term grassroots 
development activities.29 Emergency relief is more visible and attention-grabbing in 
the international media.  
 
                                                   
28 Ian Smillie and John Hailey, Managing for Change: Leadership, Strategy and Management in 
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NGOs were criticized for not thinking and working strategically – for not 
seeing their activities in relation to local development processes and 
ongoing conflicts. NGOs’ own evaluations were described as too narrowly 
linked to immediate results and not sufficiently related to improvements in 
society and lasting progress for target groups.30 
 
Again, the unheard voice of the poor who suffer prolonged poverty problems risks 
remaining unheard, owing to the ignorance of aid providers of their plight. 
Challenges for Northern and Southern NGOs 
   The previous sections have outlined the roles of Northern/Western and 
Southern/Asian NGOs up until now. Their advantages and drawbacks have been 
discussed as well. In this section, the recent and present challenges facing NGOs will 
be reviewed.  
   In addition to the aforementioned donor pressure issue, there are several persistent 
problems affecting NGOs. Examples include financial difficulties, organisational 
bureaucratisation, and leadership turnover. Among these issues, two major challenges 
can be marked. One is that governments are taking over previously distinct NGO roles 
by using same technical terms and concepts in their official aid strategies. The other is 
the changing natures of individual NGOs and their own raison d’être.   
In the 1990s, no longer needing to sustain the Cold War strategy, donor 
governments started adopting NGOs’ terms to characterise their aid strategies such as 
‘empowerment’, ‘bottom-up’, ‘participatory approach’ and ‘public participation’. This 
strategy was undertaken in order to make themselves appear to be ‘good international 
                                                   
30 John Degnbol-Martinussen and Poul Engberg-Pedersen, Aid: Understanding International 
Development Cooperation, (London: Zen Books, 2004), 160.  
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citizens’.  
It is questionable whether these terms used by governments mean the same as when 
used by NGOs. However, it is true that the ‘alternative development paradigm’ 
provided by NGOs, is not having as big an effect as before because governments seem 
to be taking over the role of NGOs. Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pederse (2004) 
have even argued that there is not much difference between NGOs and official aid 
agencies such as the United Nations. 31  It remains unclear however, as to who 
dominates the official aid agencies so it is too simple just to agree with this claim. 
However, aside from the change of the global context around NGOs, clear arguments 
among scholars and practitioners have arisen contending that both Northern/Western 
and Southern/Asian NGOs are no longer needed or supported as much as they have 
been previously. 
NGO effectiveness has also been questioned. Streeten (1997) argues that NGOs are 
not as effective as they have claimed, that their advantages of a local-centred approach 
and aid autonomy may not be as firmly established as previously assumed.32 Clark 
(1997) casts doubt on NGOs’ own claims of effectiveness stating that, “NGOs may also 
not live up to the claims made in their literatures.”33 By doing so, NGOs can make 
themselves look good in competition for obtaining funding and gaining a good 
reputation.    
Van Rooy (2001) reflects on past Northern NGO activities and concluded that 
Northern NGOs have already fulfilled their roles in international development and it is 
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time for them to leave activities to local NGOs. It is a common argument that official 
aid donors such as states and international organisations have found local Southern 
NGOs better able to maintain close links with local people and more likely to reach 
specific beneficiaries.34 Chapman and Fisher (2002) say that, “though Northern NGOs 
have often provided critical support, they have not been able to engage in mobilising 
movements and promoting civil society at the grassroots.”35 In other word, Northern 
NGOs need their Southern counter-parts to carry out their activities effectively. On the 
other hand, there is a counter-argument that poor people cannot be reached anyway 
even by local NGOs. Streeten (1997) presents his view thus: 
 
Frequently they do not reach the poor, and hardly ever the poorest. Group members 
are not keen to include them. Sometimes they reinforce the rules of power 
elites…they sometimes serve particular interests. It is often hard to identify the poor. 
The credit programs of NGOs tend to entail high administrative costs; they charge 
near market interest rates and insist on repayment.36 
 
Northern NGOs are often thought of as implementers of their own societies’ values and 
policies. This is why some aid receiving countries are cautious about foreign NGOs’ 
activities in their countries.37 There is also a criticism that they are “interested in 
increasing the wealth of their own client group” by exploiting local people and thus 
                                                   
34 These claims were made at earlier stage in NGO study by such as Korten (1990), Clark (1990), 
JVC (1993) to name a few.   
35 Jennifer Chapman and Thomas Fisher, “The effectiveness of NGO campaigning: lessons from 
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37 See Seamus Cleary (1997) for a case of Indonesia. 
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incurring the suspicion of aid receivers.38 Based on these perceptions, Southern/Asian 
NGOs are valued because they are ‘operated by locals, with local means and for local 
people’.     
However, Southern/Asian NGOs’ advantage has also been questioned. As has 
already been stated, there is doubt whether local NGOs are really reaching the poor and 
the poorest. Carolle (1992) argues the existence of two types of Southern NGOs and 
identifies the paradox of each. One type of NGO is run by local elites but not by the 
poor people who need assistance. Cleary (1997) points out that the reason members of 
most Southern NGOs are run by local elites is the demand for English skills.39 Those 
who possess good English skills are usually from the elites of the local society. A 
difference between the goals of their activities and target beneficiaries recently emerged 
as one of the paradoxes. Manji (1997) states: “it is not surprising that NGOs are prone 
to being driven by the donor’s agenda, when the donor holds the money.”40 This is not 
only the case with Southern NGOs; as Baraghouthi (1997) says, “Northern NGOs are 
increasingly dependent on their governments for funds, and this in turn has resulted in a 
clear changing in the politics of these organisations.”41 Too much dependency on 
government funding by NGOs is a classic argument for their organisational weakness. 
On this point, Hulme and Edwards (1997) concludes: “not surprisingly, as NGOs get 
closer to donors they become more like donors.”42 
There is an issue regarding the creation of networks among development NGOs. 
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NGOs have created strong relationships with central authorities, but seem to have failed 
to build strong networks amongst themselves.43 Competition and rivalry between 
NGOs for obtaining funding, supporters and legitimacy are obstacles to the creation of 
good networks. The next section will focus on the fourth issue, NGOs’ relations with 
state governments and major donor agencies.  
 
Government-NGO Relations 
   With the rise in the importance of NGOs in development and foreign aid work, it 
may seem that NGOs have come to dominate international development and foreign aid 
where governments used to be the only major actors. However, as the role of NGOs has 
increased, governments have retained their strong position as aid financiers and 
controllers regulating NGOs. This section will study NGOs’ relationships with their 
governments in preparation for the analysis of the case of Japan later in this thesis.  
The growth of NGOs in development work has perhaps been beyond governments’ 
expectations. Regarding this point, Clark (1990) notes that official aid agencies were 
hoping that “the NGO becomes just one of the many sub-contractors engaged in the 
projects.” 44  But even though NGOs have become unexpectedly powerful, the 
importance of states’ power remains an important in NGO studies, particularly with 
regard to authority over NGOs and their resources. Grugel (2004) comments that “the 
end of state-centrism has been exaggerated, the state, especially the Western state, 
retains considerable powers and resources. This means that transnational activists must 
take into account the question of state power when designing strategies and responding 
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to opportunities.”45  
   Conversely, an opposite viewpoint based on several case studies holds that the 
government is not so important for NGO activity. Taylor (1996) argues that the impact 
of the government is not the only influential factor to define NGO activities: 
 
The government clearly has a significant influence, whether directly as a major 
funder or indirectly by shaping the environment within which voluntary agencies 
work. But is the government so dominant an influence that it will outweigh all other 
external influences as well as the motivations and values that drive these agencies 
from within?46     
    
Despite this line of argument, governments are crucial for NGOs. Firstly, they are the 
authority which creates the laws and regulations that NGOs are obliged to obey in their 
operations. Secondly, quite often, they are the ones that provide resources for NGO 
operations, and one does not bite the hand that feeds.  
 
Government-NGOs Relations in Northern/Western Countries 
Acknowledging the importance of Government-NGO relations, Clark (1990) 
mentions existing tensions in them and concludes as follows: “Tensions between 
governments and NGOs are not unique to the South, they also arise in the North.”47 He 
also argued that the strategy of NGOs is as follows: 
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Opposing the state would mean using whatever channels are available to frustrate any 
government plan which is negative for the poor. This may mean organising protests, 
using the courts to challenge official decisions, joining forces with the political 
opposition or other popular movements such as trade unions to undermine the 
government’s policies or widespread use of the media and unofficial communication 
channels.48 
 
There is a wide range of NGO tactics in dealing with governments on development, 
determined by the political conditions in each country. As Riker (1995) states, 
“grassroots organisations operate within the parameters set by the states”.49  
Traditionally, relations between Northern/Western NGOs and their state 
governments have been sound.50 One good example is the environmental arena in the 
1990s. Their relations are good because there are several mutual benefits of this sound 
relationship. Examples of the benefits include mutual learning, information sharing and 
securing legitimacy for NGOs and providing accountability for the governments.     
Generally speaking, there are three reasons that Northern/Western governments 
seek cooperation with their NGOs. Firstly, NGOs can reach grassroots populations 
more effectively than governments can through their official delegations, which are 
often taken to sites that are already well-prepared. Secondly, their activities are 
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supposedly cost effective because their works are ‘voluntary’ and not so focused on 
profit-making. Thirdly, they are organisationally flexible so they can adjust their 
operations to suit each situation and thus save time and resources.  
Earlier in this chapter, it was shown that these claims have been treated with 
scepticism in a portion of the literature, for instance by authors such as Sheldon (1988) 
and Streeten (1997). But it is important that governments and international donors 
‘believe’ in these three reasons in order that they may continue to cooperate.  
   According to Takayanaghi (1997), Northern governments’ willingness to cooperate 
with NGOs first arose in the early 1980s. That is when they adopted so-called ‘new 
policy agenda’, which considered the social development aspects of their international 
aid such as “democratisation”, “good governance”, and “participation”.51 He states that 
the ideal style of Government-NGO relations should be a “creative tension” in which 
NGOs were accepted “positively”. A healthy competition between government and 
NGOs is expected in this environment. Takayanagi studies Canadian NGOs as a case 
on this issue and has come to the conclusion that NGOs are being weakened, although 
the share of funding provided by governments and international donors grows. At the 
same time, governments were seeking cooperation with NGOs owing to their unique 
mode of operations for implementing better governmental aid strategy.52  
   The danger of receiving too large a share of funding from official agencies has been 
widely discussed as a concern for NGOs. Apart from the challenge of organisational 
survival which was indicated earlier, some researchers insist Northern/Western NGOs 
are now too dependent on governmental funding within the scheme of partnership, 
                                                   
51 Akio Takayanaghi “Kaihatsu Enjyo no Atarashii Seisaku Agenda to NGO (A new policy agenda 
in development assistance and NGOs)”, Heiwa Kenkyu (Peace Studies) 22 (1997): 64.    
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which can harm NGOs’ independence. Iriye (2002) analyses this problem using the 
case of the United States where the government has become a main funding source for 
NGOs but there were two problems which arose. The first was the restrictive nature of 
government and the second was monitoring by government:   
 
1) Numerous bureaucratic rules and restrictions governed the contractual relationship 
between voluntary associations and the government. 
2) Governments were interested in monitoring the activities of nongovernmental 
organisations and in ensuring their accountability…officials in Washington D.C. often 
sought to co-opt these organisations to promote an officially defined foreign policy 
agenda.53  
 
To avoid the government control engendered by official financial assistance, some 
NGOs put much energy into fundraising. If they are independent of governmental 
funding, much greater freedom in operations can be guaranteed. But there is the issue 
of NGOs becoming more like private businesses than voluntary agencies if they 
concentrate too much on fundraising. To avoid this issue, some Northern/Western 
NGOs, for example, in Great Britain, use a system of a ‘matching fund’. This is a 
system whereby the government funds double the amount of NGOs’ self-raised funds. 
Utilising this system, NGOs can avoid being fully controlled by the government, but 
can also gain a certain financial stability at the same time.  
 
Government-NGOs Relations in Southern/Asian Countries 
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   While Northern/Western NGOs tend to enjoy close relations with their state 
governments, Southern/Asian NGOs often struggle with their central governments. 
Generally speaking, Government-NGO relations in Southern/Asian states are much 
more tense. This section will focus on the relations in the Asian region as background 
for the analysis on Japan. 
According to the terminology of Riker (1995), governments in Asia show four faces 
to NGOs. They are cooptation, cooperation, collaboration and coercion. NGOs need to 
deal with each face.54 As NGOs grow to play more political roles, governments place 
strict control over their activities. For example in Pakistan, the severity of the 
government was described as follows: 
 
Giving the federal government the authority to amend an NGO’s charter, [the 
government] dismiss its board, freeze its funds and transfer its assets. Most damaging 
was a proposal that would have prevented NGOs from receiving foreign funds that 
were not channelled directly through the government.55 
 
This hostile atmosphere of the Southern/Asian government towards NGOs is also 
observed in other research such as that of Fonseka (1995). He states that, “Asian 
governments’ attitudes toward NGOs have been no more than a mix of wary laissez 
faire and repressive tolerance.”56 Oishi (1995) discusses the Malaysian government’s 
strict control over NGOs and their response using the method of ‘Domestic 
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Development Related (DDR) conflicts’ scheme.57 He concludes that Malaysian NGOs 
use several methods in this severe environment such as making friends with newspaper 
journalists to deal with the central government in order to maintain friendly 
relationships.  
Generally, Asian governments have clear guidelines for their relations with NGOs. 
Shigetomi (2002) analyses 15 governments in terms of their relations with NGOs. He 
has come to the conclusion that, “since the state by its very nature…regards its own 
rules as universal and legitimate, it is likely that it will impose restraints on those NGOs 
which are deemed to be operating outside of these rules.”58 Bhatt (1995) also notes,  
 
…wherever governments have been supportive of voluntary action, they have always 
wanted NGOs to act only as implementers of specific development activities. Asian 
governments have not given any support or encouragement to NGOs to play political 
roles which try to redefine development paradigms, change government policies or 
restructure government delivery system.59 
 
   Cleary (1997) examines several local NGOs to assess the status of 
Government-NGO relations in Indonesia, South Africa, Sri Lanka and the Philippines, 
where he considered authoritarian political systems existed. His research found the 
Indonesian government had controlled their local NGOs so strictly that occasionally 
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they faced the threat of being banned for ‘selling out the country’.60 One former NGO 
worker revealed that a colleague known for her dissenting attitude toward the 
government was murdered, but the case was never investigated. Her colleagues have 
softened their stance toward the government following the incident for fear of also 
being killed if they maintain their attitude of opposition to the government.61  
   Having displayed the negative aspects of Government-NGO relations in Asia, it is 
necessary to now also examine the counter arguments. Broadly speaking, although 
NGOs find it difficult to deal with governments politically, they can still build friendly 
relationships at the individual level. A comment was made on this point by the 
president of one Southern/Asian NGO: “government is only a bureaucratic frame. You 
can abuse the iron frame, but don’t abuse the people who are working in it…Make sure 
you understand that it is the systems that are bad, not the people.62” This way of 
thinking was adopted by some Japanese NGOs which have made significant progress in 
Japan’s new aid policy which will be analysed in later chapters.  
   The term ‘partnership’ often comes up when describing supposedly friendly 
Government-NGO relations. Yet, as Fowler (2000) warns, “distorted language of 
partnership is a current example of how rhetoric masks major disparities in power and 
the maintenance of dependency”63. Donors could change the meaning of terms 
intentionally to suit their own purposes and interests. ‘Partnership’ has frequently been 
employed in order to make use of NGOs as cost-effective contractors to governments. 
Furthermore, Northern/Western NGOs sometimes employ the term to utilise 
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Southern/Asian NGOs as local contractors.  
Ironically, this strategy could in fact work in favour of these “contractors”. Some 
Asian NGOs make use of this system to strengthen their positions vis-á-vis the 
governments. Hudock (2002) discusses how Northern/Western NGOs’ reductions in 
operating budgets and personnel numbers have enabled Southern/Asian NGOs to build 
their own capacity for self-help and self-sufficiency. This has resulted in gains in 
strength and organisational maturing.64  
‘Participatory development’ has also become a ‘trendy’ approach in the 
development study field in terms of Government-NGO relations in Southern/Asian 
states. Under this framework, the government actively involves people on the spot for 
official aid activities in order to ‘hear their voice directly’. One advantage of NGOs 
over government is their closeness to local people at the grassroots level, making this 
method their forte: “NGOs have proved more successful than government agencies in 
utilizing participatory methods and have made a significant impact, albeit largely on a 
local scale.”65 Therefore, this method creates opportunities for NGOs and government 
to cooperate in a positive way by engaging each other at the grassroots level.  
There is a danger regarding these approaches that bind NGOs and governments in 
that aid providers can define what people ‘really need’, using the ’participatory method’ 
as a smokescreen to implement what providers really want to achieve via that aid work. 
In this case, NGOs risk being used as part of the smokescreen as well to prove the 
‘transparency’ of the governments’ aid.  
 
                                                   
64 Ann C. Hudock, NGOs and Civil Society: Democracy by proxy?, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1999), 65.  
65 John Farrington and David Lewis, Non-Governmental Organisations and the State in Asia: 
Rethinking roles in sustainable agricultural development, (London: Routledge, 1993), 36.  
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Japanese NGOs: Clarifying a Missing Part in the Field of Study 
The previous sections have displayed that there is a vast volume of research on 
Northern/Western and Southern/Asian NGOs, which covers a broad range of topics 
concerning their work. Now it remains to review the case of Japanese NGOs, which 
have often been overlooked in existing research due to their geographical, cultural and 
political uniqueness.  
When considering the case of Japan in development and foreign aid study, the 
interesting nature of its stance arises, which was discussed briefly earlier in this chapter. 
Although Japan as a major aid donor is a member of Northern/Western groups of states, 
it strongly maintains its Asian nature in the cultural and political environments. 
Superficially, Japan seems to possess a political system of liberal democracy similar to 
other Northern/Western states, but what really dominates Japanese politics is the 
influence of the Asian characteristic of a strong central authority. Therefore, it is 
debatable whether Japan belongs to the Northern/Western or the Southern/Asian 
grouping. Geographically and often politically speaking, Japan is undoubtedly an Asian 
state. However, Japan has certainly not in recent decades been an aid receiving state, a 
trait which most Southern/Asian states have in common. Is Japan a member of 
Northern/Western states? It is so by being a major aid donor and a developed country, 
but its strong Asian nature prevents the defining of Japan as a part of them.   
As NGOs’ modes of operation are affected by the states and various types of states 
interact differently with NGOs, establishing whether Japan can more appropriately be 
defined as a Northern/Western or Southern/Asian state is crucial. This issue, however, 
is too broad to be resolved only in this section alone. This thesis will explore the 
interactions of Japanese NGOs with the Japanese government, which will enable this 
question to be answered. Therefore, this section will review existing works on Japanese 
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NGOs and clarify where research is lacking in order to learn what is known and what is 
not known, regarding their operation.  
Existing works that examine Northern/Western NGOs rarely mention Japan. 
Examples are Korten (1991), Smilie (1995), Van Rooy (1998), and Fowler (2000). 
There are several works in Japanese which examine Japanese NGOs but when it comes 
to English-language literature, the number is very small.  
This small number of works indicates that Japanese NGOs are not perceived as a 
member of the Northern/Western NGO grouping. On the other hand, Southern/Asian 
NGO research also excludes Japan because Japan is not an aid recipient and does not 
share similar issues with the Southern/Asian group. It is clear therefore, that Japan falls 
through the gap between North/West and South/Asia in the existing literature.    
  Among the small number of works which examine the case of Japan is the highly 
influential book by Smilie and Helmich (1999) entitled, Stakeholders: 
government-NGO partnerships for international development. This book, which 
involves analyses of Government-NGO relations in 23 states, regions and international 
institutions, has devoted ten pages to Japan. It has written about Japanese NGOs as 
follows: 
 
Historically, however, beyond the Buddhist tradition of Charity, Japan has a limited 
tradition of philanthropy, related mainly to the building of temples and private 
schools for classical and special education. The government has traditionally 
provided leadership, and has organised the delivery of most social services. A 
dominant bureaucracy has left a very limited place for non-governmental action.66 
                                                   
66 Judith Randel, and Tony German “Chapter 14: Japan”, in Stakeholders: government-NGO 
partnership for international development, ed., Ian Smillie and Henny Helmich (London: Earthscan, 
1999), 149. 
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Despite this observation, they concluded that Japan possesses an “…NGO sector that is 
growing both in size and confidence, and becoming an increasingly significant partner 
to government in the delivery of development assistance”.67 Salamon and Anheier 
(1996), discussing the difficulties facing nongovernmental sectors in Japan, state that, 
“where government policy has seen little use for nonprofit organizations, such 
organizations have not been either encouraged or permitted.”68  
 As attested to by the above quotations, Japan’s Government-NGO relations are not 
as positive as those of Northern/Western states. Relatively negative appraisals in 
analyses are present in some other works on this issue. Mathews (1997) points out 
Japan’s hostile atmosphere around NGOs, likening it to China and the Middle East.69 
Yamamoto (1995) sharply describes the Japanese government’s relationship with 
NGOs: 
 
The government’s attitude toward NGOs has been very curt, and this lack of 
acknowledgement is closely related to the dominant role of the bureaucracy in the 
governance of Japanese society. There is an underlying assumption among 
government officials that NGOs are basically unauthorised actors in a society where 
government is the only authorized organization to promote public interest. Therefore, 
government bureaucrats could regard NGOs as a potentially disturbing agent, in spite 
of the favourable appraisal of NGOs in the mass media.70 
                                                   
67 Randel and German, 149.   
68 Lester M. Salamon and Helmut K. Anheier, The Emerging Nonprofits Sector: An overview, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 94.  
69 Jessica T. Mathews, “Power Shift,” Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, 76, no. 1 (1997), 51 
70 Tadashi Yamamoto, ed., Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific Community: 
Nongovernmental Uprisings of the Emerging Asia Pacific Regional Community, a 25th Anniversary 
Project of Japan Centre for International Exchange (JCIE), (Tokyo: JCIE, 1995), 144.   
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From his controversial viewpoint Shigetomi (2002) states: “countries like Japan, 
where political restraints on NGOs are virtually non-existent, but there is far less 
demand for NGO services than in developing countries.”71 Having said so, he notes the 
importance of the NGO sector, which he says could be more effective than 
governments in replacing some governmental work.72 Generally speaking, the overall 
literature has perceived the Japanese Government-NGO relations as one in which ‘the 
government has been trying to control NGOs’. 
   Interestingly, studies undertaken by one government official have presented a very 
optimistic viewpoint. Saotome (2003), who worked in the NGO section within the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), provides information on NGO 
cooperation in Japan’s foreign aid strategy and repeatedly emphasises the importance of 
the partnership between the government and NGOs. The emphasis was placed 
particularly on the development of governmental efforts to build the partnership with 
NGOs, but Saotome’s work failed to present any downside to the system.73   
   In Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Role of NGOs in Tokyo’s Aid and 
Development Policy, a work devoted by Hirata (2002) to Japanese NGOs, the 
relationship between NGOs and MOFA was categorised into two different forms, 
‘critical cooperation’ and ‘co-optation’. 74  As discussed in Chapter 1, Hirata’s 
conclusion, however, lacked a degree of validity due to her assumption that 
Government-NGO relations operated identically in the various fields where there was 
                                                   
71 Shinichi Shigetomi, “The States and NGOs: Issues and Analytical Framework”, The State and 
NGOs: Perspective from Asia, ed., Shinichi Shigetomi, (Pasir Panjang: ISEAS, 2002), 15. 
72 Shigetomi, 23. 
73 For a full text, see Mitsuhiro Saotome, “Nihon no ODA ni Shimeru NGO/NPO no Yakuwari 
(Role of NGOs and NPOs in Japan’s ODA)”, Kokusai Mondai (International affairs) 517, (April 
2003): 63 - 77.  
74 Hirata, Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Role of NGOs in Tokyo’s Aid and Development 
Policy, 141.  
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cooperation such as reforming official aid policy, development, anti-personnel 
landmines, and the environment. The result was that she made number of broad 
generalisations but was unable to draw specific conclusions or ‘nuanced’ relationships 
in individual areas.  
In contrast to the small number of English works, there are quite a few Japanese 
works on Japanese NGOs. However, most of the works are undertaken by government 
officials (such as the aforementioned Saotome) and by NGOs themselves, which 
publish their operational reports as part of their advocacy activities. Examples are 
Oxfam Japan, Save the Children Japan, the Japan International Volunteer Centre (JVC), 
Mekong Watch, and FoE Japan among others. Some NGO workers have written about 
their individual activities a well, such as Inagaki (1996), Nishikawa (1991), Kumaoka 
(1993), and Takahashi (2002) to name a few. Their actual experiences can be valuable 
for they have witnessed Japanese aid and NGOs from the inside.  
Among academic works, Takahashi (2004) has written a report on Japanese NGOs’ 
activities from an insider’s view, since he is an actual NGO worker as well. However, 
his report does not go too far beyond providing general information.75  
Masao Tao has produced a number of works on Japanese voluntary or non-profit 
making organisations.76 His works possess similar perspectives to Japanese NGOs’ 
analysis in terms of organisational management, but they focus on domestic issues and 
not on Japan’s foreign aid.  
As Chapter 1 explained, Japan adopted a new aid policy, “Visible Japanese Aid 
                                                   
75 Kiyotaka Takahashi, “Chapter 7: Japan”, NGO Sekuta ni 
Kansuru 6 ka Koku Hikaku Choosa: MDBs no Renkei ni Mukete (Comparative analysis on NGO 
sectors in 6 states: Toward a cooperation for MDBs), ed., Motoko Mekata (Tokyo: Keizai Sangyo 
Kenkyujyo, 2004), 183 - 215. 
76 His works include Borantarii Soshiki no Keiei Kanri (Organisational management of voluntary 
organisations)(1999), NPO to Jigyo (NPO and business sector)(2002), Borantia/NPO no Soshiki-ron 
(Organisational theory of voluntary organisations and NPO) (2004) and Jissen NPO Manejimento 
(Practical NPO management) (2004).  
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(VJA)” in the 1990s in order to highlight Japan’s presence as a ‘good international 
citizen’ with active NGO involvement in governmental aid activities. But there is 
almost no existing research on this policy. Therefore, by analysing the interactions of 
Japanese NGOs with the central government in this 1990s period of “VJA”, it will be 
possible to make a meaningful contribution to the field of study in an area where there 
is a significant lack at present. It is also important to examine how they exercise their 
influence on Japan’s foreign aid because their presence is ever increasing, and there 
seems to be no turning back the tide.  
    
2.3 Conclusion 
Through this overview of existing research on NGOs, some important aspects have 
become clear in the field of study. Firstly, there was a crucial change in the study of 
development and foreign aid, following which Southern/Asian NGOs started to receive 
more attention than Northern/Western ones. This change has highlighted the 
North-South issue more than ever. Secondly, Japan has often been excluded from 
existing works despite its importance as a major foreign aid donor and the NGOs’ 
growing importance in Japan’s aid policy-making process. There are some works in 
Japanese but most of these are simply ‘on-the-spot’ type reports which lack academic 
perspective and it is hard to say what contribution has been made by them so far. 
Thirdly and lastly, almost no research has been undertaken on Japanese NGOs in 
Japan’s new aid strategy, “Visible Japanese Aid (VJA)”, in the 1990s, under which 
Japanese NGOs have precipitated some crucial changes in the direction of Japan’s 
foreign aid.     
This third point represents a crucial lack in the literature. Examining the way 
Japanese NGOs have become influential from outside the established decision-making 
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process in Japan facilitates a greater understanding of how Japan’s new aid strategy 
operates, which has been overlooked in study thus far. This thesis will focus on this 
point and reveal the interactions of Japanese NGOs with the Japanese government by 
using three case studies in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. However, before starting the actual 
case analyses, the following chapter will provide the background to Japan’s official aid 
strategy in order to answer the following questions: What were the existing issues in 
Japan’s aid before the inclusion of NGOs? Why did the Japanese government need 
active NGO involvement to carry out its new aid strategy? 
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Chapter 3 
The Changing Framework of Japan’s Foreign Aid: 
 From a ‘faceless’ to ‘friendly face’  
 
3.1 Introduction: History of Japan’s Official Development Assistance   
The introductory chapter briefly discussed how Japan’s traditional aid strategy had 
faced severe international criticism for being “faceless”, or in other words ‘not fulfilling 
international requirements for providing a human contribution.’ This chapter will focus 
closely on the changing nature of Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) to 
clarify existing issues and problems. Some of these existing issues contributed to the 
introduction of a new aid policy framework, the so-called “Visible Japanese Aid (VJA)” 
in this thesis by cooperating Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). By analysing 
the new aid policy framework, this chapter will provide the background for the 
following chapters which examine the NGOs’ involvement. 
 
From Aid Recipient to Major Aid Donor…                      
   Although Japan is now a major foreign aid donor, it started as a major aid recipient 
country immediately after World War Two until 1951. Funding from several 
international organisations such as the World Bank helped to build Japan’s 
infrastructure, which was necessary for the later economic boom. Japan joined the 
Colombo Plan, an international aid plan, in 1955. Since then, Japan’s own aid policy, 
known as “Official Development Assistance” (ODA), has grown dramatically from 
smaller reparation payments to Asian countries in the 1950s to one of the largest aid 
contributions in the world. Although its budget  decreased from 2000, owing to a 
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prolonged economic recession,1 it still maintains its position as the second largest aid 
donor, behind only the United States. Naturally, this prominent position has attracted 
considerable attention from academics, business people and the public alike.  
   Many scholars of foreign aid have tried to understand Japan’s radical change and 
growth in the international aid scene and its political implications. Scholars such as 
Hasegawa (1975), Wright-Neville (1991), Rix (1993), Orr and Koppel (1993), Tarte 
(1998) and Furuoka (2000), have tried to analyse the nature of Japan’s ODA using 
various models. Rix (1993) analysed Japan’s aid donations focusing on its ‘giving 
philosophy’, Orr and Koppel (1993) considered Japan’s aid relations with specific 
regions in Asia, and Furuoka (2000) studied the sanction aspect of Japan’s aid and its 
impacts on aid receiving states. 
   Apart from the English written material, Japanese written works have also been 
produced in large quantities at the same time. While English literature focuses more on 
Japanese aid policy as a whole from an ‘outsider’ viewpoint, the ‘insider’ perception 
concentrated on Japan’s domestic political dynamics as to the conforming of the aid. 
This work has been undertaken by local scholars such as Sumi (1989, 1992), Igarashi 
(1990), Kusano (1993), Nishigaki and Shimomura (1993), Shiratori (1995), Shimomura, 
Nakagawa and Saito (1999), and Watanabe and Miura (2003). Among these scholars, 
some focus on the positive side and others the negative. These controversial opinions 
have formed Japan’s foreign aid study field.      
   What is clear in Japan’s foreign aid research is that it has been heavily influenced by 
both its historical development, and by international circumstances. As Rix (1993) 
states, every nation’s foreign aid is affected by its political and economic interests, 
                                                   
1 The budget for ODA of 2001 decreased by 12.5 percent in comparison to 2000. 
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social and cultural needs and values. 2  This is especially true in Japan’s case, 
particularly in regards to its aid programme conforming to Article 14 of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, which states that Japan had to pay reparations for its 
past military occupation history.  
   Altering its basic objectives to suit the global environment, Japan’s foreign aid 
appears to follow a pattern of development every decade. The 1950s can be called an 
era of reparations. The 1960s characterised Japan’s aid as quantitative expansion with 
a substantial boost in economic growth. Japan hit another economic turning point in the 
1970s with the ‘Nixon Shock’ and the ‘Oil Crisis’, ushering in a period of 
reconsiderations. As Japan emerged as the top aid donor in the 1980s, the United States 
demanded greater burden sharing in the international community.  
The 1990s saw a great transition in world politics; an ending of the Cold War and 
the subsequent Gulf War in 1991. During this period, international criticism attacked 
Japan’s foreign aid as being ‘faceless’, meaning it only contributed money, but not the 
human resources for which there was a greater need as a result. Japan started searching 
for its own way to maintain its role in the world in the post Cold War period, which 
introduced NGO involvement to highlight the contribution of Japan by using NGOs as 
subcontractors.   
   Understanding these series of changes helps to explain how Japan’s current ODA 
policies have developed. Therefore, each of the following sections focuses on 
determining the features and standpoints of Japan’s traditional foreign aid strategy 
during these various periods.  
 
                                                   
2 Alan Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge: Policy Reform and Aid Leadership, (London: Routledge, 
1993),15. 
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The 1950s: The Era of ‘Baisho’ or Reparation to Those Damaged in the War 
   As mentioned earlier, Japan’s foreign aid started through its reparations obligation 
under the Colombo Plan in 1955 to those countries which had been occupied by the 
Japanese military during the War.3 The reparations were accepted by the Development 
Assistance Community (DAC), an offshoot of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), as a component of Japan’s aid.4  Actual 
reparation payments started with requests from Burma/Myanmar in 1964, followed by 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and finally, the Republic of Vietnam. Reparation-like 
payments5 were also made to countries which had not specifically requested the 
reparation such as Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Republic of 
Korea.6 Some countries such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the 
People’s Republic of China, the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam, have not asked for reparations. This still appears as Rekishi 
Mondai (the history issue) in the present foreign policy alongside the official apology 
issue.7 The history issue between Japan and other states started from this point. China 
and South Korea consider Japan has not given enough Syazai or ‘apologies’ that it owes 
them since the War.8 Therefore, these two states often raise the issue and demand that 
Japan make official apologies such as putting it in writing as a record for the future9. 
                                                   
3 See The Colombo Plan Headquarters homepage. “The Colombo Plan,” About Us, n.d., 
<www.colombo-plan.org for more information> (4 January 2006). The Colombo Plan was 
“conceived at a meeting of British Commonwealth foreign ministers at Colombo in January 1950 
and put in effect in July 1951. The aim was to provide economic aid to areas of South and Southeast 
Asia.” from the homepage of the Colombo Plan referred above.  
4 Sukehiro Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid: Policy and Practice (New York: Praeger Publisher, 
1975), 40.     
5 It has actually taken the form of a “Grant”, which requires no repayment. 
6 Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid: Policy and Practice, 13. 
7 Hasegawa, 40.  
8 There are a lot of debates over whether the compensation for these states was completed or not, 
but this thesis will not go too far and refers to the Japanese official comments because the topic is 
too vast to cover in the thesis.  
9 Examples of history issues include forced labour, forced prostitution, and Yasukuni Shrine (a 
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Japan, on the other hand, considers that it has fulfilled reparation for these two countries 
by reparation-like payments10 and is afraid that any further apology will hurt the 
remaining families of dead soldiers. Yet, the Japanese government wishes to improve 
foreign relations with China and South Korea, so this history issue remains unresolved.     
   It is important to mention here that, although the reparations were essentially meant 
to be for other countries, they have never exceeded one percent of Japan’s gross 
domestic product (GDP). So, it can be argued that the Japanese reparation system 
helped its own reconstruction rather than benefiting the recipient countries. In this 
aspect, Hasegawa (1975) concludes that Japan’s post-War reparation policy had “the 
effects of both reparations and reparation-like payments… encouraging rather than 
demanding, the rehabilitation of the Japanese economy.”11  
 
The 1960s: The Era of Quantitative Expansion by Boosting Japan’s Economy 
   After the period of reparation, which had helped to reconstruct Japan’s 
war-damaged economy, an expansion stage followed boosting the economy. With its 
fast growth, Japan tried to catch up with the economic pace of other Western developed 
countries. As a result, Japan began to join and establish aid-related entities in order to 
fulfil its aid obligation. Furuoka (2000) calls it the ‘institutionalisation of Japan’s aid 
giving’. Over this period, Japan took a leading role in various aid institutions including 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1966, joining DAC in 1964, and establishing 
the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) in 1961 and the Overseas Technical 
                                                                                                                                                     
Japanese war shrine). Japan has been requested to make an official apology for its atrocities during 
the war and compensate victims.   
10 Some say that ODA is considered to be a form of reparation for neighbouring Asian states, which 
suffered from the war. 
11 Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid: Policy and Practice , 46.  
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Cooperation Agency (OCTA) in 1962.12 During this time, Japan also hosted the first 
Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia in 1966.   
During this decade, the Japanese government focused on strengthening diplomatic 
relations with Southeast Asian countries. In this period, the aid was aimed at 
maintaining the political stability of Japan’s major Asian trading partners as any 
instability within these states had a direct affect on Japan’s imports and exports. As a 
result of fulfilling this aim, the actual share of aid distribution in Asian countries 
constituted 98 percent of Japan’s total aid flow through this decade.13 
Wright-Neville (1991) notes that Japan’s foreign aid in the 1950s and 1960s, “came 
to be considered as one contribution toward the maintenance of the post-war 
international order”.14 However, criticism rose from DAC, especially since Japan’s aid 
was not keeping pace with its GNP growth,15 and the Yen Loan, which requires a 
future repayment with interest although it is low, constituted more of its total aid than 
its aid Grant, which needs no repayment.16 That means Japan’s foreign aid was more 
focused on its own economic interest than benefiting recipient states. Rix (1993) also 
comments that the characteristics of Japan’s aid policy were an “absence of 
humanitarian values” and “lack of a concept of charity”.17   
The criticism that Japan’s foreign aid was lacking in moral ethical concerns continued 
into subsequent decades. There are two obvious reasons for the self-serving nature of 
                                                   
12 OCTA was a predecessor of the Japan International Cooperation Agency, which is a major 
aid-related agency currently. 
13 Fumitaka Furuoka, An Inquiry into the Principles of Japan’s Aid Policy, (PhD diss., University 
Sains Malaysia, 2000), 46. 
14 David Wright-Neville, The Evolution of Japanese Foreign Aid 1955-1990, Monograph No.2, 
(Clayton: Monash Development Studies Centre, 1991), 72. 
15 The ODA percentage of GNP increased from 0.15 percent in 1960 to 0.26 percent in 1969, 
however, its ratio was still under the average of DAC member countries which was 0.36%.  
16 The share of the Yen Loan was 49 percent and the Grant was 28 percent in 1969. 
17 Alan Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge: Policy reform and aid leadership (London: Routledge, 
1993), 15.  
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Japan’s aid. Firstly, Japan’s international role at this time was relatively unimportant, so 
domestic factors such as development of its economy and interests overwhelmingly 
affected the development of its aid policy.18 Secondly, being under the post-War 
umbrella of US security, Japan could use foreign aid to reconstruct its diplomatic 
relations by directing aid where it would be politically advantageous.19 
 
The 1970s: The Era of Securing Resources  
During the 1960s, it was obvious that the main motive for Japan’s aid was to promote 
its own economic interests. However, the 1970s represented some major changes in 
Japan’s aid policy. Some of these were the result of, or reaction to, international events, 
while others were driven by domestic causes. 
  International circumstances affecting aid policy can be characterised by two events 
that plunged the Japanese economy into turmoil through the 1970s: (1) the ‘Nixon 
Shock’ in 1971 and, (2) the ‘Oil Crisis’ in 1973. The ‘Oil Crisis’ had a particularly 
profound influence on Japan’s aid policy long after the event.  
     The first, the ‘Nixon Shock’, occurred when the United States President Richard 
Nixon visited China without informing Japan. At this time, the United States had no 
formal diplomatic relations with China and nor had Japan, as both states had 
anti-communist foreign policies. Though this is seemingly unrelated to Japan’s direct 
relations with the United States, it did show Japan that the United State would not 
hesitate to act in its own best interests and indirectly risk Japan’s national interest. In 
doing so, the Japanese government had realised that an “alliance with the United States 
                                                   
18 Wright-Neville, The Evolution of Japanese Foreign Aid 1955-1990, 74. 
19 Koppel, Bruce M. and Orr, Robert M. Jr, ed., Japan’s Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New 
Era, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 342. 
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could have its cost as well as its benefit.”20  
   While still suffering the effects of the ‘Nixon Shock’, Japan encountered another 
major international crisis, the ‘Oil Crisis’. In 1973, the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) started increasing the oil price and threw the world 
economy into panic. Japan was designated as one of the ‘unfriendly’ countries, and 
faced a huge ten percent reduction in its monthly OPEC oil supply. For Japan, a 
resource-poor country, their decision was devastating. In return for lifting the imposed 
reduction, OPEC countries demanded that Japan increase its level of economic aid and 
private investment in the Arab region. In compliance, Japan decided to provide three 
billion JPY in aid to the Arab countries for its ‘kind concern’.21  
   Learning from the crisis, Japan sought to consolidate its position of ‘resource 
nationalism’ by following a plan of increasing the number of countries supplying it with 
vital resources. After the oil incident in 1973, it would no longer be reliant on one 
region for essential resources. 
 Following these incidents, Japan understood more clearly its need to look after its 
own interests in the international community.22 As a result, the number of aid receiving 
countries was increased, and so was the aid budget for countries with raw materials, 
such as Indonesia. On the other hand, countries which did not possess much in the way 
of resources such as South Korea, Cambodia, and Thailand, did not receive any 
additional benefit.23 The aid to Asia dropped to 69 percent in 1979 compared with 88 
percent of total aid distribution in 1973.24 
                                                   
20 Wright-Neville, The Evolution of Japan’s Foreign Aid 1955-1999, 76. 
21 Sandra Tarte, Japan’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, National Centre for Development 
Studies, (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1998), 23. 
22 Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era, 348. 
23 Wright-Neville, The Evolution of Japan’s Foreign Aid 1955-1990, 66. 
24 Furuoka, An Inquiry into the Principles of Japan’s Aid Policy, 47- 48. 
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   The ‘Oil Crisis’ also made Japan realise that foreign aid was the major leverage in 
international relations for Japan. It was able to lift the penalty off its shoulders because 
it had a large quantity of aid for distribution to those penalising countries.  
    In addition to these international causes, some domestic issues also affected 
Japan’s foreign aid strategy. Towards the late 1970s, Japan’s aid became ‘a central 
component of Japan’s nascent peace diplomacy’25 and paved Japan’s path to becoming 
the top donor of the next decade.  
   The ‘Medium-term Target’ policy was introduced in 1977, doubling the amount of 
the foreign aid allocated within the next five years. The 1978 guideline stated that, to 
provide aid to countries bordering areas of conflict such as Turkey, Pakistan and 
Thailand, it would have to be reduced in other countries such as Afghanistan, Angola, 
Cambodia, Cuba, Ethiopia and Vietnam. This policy was based on the influence of the 
United States security umbrella. Although Japan started matching policies in its own 
national interest, its continued reliance on the United States for security indirectly 
influenced the development of Japan’s strategic interests and aid policies.  
   Japan’s fast growing economy also attracted attention, scrutiny and pressure from 
the international community. According to Wright-Neville (1991), Japanese aid in the 
1950s and 1960s was initially directed by domestic factors and ‘cultural values’, but in 
the late 1970s, international pressure started to shape its aid more than domestic issues. 
 
The 1980s: Burden Sharing but No Altruism as Top Donor 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) has described the reasons for 
Japan’s provision of foreign aid as “these countries are impoverished and are in need of 
                                                   
25 Tarte, Japan’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, 25. 
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assistance from richer nations including Japan…”26 MOFA adds that: “by helping to 
promote economic standards and stabilize living standards…Japan not only strengthens 
its friendship and interdependence with the region, but also contributes to peace and 
stability at both the regional and global levels.”27 This shows a new direction in 
Japan’s aid strategy in order for it to play an initiative role in international relations. As 
Japan became a predominant aid donor, an even greater amount of aid was expected. 
This increased burden characterised Japan’s foreign aid in the 1980s.   
   By 1988, Japan had become the top donor of foreign aid with regard to the total 
amount of its ODA. The period from the 1970s onwards also gave rise to Japan’s focus 
on resource security.28 Concurrently with this, as Japan emerged in the international 
community as a great economic power, it was required to share the burden of 
maintaining international peace. Based on the aid philosophy developed by the Ohira 
and Takeshita administrations, aid policies became the main tool in this new role. 
   In April 1981, the then Prime Minister (PM) Ohira announced Japan’s aid 
philosophy.29 This was the first definitive standard of aid philosophy since Japan 
started its foreign aid programme in 1955. Yasutomo (1986) states the following three 
points of this newly established aid philosophy: Japan’s aid is “a necessary ‘cost’ if 
Japan is to remain a peaceful country”, “a necessary ‘cost’ if Japan is to remain an 
economic great power” and “aid can strengthen weak spots in overseas economic 
dependence.”30 Ohira’s aid philosophy incurred some criticism from the international 
                                                   
26 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) Japan’s ODA 1990, (Tokyo: Association for 
Promotion of International Cooperation [APIC]), 3.  
27 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1991, (Tokyo: APIC, 1992), 21.  
28 Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era, 10. 
29 The book was published as Keizai Kyooryoku Kenkyuukai ed, Keizai Kyoryoku no Rinen – 
Seihu Kaihatsu Enjo wo Naze Okonawunoka (The Philosophy of Economic Cooperation: Why Give 
Official Development Assistance?), (Tokyo: MOF, 1980). Two principles of Japanese economic 
cooperation strategy, humanitarian consideration and mutual reliance, were confirmed in this book.  
30 Dennis T. Yasutomo, The Manner of Giving: Strategic Aid and Japanese Foreign Policy, 
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community for its apparent lack of altruism. More specifically it was criticised because 
“little mention is made of the role of aid as a means for the alleviation of poverty…, or 
of aid as a moral obligation incurred by virtue of a universal humanity.”31  
Eight years later, in 1988, PM Takeshita Noboru clearly expressed in the document, 
“International Cooperation Initiative” how aid should be aimed. He emphasised 
“cooperation towards achievement of peace, expansion of official development 
assistance and promotion of international cultural exchange”32Again, in this guideline, 
there is no mention of humanitarianism or altruism. In the same year, the government 
deployed a major untied aid campaign33 to avert international criticism based on Japan 
serving only its domestic firms using tied aid.34 However, the international community 
still criticised Japan’s closed market, low ratio of aid per gross national product (GNP)35, 
infrastructure concentration, as well as aspects of its aid programme that clearly sought 
to benefit Japanese firms rather than just providing aid.36 
   Japan faced a need to encounter these negative criticisms from other aid donors. As 
Tarte (1998) mentions, “the more visible Japan became as a donor, the more criticism it 
attracted”.37 Throughout the 1980s, as Japan grew to be the top donor of foreign aid, it 
also faced an increasing international demand to apply moral judgement in aid 
development. Owing to the Marcos scandals in the Philippines in the 1980s,38 there was 
                                                                                                                                                     
(Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1986), 51. 
31 Wright-Neville, The Evolution of Japanese Foreign Aid 1955-1990, 85. 
32 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1990, (Tokyo: APIC, 1991), 6. 
33 “Tied aid” means when the aid recipient country is required to purchase goods and materials from 
the aid country. “untied aid” means, in contrast, that recipient country has no such obligations. 
(Furuoka, 2002:16.) 
34 Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era, 10. 
35 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1998, (Tokyo: APIC, 1999), 6.  
36 Tarte, Japan’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, 30- 31. 
37 Tarte, 31. 
38 This scandal was about illicit ODA contracts between the Philippines government and several 
Japanese companies for creating mutual benefits which appeared to the Japanese public following 
the downfall of the President Ferdinand Marcos in 1986.   
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considerable domestic pressure from taxpayers over the inefficiency of large-quantity 
aid spending.  
   To ease these tensions, the government created a cabinet committee on ODA. 
However, the dilemma that the government was experiencing during this time was that 
there were too many interests and demands coming from all directions both foreign and 
domestic. The international community required that Japan play a more political role in 
maintaining international peace and security, while at the same time domestic 
administrative ministries focused more on the development of policies concerning 
respective trade, investment and resource security. It can be said that trying to 
accommodate all these different aims in Japan’s aid policy, made the philosophy vague 
and general. 
 
The 1990s: Adjusting to the Global Context  
   With the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Cold War system which 
had determined much of the world’s foreign policy since the Second World War, came 
to an end. The end of the Cold War denoted a victory for Western liberal democratic 
values, and the promotion of these values emerged as a new global trend. As Japan’s 
foreign aid was a major part of its foreign policy, Japan worked in line with this trend, 
even though Japanese aid had been criticised as lacking humanitarian objectivity.39 
While characterising Japan’s foreign aid, Orr (1993) states that, “there is the money but 
not vision.”40 At the same time, Japan’s lack of physical participation in the Gulf War 
brought the most severe criticism from the international community, which described 
Japan’s foreign policy as ‘faceless’. This begs the question: ‘to whom has Japan’s 
                                                   
39 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge: Policy reform and aid leadership, 15. 
40 Koppel and Orr, ed., Japan’s Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era, 342. 
 65 
foreign policy been faceless?’ Some academics have stated Japan’s foreign policy has 
been faceless to aid receiving countries for not providing much in terms of human 
resources. Others say that it was faceless with regard to fellow aid donor countries due 
to its lack of a clear strategy.41 Together, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent 
first Gulf War, challenged Japan’s foreign aid in the 1990s and brought about drastic 
changes.   
 
The Present: Creating its Own Path of Aid 
In the previous sections, the traditional foreign aid of Japan has been characterised 
by both quantitative expansion and political non-intervention. Considering the deep 
memories of the Japanese military occupation in neighbouring Asian countries, the 
Japanese government has resisted attaching political conditions to its aid in this region 
for fear of perceived involvement in the internal affairs of receiving states.42 This 
attitude has been bitterly criticised by other Western donor states, which wanted Japan 
to play a more active role by using its substantial aid power as a sanction tool. The 
Japanese government has justified its position of not employing foreign aid as a 
sanction tool by referring to Japan’s own aid-receiving experience. As a result of these 
experiences, Japan promotes the concept of “self-help” but refuses to interfere in the 
domestic politics of recipient states. However, because of globalisation, Japan can no 
longer pursue its traditional non-interventionist aid policies.  
 In 1991, in response to global trends, the then PM Kaifu Toshiki announced a new 
aid guideline. This new guideline placed a new set of conditions on the recipient states, 
taking into account their military policy, economic policy and political situation, prior 
                                                   
41 Takeshi Igarashi, ed., Nihon no ODA to Kokusai Chitsujyo (Japan’s ODA and an international 
order) (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), 1990), 40.  
42 Furuoka, An Inquiry into the Principles of Japan’s Aid Policy, 33. 
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to the commencement of Japanese aid.43 In contrast to the previous unconditional aid 
policy guidelines (Ohira and Takeshita), this was the first time that foreign aid came 
with political conditions attached.  
 In 1992, Japan established the ODA Charter, with four principles setting out the 
conditions for aid donation. They are:  
1) The simultaneous pursuit of environmental conservation and development; 
2) Avoiding the use of ODA for military purposes for aggravation of 
international conflicts; 
3) Paying close attention to trends in recipient countries’ military 
expenditures, development and production of weapons of mass destruction, 
and export and import of arms; 
4) Paying close attention to efforts in promoting democratisation and 
introduction of market-oriented economies, and to the conditions related to 
basic human rights and freedoms.44 
Particular attention should be given to the fourth principle which states that: “full 
attention should be paid to efforts in promoting democratisation and the introduction of 
a market-oriented economy, and the situation regarding the security of basic human 
rights and freedoms in recipient countries.”45 It is clearly shown in this guideline that 
Japan now attaches political conditions to its aid decisions. This change was an 
inevitable response to the international pressure to establish Japan’s role in the post 
Cold War era based on the maintenance of international peace and security.  
 
Is Japan Developing its Own Path? 
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Some observers comment that Japan’s aid policy has remained a reactive policy. 
Yasutomo (1990) considers that Japan always pursued its own interest in foreign aid 
policy, but it seemed reactive only because that interest did not contradict that of the 
United States.46 Orr (1991) contends that Japan now possesses different considerations 
towards human rights and political development as a result of the impact of Western 
liberal democratic values. This is revealed in Japan’s aid to Iran and China, where other 
donor countries such as the United States suspended their aid. Recently, the aid to 
Burma/Myanmar also re-started despite the many human rights abuse cases reported by 
NGOs closely working with local people.47 Tarte (1998) argues that Japan started 
building its own path, distinct from the United States and other Western nations, to 
express its own political concerns through aid. Often the development of these policies 
could be seen as breaking concert with the United States’ foreign policy.48   
Although some claim that Japan pursues its own aid strategy based on its own 
interest, overall, Japan’s foreign aid has reflected international events and concerns with 
a remarkable hypersensitivity. The above analysis of the history of Japan’s foreign aid 
has clarified its reactionary nature. Being reactive in part has protected Japan from 
taking too active a role in the international community, which could raise doubts in 
other Asian neighbours. Over the last decade, however, Japan has started using its 
foreign aid more actively to show a ‘human face’ in foreign policy, employing NGOs as 
surrogate aid institutions. 
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3.2 Categories and Decision-Making Processes of Japan’s ODA 
Three Categories and Three Different Decision-Making Processes 
   There are three aid providing schemes in Japan’s ODA. They are: Bilateral Grant, 
Bilateral Loan (Yen Loan) and Multilateral Grant. Each category possesses its own 
major administrators and decision-making processes, which has complicated Japan’s 
ODA administration and stimulated a lot of criticism domestically and internationally. 
Four major actors are usually identified. These are: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) and the Economic Planning Agency (EPA). In addition to these key 
players, there are a number of other agencies related to Japan’s foreign aid. This section 
studies each ODA category and highlights its features and issues. 
 
No Repayment Needed: Bilateral Grant    
   Bilateral Grant is, “a form of foreign aid that does not impose a repayment 
obligation.”49 There are two categories of Bilateral Grant: Grant Aid and Technical 
Cooperation. The first sub group of the Bilateral Grant, Grant Aid is under the 
MOFA’s supervision. The second group, Technical Cooperation, is carried out by the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency; the aid implementing agency that is under the 
MOFA’s jurisdiction. The MOFA occupies a crucial part of Japan’s ODA as a whole 
since the aid strategy is a major tool of Japan’s foreign policy. Hirata (1998) describes 
in detail how the MOFA has played a pivotal role in Japan’s aid programme as follows: 
 
The MOFA is the most prominent ministry concerned with Japan’s aid. It not 
only participates in the decision making of loan aid through the four-ministry 
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system but also takes responsibility for Japanese grants…the ministry takes 
charge of coordinating with the other ministries that also carry out ODA 
activities under their own budgets. MOFA also receives the largest ODA 
budget in the aid administration.50  
    
Grant Aid covers the following six categories: 1) General, 2) Fishery, 3) Cultural, 4) 
Food Aid and 6) Aid for Increased Food Production. The first category of General 
Grants is divided into four further areas; 1) General Project Grant Aid, 2) Grant Aid for 
Debt Relief, 3) Non-Project Grant Aid, and 4) Grants for Grassroots Projects. Among 
these four areas of General Grants, attention should be paid to Grant Assistance for 
Grassroots Projects, since this is the scheme through which the Japanese government 
supports NGO activities. This grant aid is for “a scheme of assistance in response to 
[a]request from a developing country’s local public bodies, research and medical 
institutions, and NGOs and similar groups active in developing countries.”51 Features 
of this assistance are: 1) small-scale project implementation, 2) the MOFA’s sole 
approval and 3) a fast approval process due to only the MOFA being involved.52  The 
main aim of this scheme is fast provision of aid. This is because the old style of grant 
aid was characterised by a large budget and slow procedures, which meant it was hard 
to address local needs in developing countries which were usually urgent and with 
problems at the grassroots.    
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The Decision-Making Process of the Bilateral Grant 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has been the major administrator of this 
scheme, but when it comes to discussion over the budget, the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) has come to compete against the MOFA. When competition between major 
aid-related ministries occurs, it influences the direction of the policy regardless of its 
effectiveness because each actor possesses its own interests and aims. It is not only 
between the MOFA and the MOF, but when a business sector presents a strong demand 
about an aid programme such as supplying resources for the programme, the MITI also 
interrupts the competitive relationship. Rix (1993) describes this as follows: 
 
It is often said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seeks to enhance Japan’s 
security and image through aid, whereas the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI) has primarily trade promotion in mind, and the Ministry 
of Finance (MOF) has kept the purse strings tied tightly.53 
   
You Have to Repay Later: Bilateral Loans (Yen Loans) 
   Bilateral Loans are usually known as ‘Yen Loans’ and according to Okuizumi 
(1995), their primary aim was to provide aid for economic infrastructure projects.54 
They comprise about 30 percent, and sometimes close to half of the total ODA, and are 
thus a major form of Japanese aid.55 The MOFA describes the Bilateral Loan as 
follows: “ODA Loans (Yen Loans) lend funds for development at low interest for long 
periods to developing countries.” 56  Project Loans, Non-Project Loans and Debt 
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Rescheduling are the three areas in this category.    
   According to Furuoka (2000), the loan implementation decision depends on 
considerations regarding the stages of development of recipients; terms are changed 
according to the country’s ability to repay the loans and its economic conditions.  
   The Ministry of Finance (MOF), in its position of budget administrator in Japan’s 
bureaucracy, has the strongest impact on the Bilateral Loan of Japan’s ODA (a further 
analysis will follow in the next sub-section). Since the MOF has stressed the ability of 
the recipient to repay the loans in future, the Bilateral Loan tends not to cover countries 
most in need of aid, many of which are very poor and have a lower likelihood of 
repayment. This aspect of the Bilateral Loan has attracted international criticism of 
Japan’s aid, since it is seen to be self-serving and not helping the poorer states.  
 
 
Decision-Making Process of the Bilateral Loan  
   The Bilateral Loan decision-making process is much more complicated than that of 
the Bilateral Grant because all the major aid players are involved. Furuoka (2000) 
reflected on this point clearly by citing Orr (1993) that every single loan extended must 
go through a decision-making process that includes participants or representatives of 
each of the four government agencies (MOFA, MOF, MITI and EPA) as indicated in 
advance.57 Orr (1993) supposes that the MOF favours loans over the grant because it 
has much more impact on the lending issue and is able to exert influence over loans in 
comparison to grants over which the MOFA has a certain influence.   
 
Money Check without the Country’s Name: The Multilateral Grant 
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   The third category of Japan’s aid is the Multilateral Grant, in other words, 
contributions to international organizations. It is in this way that Japan shows 
international cooperation by giving aid indirectly under MOFA’s supervision. In fact, 
the government, by being a top donor, has much power over the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB), one of the major multilateral financial organisations. Furthermore, the 
president of the ADB is traditionally chosen from among Japanese nationals.58  
   The government officially makes a statement regarding the importance of 
multilateral grants to Japan in their annual aid reports. In comparison with bilateral aid, 
the government’s official report lists four advantages of multilateral aid: 
 
1) It makes use of the specialized knowledge of the various international 
organisations, 
2) It secures the political neutrality of aid, 
3) It establishes new relations with countries such as in Africa, with which Japan has 
had little human interchange, and 
4) It brings about improvements in the tying status and quality of ODA.59 
 
   The Japanese government agrees with the importance of donations to international 
organisations such as the United Nations. It states that aid through multilateral 
institutions has different advantages from those of bilateral aid including the ability of 
multilateral agencies to draw on the expert knowledge and experience to which they 
have access by virtue of their association with the global network.60  
On the other hand, Japan’s contribution to multilateral agencies as a percentage of 
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its total ODA in 1993 and 1994 averaged 28.1 percent, which was lower than the 
two-year average of other DAC member countries.61 
The ratio of Japan’s contribution to international institutions (Multilateral Grant) 
presents it is important to Japan but much of the past contribution (1988-1997) has gone 
to international finance institutions such as World Bank group, which directly work on 
international financial issues.62 The less amount of the contribution has gone to other 
organizations working indirectly on aid issues such as human rights and over-population. 
This is due to the fact that with multilateral donations, it is impossible for Japan to show 
its ‘face’ or ‘name’ in recipient countries since financial support through this system is 
associated with no particular names. Although it is possible for Japan to be listed among 
major donor countries to multilateral agencies in their annual reports, Japan is 
nevertheless eager to seek direct recognition from recipients because its aid is a major 
tool for constructing bilateral relations in the international community. As stated by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), “As development assistance is an effective 
diplomatic tool, bilateral ODA will continue to represent a large portion of Japan’s 
aid.”63   
 
Decision-Making Process of the Multilateral Grant 
   As clearly shown by the MOFA, multilateral grants are a less important aid scheme 
in comparison to bilateral grant and loans. This may be why, according to Rix (1980), 
the decision-making procedure for multilateral aid is rather straightforward compared to 
the other schemes since its contribution is governed by international treaties and 
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agreements.64 However, on the contrary, Rix still states that there is rivalry between the 
MOFA and MOF.  
  Contributions to the United Nations and related agencies such as the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees and United Nations World Food Programmes are 
supervised by the MOFA because it has the United Nations division under its 
jurisdiction. In contrast, the MOF exerts its influence on capital subscriptions to 
international financial organisations such as the Asian Development Bank.  
 
3.3 What were the Issues in Traditional Aid Policy? 
   The previous section discussed the historical background from the 1950s to 2000 and 
onward, as well as the structures of Japan’s aid programmes. Through the history it 
becomes clear that the more powerful and visible Japan has become as a donor, the 
more attention has been paid to it by the international community, especially other aid 
donors. Japan’s aid has been labelled bitterly as ‘faceless’, ‘lacking altruism’, 
‘self-centred’, ‘on a commercial basis’ and so forth by critics. Also, from the structural 
analysis, some crucial issues have appeared, such as the complexity of aid 
administration which involves too many key players. This situation has invited severe 
criticism as well.   
   As a response to this criticism, the Japanese government has set up a new aid policy 
line in which the emphasis is more on Software, which is human resource development, 
and institution building65, providing technology and expertise, than on Hardware, which 
is the “provision of physical construction and equipment66” in the 1990s. This is partly 
symbolised by the adoption of the ODA Charter in 1992. However, the questions still 
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remain and these are:. Which issues in the aid programmes themselves that attracted 
‘criticism’ brought the government to change its aid strategy? What sort of issues has 
the government tried to settle with the new aid policy line? 
   Before analysing Japan’s new aid policy itself, in which NGOs play significant roles, 
it is important to study several other aid issues more carefully in addition to those 
already addressed in the previous section. This is because the government has tried to 
counter ‘criticism’ with a new solution; a new aid policy. Identifying the existing issues 
in the aid programme will enable clarification of the features of the new aid policy in 
comparison. This section analyses the issues and problems in Japan’s aid structure and 
administration, which underlie the introduction of the new aid policy. 
 
General Criticism in the Past Studies 
There is a huge amount of research on Japan’s aid policy, and most of this refers to 
problems. This highlights how problematic and difficult Japan’s foreign aid has been. 
Several problems have been identified in existing studies. For example, Rix (1993) 
considers five crucial problems in Japan’s aid programme. They are:  
  
1) Shortage of aid administration staff  
2) Cross-agency barriers  
3) Large-scale emphasis  
4) Diffuse responsibility between agencies  
5) Inter-ministry rivalry within JICA.67  
 
Rix’s points covers most of the general criticism of Japan’s foreign aid. Wright-Neville 
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(1991) mentions the request-based nature of Japan’s aid policy which has borne a 
linkage between overseas consultants, Japanese construction firms, and politicians.68 
This problem also links the shortage of aid staff (Appendix 2: Figure 1) to dependency 
on consultants and firms which possess significantly more information network systems 
than the government.69 With regard to a small number of staff, Hirata (1998) analyses 
that it included the involvement of NGOs to fill the shortage of aid administrators.70 
This correlates with the government’s original intention to make use of NGOs as 
supplementary to its official aid activities.  
 
Complications of Aid Administration 
   The complications and difficulties of Japan’s aid programme are well known. Many 
studies have been undertaken by both domestic and overseas researchers. Rix (1993) 
states that Japan’s aid programme is, “of day-to-day decisions across the whole of the 
Japanese government system.”71 That means that Japan’s aid programme is formed 
through each ministry’s daily routine, with no single administration body. According to 
the MOFA’s classification, Japan’s ODA can be categorised into the following three: 
the Bilateral Grant, the Bilateral Loan (also known as the Yen Loan) and the 
Multilateral Grant or Contribution to International Organisations. Unlike other aid 
donor states which possess a single aid agency such as the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the Canadian International Development Agency, 
Australia’s AusAID, and the New Zealand Agency for International Development 
(NZAID), Japan has no such agency. Many ministries and agencies are involved in the 
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aid programme. Keizo Takemi, a member of the Liberal Democratic Party’s Special 
Committee on External Economic Cooperation, has argued on this point:  
 
Simply forming new organs or reshuffling existing ones is not an effective way 
to make the Japanese bureaucracy function. To foster new systems for 
formulating policy, it is often better to work them smoothly into the existing 
government organisations.72 
    
However, he has failed to mention the drawbacks in a multiple aid administration.  
   NZAID, the newly founded (in 2002) aid implementing agency of New Zealand, 
can provide a good comparison. As shown in the table, it is easy to determine the 
advantages of establishing a single aid agency for a more effective aid programme 
(Appendix 2: Table 1). Establishing a single aid administration has remained a ‘hot’ 
issue, but it has always been confronted with opposition from authorities, especially 
from the MOFA, which has been afraid of losing its position among inter-ministry 
competition using ODA policy, and the idea dissolved at the end. 
 
Single Aid Agency Issue  
   The absence of a single aid agency has attracted much criticism from other countries. 
This is because these ministries and agencies are viewed as serving their own interests 
in providing aid, and have little intention to serve the aid policy as a whole. An example 
of this can be seen in an aid budget distributed among 18 ministries and agencies. Each 
ODA scheme (bilateral grant, bilateral loan and multilateral grant) has its own 
decision-making procedure, actors, and also influence, which has made the general aid 
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decision-making process vague and unclear. As a result, the efficiency of Japan’s aid 
has been questioned.  
 
Inter-Ministry Rivalry and ‘Too Many Actors’ 
It is often asserted that the most serious problem in Japan’s aid is “the competitive, 
vertical structure of the aid administration which prevents extensive horizontal 
communication between the many elements of the bureaucracy involved in aid.”73 As 
indicated above, each ODA scheme possesses its own procedures and related actor. 
Among ministries and agencies involved in aid, the more influential actors are the 
MOFA, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) and the Economic Planning Agency (EPA). Together, they are called 
the Yon-Sho-Cho Taisei or the ‘four ministries system’. Although several other 
ministries and agencies have shared the aid budget and influence over the policy, the 
actual aid programme has been very much directed by the above four actors and 
agencies under their jurisdiction, such as Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) as the MOFA’s external body.    
   Each ministry and agency has various roles, interests, purposes and structures in aid 
administration. The MOFA acts in the context of diplomacy and foreign policy to 
improve Japan’s image in the international community by converting views of Japan 
being a mere economic power or a ‘free rider’ in international security. In order to 
enhance Japan’s good image, this ministry has been sensitive towards concerns of other 
countries about what they think of the state.   
   The Ministry of Finance (MOF) can be considered as a financial manager for the 
country’s economy, so its role is to secure a stable financial situation for Japan. The 
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Ministry of International Trade and Industry has a similar role, but it acts more in 
promoting Japan’s private business sectors. Therefore, contradiction and conflicts have 
often occurred between the MOFA and the other two ministries. The former focused on 
Japan’s international reputation and the latter on promoting Japan as an economic power. 
Rix (1993) describes this situation as follows: 
 
It is often said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seeks to enhance Japan’s 
security and image through aid, whereas the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI) has primarily trade promotion in mind, and the Ministry 
of Finance (MOF) has kept the purse strings locked tight.74       
 
 Wright-Neville (1991) claims that bureaucrats had more loyalty to their parent 
ministries than to the government.75 Inevitably, conflicts exist between the ministries.  
Three ministries have their own aid implementing agencies under their jurisdictions 
as well, which contributes to the complicated form of aid administration. The MOFA 
exerts much influence over the Grand Aid and the administration of JICA, which 
controls a part of the Grant Aid. The MOF is in charge of the Yen Loan scheme, 
supervises the Export-import Bank (Exim Bank) and also has a certain influence on the 
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF). Although the Economic Planning 
Agency (EPA) was technically responsible for the OECF, presidents of the agency are 
traditionally retired MOF officials. This situation explains how the MOF is influential 
over the OECF in comparison to Japanese presidents of the ADB. Both agencies were 
combined into the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) at a later stage.  
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Major Actors in Japan’s Decision-Making  
    There is little doubt that the ‘four ministries system’ was one of the major 
problems in Japanese foreign aid. However, the problem which affected the overall aid 
structure in Japan lay in Japan’s general decision-making system. The ‘Iron Triangle’ 
was the traditional term given to the decision-making process of Japan and had a huge 
influence on aid policy making during the period focused on here, though there were 
several other semi actors.76 It was called ‘triangle’ because politicians, bureaucrats and 
the business sector each took a position of the triangle to form policies, and refused to 
allow the participation of external actors such as NGOs. The inter-Ministries rivalry 
which was explained before is involved in this decision-making process and the rivalry 
among bureaucrats makes the system even more complicated.  
A number of researchers have analysed this ‘Iron Triangle’ way of policy 
decision-making. This triangle still remains, with some transformation in the 
participating actors such as the media and fast-growing computer-related firms that keep 
themselves apart from the rest of established business sector because of their differences 
in business philosophy and strategy77, but it comprised the above three powers in the 
1990s. Furuoka (2002) who has analysed Japan’s economic sanction policy in the 1990s 
says, “there is little doubt in Japan that a powerful combination of politicians, 
bureaucrats and big businesses- the so-called ‘Iron Triangle’ - has been effectively 
                                                   
76 Some scholars say that the “Iron Triangle” theory was already out of date in the 1990s. However, 
authors believe that this system still had much influence over Japan’s decision-making process. This 
will be explained later.   
77Traditional Japanese companies have several philosophies in business such as family-like 
management and the lifetime employment system. This style has its own advantages but it also 
slowed down the effectiveness of management for over-protection of employers. Newly started firms 
pursue different viewpoints in their business such as cost-effectiveness by having many young 
contract-based workers. As a result, new companies have been catching up with traditional 
companies and performing strongly in the market. Because of these differences in management and 
envy of the success of the other, relationships between traditional and new companies are often 
unfriendly.   
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ruling the country’s policymaking.”78 He also concludes that it successfully influences 
Japan’s aid policy-making process as well.79 Tabb’s description identifies the situation 
of Japan’s decision-making process as; “the nexus of corporate interest, the LDP 
[Liberal Democratic Party], especially the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry has ruled Japan for the last half century.”80 
   As a consequence here, the above three sectors connect with each other for their 
own interests and mutual benefits. The following section explains each actor and then 
reveals how they relate to each other, and why it has been problematic for Japan’s aid 
policy-making.  
 
Bureaucracy: ‘Amakudari’ or Early Retirement System 
   Bureaucracy is at the centre of Japan’s aid programme, as it makes up all four major 
actors in the ODA. Wright-Neville (1991) describes the attitude of bureaucrats as: “civil 
servants who are heavily involved in the policy formation process, often exercising a 
degree of initiative and individuality which would be unacceptable in other advanced 
industrial democracies.”81 Although Japan’s domestic politics have been dominated by 
politicians and bureaucrats, Furuoka argued that the trend was not observed in the aid 
programme.82 Regarding this aspect, Hirata (1998) concludes that politicians have less 
interest in the aid programme because it is a poor vote-catcher.83   
   The bureaucracy, the most powerful actor in the aid programme has a connection 
with the other two actors of the triangle, politicians and the business sector. However, it 
                                                   
78 Fumitaka Furuoka, “Challenges for Japanese Diplomacy After the End of the Cold War,” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, no.1, April (2002): 122. 
79 Furuoka, 122.  
80 William K. Tabb, “The End of the Japanese Postwar System”, Monthly Review 51, no. 3, (1999): 
77. 
81 Wright-Neville, The Evolution of Japan’s Foreign Aid 1955-1990, 52. 
82 Furuoka, “Challenges for Japanese Diplomacy After the End of the Cold War”, 122. 
83 Hirata, “New Challenges to Japan’s Aid: An Analysis of Aid Policy-Making”, 322. 
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does not spare a place for the external actors such as NGOs.  
   Matsumoto (1997), who researched Japan’s aid programme in the Lao Republic, 
reveals the ignorance of the actions of external actors by the bureaucracy, stating that 
bureaucrats superficially say that they are open to external voices such as NGOs. 
However, whether they are to be referred to the decision-making process or not is 
totally left to the bureaucrats’ preference.84  
 
Politicians: Election Campaigns Need Money 
   According to Orr (1993), there are three functions for the Japanese Diet to 
implement in the aid programme: 1) to pass the annual aid budget allocation, 2) to pass 
a special resolution prohibiting the use of foreign aid for certain purposes, and 3) to 
authorise a carry-over.85 He also mentioned that bureaucrats have been drawing a bill 
of annual aid budget allocation, and in practice, the Diet cannot change a bill once it has 
been submitted by bureaucrats.86 ? ?  
   Although politicians rarely have an interest in the aid programme, there are some 
occasions where they are involved, such as when a business sector lobbies them. There 
are two channels that politicians can use when they want to influence bureaucrats: 1) 
lobbying the bureaucrats, 2) and assembly influence through the country’s friendship 
associations. In order to be re-elected, politicians need to run election campaigns and 
that requires money. On this aspect, politicians can closely link themselves to the 
business sector. According to Rix, politicians provided solid ODA related contracts to 
                                                   
84 Satoru Matsumoto, Mekong-Gawa Kaihatsu: 21 seiki no Kaihatsu Enjyo (Mekong River 
Development: Development Assistance in the 21st Century), (Tokyo: Tsukiji Syokan, 1997), 177.  
85 Robert M. Orr., Domestic Dimensions of Japanese Foreign Aid, (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of 
Strategic and International Studies, 1993), 5 
86 Orr, 5.   
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the business sector and asked them to purchase party tickets for fundraising in return.87   
 
Business Sector: We Want Stable Government’s Funded Projects 
There are three main actors in the business sector that have an impact on the aid 
programme. They are the construction companies, the trading companies and the 
consulting companies.     
There are four possible reasons why the business sector has had an impact on the aid 
programme as part of the established decision-making process: 1) the absence of a 
single aid agency, 2) an insufficient number of aid staff, 3) the re-employment of 
bureaucrats, and 4) a funding source for politicians.  
   Regarding the lack of a single aid agency, Arase said, “this system of decentralised 
authority…is also important to the private sector clients of the main ministries and 
agencies who use bureaucratic sponsorship to gain access to ODA resources.”88 The 
insufficient number of aid staff has created the bureaucrats’ dependency on trading 
companies’ seconding (syukko) to fill the gap in their information gathering. As Orr 
(1993) indicates, “on the commercial matters trading companies make the American 
CIA look like amateurs. They are professionally run, with clear commercial 
objectives.”89 
   Among politicians, there is a special group called Kensetsu Zoku or “Construction 
interest group” which maintains a special connection with construction companies. 
They have a mutual interest in funding resources for politicians and project contracts for 
construction companies, which makes them closer to each other for mutual benefits. 
                                                   
87 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge: Policy reform and aid Leadership, 55.  
88 David Arase, “Public-Private Sector Interest Coordination in Japan’s ODA,” Pacific Affairs 67, 
no.2  (1994): 178, 
89 Orr, Domestic Dimensions of Japanese Foreign Aid, 9-10. 
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Construction companies lobby politicians to gain access to construction contracts in 
ODA projects. This is because with ODA, the government is the client, so its payments 
are always guaranteed.  
   Trading companies, as well as consulting companies, act as ‘Request Makers’. As 
already indicated, the principal nature of Japan’s aid giving is request-based. As Orr 
(1993) writes, “the trading companies often inform recipient countries of the type of 
funding they can obtain from Tokyo…The trading companies can advise as well as 
assist in the negotiation process in Tokyo to ensure that the recipient’s request receives 
a positive response.”90 As Matsumoto (1997) implies, development assistance projects 
are owned by the government and consulting companies at the request level.91      
It has been clearly shown above that each actor of the ‘Iron Triangle’ has been 
closely connected. The biggest problem in this system was that it was extremely 
exclusive, and outsiders were hardly ever able to penetrate it. In terms of Japan’s 
foreign aid, outsiders such as NGOs which had been carrying out their own aid 
activities and gaining a good reputation were ignored by the system. This resulted in a 
huge loss for the Japanese government. Therefore, when it became necessary to 
highlight Japan’s contribution and presence in the international arena via its foreign aid 
it was natural for NGOs to become partners. The only miscalculation made by the 
government was that NGOs have now grown out of their hands.  
 
3.4 Why is a New Aid Policy Line with NGO Participation Needed? 
   The complexity of Japan’s aid programme has been made apparent in the above 
analysis. There were many ‘too’s in explaining the Japanese aid structure: there were 
                                                   
90 Orr, 10. 
91 Matsumoto, Mekon-gawa Kaihatsu: 21 Seiki no Kaihatsu Enjyo (Mekong River Development: 
(Development Assistance in 21st Century), 179. 
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too many major actors with too many various interests involved in procedures that were 
too complicated. Therefore, a new aid policy line was required in order to make 
Japanese aid efficient as well as demonstrate Japan’s presence in the international 
community.    
       
Showing Japan’s Contribution: Showing its ‘face’ 
   After the Gulf War, the Japanese government was urged to show its active 
contribution in the international arena. As already discussed in this thesis, Japan faced 
severe criticism for not providing a human contribution to the international crisis scene, 
but only financial assistance. The intention of the Japanese government to take an active 
role in the international arena can be read from various sources, especially from its 
official foreign aid annual reports. The then Prime Minister (PM) Kaifu Toshiki made a 
speech at the Diet in March 1990 that clarified the Japanese government’s intention “to 
use Japan’s economic and technological resources and its past experience as the basis 
for an active role in international efforts to create a new order.”92 According to one 
statement, this is what Japan should do in its foreign aid programme: 
 
Changes in the international community require Japan to make a wide-ranging 
human contribution, and in addition to assistance at the government level, we 
also need to consider seriously how individual Japanese can contribute. There 
is growing awareness in Japan of the importance of aid based on public 
participation, including activities by local authorities and NGOs.93 
 
                                                   
92 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1991, 3. 
93 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1991, 10. 
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What can be read here is that NGOs were mentioned in terms of the human contribution 
that Japan was required to make. In Japan’s ODA 1994, there was a clear 
acknowledgement of the importance of NGOs in making Japanese aid visible. The 
following statement made by the government emphasises how NGOs were appreciated 
in developing countries, which also means it would be useful for the government to use 
their established strong reputation and popularity. 
 
In response to requests for funds received from NGOs which are involved in 
aid activities in developing countries and those from local public bodies of 
developing countries to finance grass-roots projects, Japan’s overseas 
diplomatic missions have quickly come up with grant aid tailored to meet their 
needs, and the visible aid activities in which these NGOs are engaged at the 
grass-roots level are highly appreciated by the people of developing 
countries.94 
 
The report also stated, “…economic and technical aids of private citizens and local 
public bodies can be extended through direct contacts at grass-roots level with 
developing countries, and the government should lend active support to such efforts 
from the standpoint of promoting visible aid.”95 NGOs’ good reputations and visibility 
in the aid receiving countries have attracted the government’s attention. Therefore, a 
budget for supporting NGOs was extended for their “widespread sympathy and high 
appreciation, here and abroad.”96 
Having mentioned NGOs’ importance in their official statements repeatedly, the 
                                                   
94 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1994, 75. 
95 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1994, 92-93 
96 MOFA, 93. 
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Japanese government has tried other means to make its contribution visible. One was by 
hosting high-level international conferences in the early 1990s such as the Mongolian 
Assistance Group Meeting, the International Committee on Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction of Cambodia, the Comprehensive Development Forum on Indochina, 
and the International Conference on African Development. The other action taken by 
the government was the adoption of the Official Development Assistance Charter in 
1992. This charter is regarded as Japan’s aid philosophy, which Japan has been 
criticised for not having, and has been the basis of Japan’s foreign aid programme since 
then. The next section addresses this Charter prior to analysing the “Visible Japanese 
Aid” policy.      
  
“Official Development Assistance Charter” 
  Japan’s aid philosophy, the Official Development Assistance Charter, was adopted in 
1992. The rationale for this adoption was described as: 
 
As a major economic power, Japan is obliged to meet the expectations 
placed on it by international society, and is working to increase the quantity 
and quality of its aid. An essential step in this process is to clearly set forth 
the concepts and principles pertaining to aid and to carry out this aid more 
effectively and efficiently. This will increase domestic and international 
understanding of these efforts, and help to secure a broad base of support.97 
  
Four points were made in the Charter as follows: 
 
                                                   
97 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1992, 3. 
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1)  Environmental Conservation and development should be pursued in 
tandem.  
2) Any use of ODA for military purposes or for aggravation of international 
conflicts should be avoided. 
3) Full attention should be paid to trends in recipient countries’ military 
expenditures, their development and production of mass destruction weapons 
and missiles, their export and import of arms, etc., so as to maintain and 
strengthen international peace and stability, and from the viewpoint that 
developing countries should place appropriate priorities in the allocation of 
their resources in their own economic and social development. 
4) Full attention should be paid to efforts in promoting democratization and 
the introduction of a market-oriented economy, and the situation regarding 
the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient country.98   
 
In the Charter, the government declared that Japan should pay close attention to the 
social development side of the aid projects. Based on this declaration, there was a clear 
shift in Japan’s foreign aid. The shift was towards so-called ‘Software aid’ which NGOs 
have played important roles in implementing.  
 
Conclusion: From Hardware to Software Aid: A shift in Japan’s aid programme     
“Software aid” was first introduced in the MOFA’s aid annual report in 1995. It 
described the change from traditional aid to a new aim “to achieve the ultimate purpose 
of official development assistance to developing countries, development of human 
resources and institutional building is no less important than that for economic 
                                                   
98 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1998, 151. 
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infrastructure.”99 It also emphasised the importance of the “software” aspects of 
development, which are the “introduction of a parliamentary system, the judiciary, 
labour-management relations and the election system of Japan”100. The aim of this is to 
promote the democratic process in the recipient country as well as the introduction of a 
market-oriented economy, and the creation of an agricultural cooperative system. One 
point to remember is that in this description of software aid, the term ‘good governance’, 
or ‘securing of basic human rights’ was avoided. So at this stage, although the 
government declared its change to a new line, this change was on purely technical 
matters.     
   Since the adoption of the ODA Charter, the Japanese government has been 
gradually responding to requests made by the international community in the early 
1990s, exemplified by a decrease in the percentage of tied aid, which often is used as an 
indicator of aid quality. In 1993, the total bilateral ODA in Japan’s foreign aid consisted 
of 11 percent of the entire amount, which was the lowest amongst the five other top 
donors.101   
   As discussed earlier, Japan’s traditional strength in its foreign aid was economic 
infrastructure. Although the government declared it would shift the objective to 
software aid, infrastructure projects remained a major aid programme, as shown in the 
government’s “Three Balance” policy in 1994. The Three Balances are: 
 
1)  Maintaining a balance between the traditional type of aid and new types of 
aid; 
                                                   
99 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1994, 60.  
100 MOFA, 64. 
101 Tomoko Fujisaki et al., “Japan as Top Donor: The Challenge of Implementing Software Aid 
Policy,” Pacific Affairs, Winter (1996/1997): 522.  
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2) Maintaining a balance between material (“hardware”) aid and human and 
institutional (“software”) aid; 
3) Maintaining a balance between large-scale development projects and 
small-scale (grass roots) projects.102 
 
   In this “Three Balances” policy, the “traditional type aid”, “material aid”, and 
“large-scale development projects” mean the same as economic infrastructure 
concentrated aid. In contrast, “new types of aid”, “human and institutional aid” and 
“small-scale projects” aim to develop new approaches towards newly arisen global 
issues such as the environment, population growth, HIV/AIDS and Women in 
Development (WID). This is accomplished through the improvement of human 
resources and the involvement of Japan’s own governmental and non-governmental 
bodies such as the Japan Overseas Volunteer Centre (JOVC) and NGOs.103 The mix of 
conventional and new approaches to aid has clearly been shown in these three points, 
which explains the contradiction that the Japanese government faced.        
As Fujisaki et al. (1996) mentions, although, “by depicting them as a matter of 
balance, the MOFA has both confirmed the conventional approach to hardware, 
large-scale development projects as a strength of Japan’s foreign assistance”104, and the 
government “has expanded the scope of ODA to more ambitious and proactive 
approaches such as software and new types of aid.”105 
   The increase in subsidies for NGOs can also be an indicator for changing from the 
hardware to the software aid policy line. Fujisaki et al. (1996) admits, “the 
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strengthened governmental support to NGOs is certainly a new and a positive 
change.”106 However, he also argued that the subsidy does not cover what the NGOs 
really need, such as the cost for personnel and other recurrent costs.107 This means that 
despite the government established partnership system for NGOs, its functional 
effectiveness is still questioned.  
   Answering this question, the next chapter will focus on the interactions between the 
Japanese government and NGOs. The main focus will be on how NGOs have made use 
of “official interactions” prepared by the government by going through each 
governmental cooperation scheme. 
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Chapter 4 
Interactions: 
How do NGOs interact with the Japanese government?  
 
 4.1 Introduction: Various Interactions with Japanese NGOs 
Japan’s ODA started in the 1950s as part of the Colombo Plan. As the previous 
chapter noted, although starting as an aid receiving country, Japan had become one of 
the top donors of foreign aid by the 1990s. Yet, after receiving severe international 
criticism for its ‘faceless’ aid policy at the beginning of the 1990s, the Japanese 
government faced the need to create “Visible Japanese Aid (VJA)”. This incorporated 
transparency and effectiveness in the aid strategy through cooperation with 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).  
To facilitate cooperation with NGOs, the Japanese government has established 
schemes to provide financial assistance and ways of institutionalisation for NGOs. They 
also became institutionalised via access to the aid decision-making process through 
sub-official meetings with the government such as NGO-ministries and aid agencies 
meetings. Yet, there is doubt that in practice NGOs are guaranteed the political access 
that the government has claimed. Many NGO related staff have stated that the 
cooperation system with the government is superficial, and in reality, they have been 
struggling to access central decision-making proceedings. As Rix states, “although the 
government wants to use NGOs as a convenient aid delivery vehicle and its providing 
high levels of subsidies and project funding, the attitude in Japan is still far from 
regarding the NGOs as partners in development projects”.1 On the other hand, it is also 
                                                   
1 Alan Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge: Policy Reform and Aid Leadership, (London: 
Routledge, 1993), 70.  
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true that Japanese NGOs have been becoming more influential than ever in official aid 
policy, as has been demonstrated by many articles.2 
This chapter focuses on Japanese NGOs’ interactions with the government from the 
beginning of the 1990s. The objective is to analyse how Japanese NGOs sought to 
increase the influence on the government’s aid decision-making process. These 
interactions are both official and unofficial. Official interactions were made by using the 
established institutionalised means, while the unofficial were through private means. 
The chapter will conclude with examples of Japanese NGOs’ interactions with the 
Japanese government, which will be cases that the following chapters will examine.     
       
4.2 Government’s Cooperation System with NGOs: “Collaboration, Support and 
Close Dialogue” 
Collaboration 
Three main fields of cooperation with NGOs have been set up under the following 
titles: “Collaboration, Support and Close Dialogue”. “Collaboration” introduced an idea 
of a ‘Japan Platform’ by linking the government, business community and NGOs 
together to provide quicker and more effective emergency humanitarian relief such as 
disaster relief. Major overseas projects taken by the Japan Platform programme since its 
start include: assistance to Mongolia when it experienced heavy snow damage in 
2000/2001; providing support to Western India after the 2001 earthquake, and 
reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan as well as assisting Afghan refugees 
(Appendix 2: Figure 2). 
Although the Japan Platform has occupied a major part of “Collaboration”, there are 
                                                   
2 There are a number of authors who have written about the importance of Japanese NGOs in 
Japan’s ODA. For example, Sumi (1989), Shiratori (1995), and JVC (2000). Takahashi (2004) has 
written especially about Japanese NGOs in Japan’s official aid strategy in general terms.  
 94 
some concerns regarding the system itself. Firstly, NGOs compete against each other to 
receive funding from this scheme. This can spoil the networks established among them. 
Secondly, NGO activities can be integrated into official aid activities to the detriment of 
NGOs’ autonomy and independence. Thirdly, because the Japan Platform was designed 
to provide emergency relief, its area of operation has been limited.3 To increase the 
visibility of ‘humanitarian relief’ areas which require long-term assistance, such as 
improving living conditions and easing poverty, tend to be ignored.  
 
Support 
The “Support” scheme involves financial assistance. The government has described 
the subsidies as the “main pillars of the governmental NGO support scheme.”4 In other 
words, it has said that the financial assistance is the mainstay of the government’s 
cooperation with NGOs, rather than building cooperation systems for NGOs to obtain 
access to official decision-making.  
   There have been two major schemes of financial assistance available for NGOs: the 
NGO Project Subsidy (NPS) and the Grants for Grassroots Projects (GGP). The NPS 
was mainly for use by Japanese NGOs, while the GGP was available for local NGOs in 
aid receiving country. The budgets for these two financial assistance programmes have 
increased and there is little doubt that many NGOs have benefited from these resources.  
Financial support has also been provided by other ministries: For example the 
Ministry of Post and Telecommunication has an ‘International Volunteer Support’ 
scheme, on which a number of NGOs rely, including some international agencies such 
                                                   
3 Mekata Mekata, ed. NGO Sekutaa ni Kannsuru Rokkakoku Hikaku Choosa: MDBs tono Renkei ni 
Mukete (Comparative Analysis on NGO Sectors in 6 States: Toward a Cooperation with MDBs), 
(Keizai Sangyoo Kenkyuujyo, 2004) March 2004, p.189. 
4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), “Collaboration, Support, and Close Dialogue,” n.d., 
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/category/ngo/partnership.html#l> (9 December 2003).  
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as United Nations World Food Programme (UNWFP).  
As stated in annual reports on Japan’s ODA by the MOFA, Japanese NGOs are 
experiencing a range of financial problems. In order to support their financial basis as a 
part of the government’s cooperation system, the MOFA and the MOF have established 
subsidies for NGOs. The MOFA, the ministry which provides the largest amount of 
subsidies to NGOs among ministries, has two main financial support schemes. As 
mentioned earlier, they are: NGO Project Subsidies (NPS) and Grant for Grassroots 
Projects (GGP), both of which were established in 1989. This marked the beginning of 
NGO-Government financial cooperation. Before this, the “Japanese grant aid had been 
limited to the inter-governmental level.”5  
The government has used these financial subsidies as a tool to hold control over 
NGOs. In respect to the connection between governmental subsidies and NGOs, 
Baragouthi (1997) has stated, “northern NGOs are increasingly dependent on their 
governments for funds, and this in turn has resulted in a clear changing in the policies of 
these [Non-governmental organisations])”6 Japanese NGOs are no exception. What 
makes situations surrounding the Japanese NGOs worse is that in the Japanese 
government’s funding scheme, later payment system. In this system, NGOs cannot 
receive repayment from the government until they complete their projects. 
  Since its start in 1989, the financial support scheme has experienced some changes. 
For example GGP has been divided into the ‘Technical Cooperation for Grassroots 
Projects’ and is mainly operated by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 
                                                   
5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), Japan’s ODA 1999, (Tokyo: Association of 
Promotion for International Cooperation [APIC], 2000), 19. Although there was a small capital flow 
from the government to Japanese NGOs, it was a private scheme and not officially set up. 
6 It was “organisation” in the original sentence but the author changed this to “Non-governmental 
organisations” in quotation to clarify the meaning. Refer to Mustafa Barghouthi, “North-South 
relations and the question of aid,” in Development and Patronage, ed. Melakou Taegan and Debora 
Eade (London: Oxfam Great Britain, 1997), 69. 
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and partly to Grant Assistance for Japanese NGOs in 2002. A new financial support 
system for emergency relief was also set up in 1999 and evolved into the 
aforementioned Japan Platform (JPF) in 2000. The MOFA explained that these changes 
were for the enhancement of activities by Japanese NGOs and their capacity building.7  
However, even though the scheme of financial support has encouraged this change, 
several problems remain. These include the lack of personnel interchange between 
official aid agencies and NGOs. This obstructs efforts to work for the common good. 
For instance, multiple windows of aid administration confuse funding and project 
applications. It may be concluded that this financial support system is meant to assist 
the government’s ability to take advantage of the NGOs and control their autonomous 
activities. By tightening the purse’s strings, the government is capable of holding 
control over NGOs by requiring them to impose “self-restriction” in order to obtain the 
government’s approval for funding. The following section analyses each scheme for 
financial support and reveals several remaining problems, as well as examining how 
NGOs are trying to move away from the government’s influence. 
 
NGO Project Subsidies: “it will be reimbursed later” 
   The NGO Project Subsidies (NPS) programme started in 1989. It was the scheme 
under which “the government subsidises one half of the cost of development 
cooperation projects undertaken by Japanese NGOs in developing countries”. 8 
However, it is important to note here, that it was not a ‘matching fund’ system as many 
other DAC countries have for their NGOs. The ‘matching fund’ system is when the 
                                                   
7 MOFA, ODA to NGO: Seifu to NGO kan no Renkei, Shien, Taiwa (ODA and NGO: Cooperation, 
Support and Consultation between the government and NGOs), (Tokyo: Minkan Enjyo Sienshitsu, 
2003), 2.  
8 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1996 (Tokyo: APIC, 1997), 184. 
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government subsidises NGOs twice the amount as the NGOs have earned. In Japan, the 
government supports NGOs by “not more than 50 percent”.9    
   The budget for this scheme started with 110 million JPN in 1989, but as it is one of 
two main financial support systems, it increased drastically to one billion JPY in 1996. 
However, it later decreased to 684 million JPY in 2000 due to the continued recession 
in Japan (Appendix 2: Figure 3)  
   In contrast with the Grant for Grassroots Project (GGP), this system is purely for use 
by the ‘Japanese’ NGOs. Considering this, it is important to note that since 1998 the 
scheme’s budget has continued to decline. In contrast, the GGS budget has increased 
with subsidies flowing directly to local NGOs in developing countries. This can be seen 
in “South-South cooperation”10, which literally means mutual help between entities in 
developing countries. In this context, the Japanese government has donated funds to 
local NGOs in developing countries to help the local people.  
Under this cooperation scheme, it is also true that the Japanese government could 
control the flow of funds to local NGOs in developing countries by bypassing the 
Japanese NGOs, which used to play major roles in overseas projects. The direct fund 
flow to the local NGOs turn them into major players instead of Japanese NGOs. Two 
assumptions can be made from this point: firstly, it is by providing ODA to the local 
NGOs directly that the government can practise the “Visible Japanese Aid (VJA)” 
strategy by giving money under the name of the country. A crucial problem here is that 
there are many NGOs in developing countries wanting to receive foreign capital for 
their own sake but not for the sake of people in need. As described in the previous 
                                                   
9 Suzuka Yoshida, NGO ga Sekai wo Hiraku (NGOs open the world) (Tokyo: Aki Syobo, 1995), 
185.  
10 Japan’s ODA 1997 and Japan’s ODA 1998 have sections on “South-South Cooperation” in page 
98 and page 84.  
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chapter, a divide between elite and non-elite in community can often be observed in 
developing countries. It is possible that the government could pay money to NGOs 
which were formed by elite groups intentionally to benefit themselves from donated aid. 
Secondly, the Japanese government is in a position to weaken NGOs by regulating their 
power by decreasing the financial support.11 
As repeatedly mentioned in the government’s white paper, Japan’s ODA, the 
prominent weakness of Japanese NGOs is financial. A lot of NGOs rely on 
governmental funding for their survival, especially after the ‘economic bubble burst’ 
when private business sectors were interested in providing financial support as a part of 
the ‘philanthropic’ trend. 12  With the decreasing aid budget the Japanese NGOs 
competed against each other over a smaller pie. In order to obtain a piece of the pie, 
NGOs can impose ‘self-regulation’ to gain the government’s favour or preference. If the 
government is not satisfied with results from an NGO, its application for reimbursement 
can be rejected.  
The other important feature of this scheme lies in the nature of projects that are to be 
funded. According to Japan’s ODA 1996, projects that can be covered by the scheme 
are listed as follows; 
 
1) “Agricultural and fishing village development projects (construction of 
livestock raising areas and construction of small-scale irrigation facilities.) 
2) Manpower development projects (construction of schools and libraries, 
literacy education, etc.) 
                                                   
11 Mikimasa Yoshida, ed., NGO no Genzai- Kokusai Kyooryoku Katsudoo no Genjyoo to Kadak 
(Current situation of NGOs: Issues in international cooperation activities), (Tokyo: Asia Keizai 
Kenkyuujyo, 1997), 7. 
12 The ‘Philanthropic’ trend involved the business sector practicing its social responsibility in 
society when they make profit out of the society. It has become a trend since the 1980s.    
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3) Health and hygiene projects (construction of simple toilets, nutritious 
meals programs for pregnant women and infants.) 
4) Medical care projects (construction of clinics in outlying areas, travelling 
clinics.) 
5) Improvement of local industry projects (construction of vocational 
training centres and industrial promotion facilities.) 
6) Improvement of living environment projects (construction of wells, 
construction of living condition improvement centres.) 
7) Environmental conservation projects (afforestation.) 
8) Projects for hauling private aid goods, and projects for transferring and 
disseminating development cooperation techniques (seminars and 
workshops on development cooperation techniques.)”13  
 
Most of these categories involve ‘construction’. The government has stated that NGO 
project subsidies are meant to support software aid. In contrast, the Grant for Grassroots 
Projects (GGP) concentrates on hardware aid.14 However, projects related to software 
aid only occur in the eighth category in the form of ‘seminars and workshops’. From a 
NGO perspective, a ‘construction’ project means a huge budget. This was especially 
difficult for NGOs with lower amounts of self-funding and a small number of staff in 
terms of implementing such projects.  
   The main problem in this scheme is that it is operated on a ‘later payment’ system. 
Also, governmental subsidies are only allowed to be spent on the projects themselves, 
and not on administration costs such as personnel, on which NGOs typically spend a lot 
                                                   
13 MOFA, Japan’s ODA1996, (Tokyo: APIC, 1997), 184.  
14 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 2000, (Tokyo: APIC, 2001), 298. 
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to maintain highly-trained staff. 
   This financial assistance can be an effective mean for the government to take control 
over NGOs.15 The ‘later payment’ system has two drawbacks for NGOs. Firstly, it 
restricts the actions of NGOs to ‘self-regulation’ in order to obtain reimbursement from 
the government after projects are already finished. This is because the government will 
only repay NGOs upon receipt of the submission of final reports of already finished 
projects.16 Yamamoto (1995) laments, “payment is received from the government only 
after a project is finished,…Therefore, NGOs have to have enough funds to carry out 
projects before receiving reimbursements from the government.”17 In cases where the 
government is unsatisfied with achievements, repayment requests can be rejected. The 
other drawback is that NGOs have to accomplish projects without actual financial 
support. They only have the government’s promise of repayment. Therefore NGOs are 
frequently forced to complete projects to a lesser quality than they would ideally like 
due to this financial reality.18 
 
Grants for Grassroots Projects (GGP): direct funding for local NGOs in developing 
countries  
   A second financial support scheme consists of the Grant for Grassroots Projects 
(GGP). It started as ‘Small-Scale Grant Assistance’ in 1989, and was renamed in 1995.  
   According to Japan’s ODA 1999, the stated aim of this support system is that the: 
“GGP serves as a framework for financial assistance to economic and social 
                                                   
15 Michiya Kumaoka, interviewed by the author, 24 June 2003.  
16 Maki Hasegawa, interviewed by the author, 15 March, 2003. 
17 Tadashi Yamamoto, ed., Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific Community: 
Nongovernmental Uprisings of the Emerging Asia Pacific Regional Community: a 25th Anniversary 
Project of Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE), (Tokyo: JCIE, 1995), 152. 
18 Hideaki Ishii, interviewed by the author, 15 October, 1999.  
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development projects implemented by NGOs, local government, and research and 
medical institutions that take an active part in developing countries.”19 As indicated in 
the graph (Appendix 2: Figure 4), the budget for this scheme keeps increasing.  
   The difference between this grant and NGO Project Subsidies (NPS) was that it was 
not only aimed at supporting ‘Japanese’ NGOs, but also local NGOs in developing 
countries. In fact, a large share of the aid went to local NGOs, which accounted for forty 
three percent of the total NGOs, and Japanese NGOs only received four percent in 
1998.20  
   Under the GGP scheme, embassies or agencies in developing countries may receive 
applications for projects. The embassies and agencies themselves are in charge of the 
project selection and the decision-making. Projects which can be covered by this 
support system are described as follows: 
 
The largest share of GGP funding goes to projects in the education and research 
fields, such as the construction and repair of elementary school classrooms. This is 
followed by projects in the fields of heath and medical care and social infrastructure 
and environment. The former include the provision of medical equipment for 
hospitals, hospital ward construction and improvement of mother and child heath 
care.21         
 
   It is clear that “construction” is important in this grant, which is similar to the NPS 
scheme. Embassies try to distribute grant aid evenly among the above fields. However, 
medical care applications, which seem more like emergency relief as it has usually been 
                                                   
19 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1999, (Tokyo: APIC, 2000), 19. 
20 MOFA, 24.  
21 MOFA, 24.  
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related to natural disasters, were preferred above the other fields by the Japanese 
government.22  
   These two subsidy schemes clearly showed the intention of the Japanese 
government to utilise NGOs as government vehicles. The Japanese NGOs have been 
manipulated due to the decrease in the budget, the ‘later payment system’, and 
‘preferred’ projects for funding. However, the Japanese NGOs fought back against the 
government by making full use of ‘interactions’ that will be described in a later section. 
 
Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Projects 
   The Japanese government established a new scheme of financial support for NGOs 
in 2002, called Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Projects. The result and impact 
of this new scheme is yet to be examined due to its short history. Only a brief overview 
will be given here. This grant is an integrated form of the existing GGP and a part of 
financial assistance for NGOs in emergency relief activities and allows a spent on 
administration cost of NGOs, which was not permitted by other financial subsidy 
systems such as NPS and GGP. In return, NGOs which receive this assistance are 
obliged to accept external auditing for all their applicable projects. Therefore, NGOs are 
required to provide accountability and transparency to the outside.23 This system 
secures healthy organisational management of them at the end, which are often 
questioned for their secretive nature.   
       
 
 
                                                   
22 An anonymous MOFA official, interviewed by the author, 17 August 2002. 
23 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 2002, (Tokyo: APIC, 2003), 116-117. 
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Close Dialogue     
The last scheme, “Close Dialogue”, aims to foster close dialogue between the 
government and NGOs to generate better aid practice. Under this scheme, the 
NGO-MOFA Regular Meeting and the NGO-Embassy Meeting are held regularly with 
other aid agencies participating. There is also other dialogue with aid implementing 
agencies such as Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (MOFA’s jurisdiction). 
Attempts to open this dialogue were seen not only with MOFA, but also with other aid 
implementing entities as well, such as the regular meetings between NGOs and the 
Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC) (under MOF jurisdiction).         
In addition to these actual support schemes, a clear indication of the cooperation 
with NGOs appeared in numerous official documents and declarations, such as the 
ODA Charter which was adopted in 1992 as a guideline for Japan’s foreign aid. While 
respecting NGOs’ independence, this encouraged cooperation with NGOs as well as 
other aid agencies such as the United Nations24. Another example, the Medium-Term 
Policy on ODA adopted in August 1999, mentioned the importance of establishing 
cooperation with NGOs as well as appropriately utilising their resources25. The MOFA 
started up a special support section under its jurisdiction to assist in the cooperation 
with NGOs, the Minkan-Kyoryoku Suishin Shitsu (or the NGO Activities Promoting 
Room within the Economy Planning Agency [EPA]). In addition, the MOF also 
integrated two different aid agencies into one agency, the Japan Bank of International 
Cooperation (JBIC) in 2001 for more effective aid implementation. This agency is to 
conduct Japan’s Yen Loan projects. 
 
                                                   
24 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 2001, (Tokyo: APIC, 2002), 119 (Japan’s Official Development Assistance 
Charter, 4. Measures for the Effective Implementation of Official Development Assistance).  
25 MOFA, 140. 
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Are They Really Cooperative?   
On the basis of these positive and encouraging official claims, it would appear the 
cooperation between the Japanese government and NGOs was ‘improving’ through the 
system of enhanced cooperation. Apparently, while the ‘change’ has appeared in the 
relationship in the new systems, there remains doubt as to whether the change is 
actually ‘improving’ the system, or merely ‘old wine in a new bottle’. 
   It is suggested here that analysis of the governmental documents and statements can 
be misleading and possibly one-sided. Mitsuhiro Saotome, of the MOFA, has stated that, 
“the Japanese government has been expanding its support for NGOs in terms of 
enhancing organisational structures as well as their finance.”26 However, in the author’s 
interviews with some NGO personnel that are receiving ‘governmental support’, 
dissatisfaction with the Japanese government has been clearly indicated. 
   For instance, as has been mentioned, the financial assistance budget for NGOs 
increased if the two schemes, NPS and GGP, were seen as one. When looking at the 
budgets of these two schemes separately, it is obvious that the budget for GGS was 
increased while that of the NPS was decreased. Considering who were eligible to 
receive these two subsidies, it can be said that the Japanese government has favoured 
funding directly local NGOs in aid receiving countries rather than enhancing Japanese 
NGOs budgets. This contrast with what was happening under the “South-South 
Cooperation” system. However, the fund has bypassed Japanese NGOs but flew directly 
to local NGOs in developing countries.  
   The “later payment system” that meant funding was provided upon completion of 
the project was a critical issue in the way in which subsidies were implemented under 
                                                   
26 Mitsuhiro Saotome, “Role of NGO/NPO in Japan’s ODA”, Kokusai Mondai (International 
Affairs) 517 (2003): 69. 
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this system. Even though the funding was approved, the NGOs had to fund a project by 
themselves until they were repaid by the government, so the financial burden remained 
as the NGOs’ own problem. In order to receive the repayment NGOs increased 
‘self-restriction’. This meant that NGOs adopted behaviour favourable to the 
government in their projects.         
The most frequent cause of discontent from the NGOs was a lack of 
‘institutionalised interaction’ with the government, which is defined as official access to 
the decision-making process to consider their opinions in aid policy. While other 
Northern/Western NGOs enjoy their institutionalised status (such as attending 
governmental conferences or being invited as part of official envoys), Japanese NGOs 
do not have official access to the government’s decision-making process. Meanwhile 
dialogue between them could be possible as one MOFA official states, “We are eager to 
listen to outside voice. It is, however, left to bureaucracy whether they would be 
referred or not into actual policy forming”.27 
 Having said this, the Japanese NGOs have their own ways of putting pressure on the 
government concerning foreign aid issues. However, the Japanese government also uses 
these interactions to control NGOs. The author defines this as ‘unofficial interaction’. In 
order to reveal the substantive meaning of the NGOs’ participation in their usage of 
unofficial interactions in Japan’s foreign aid, this chapter will address the claims of both 
the government and NGOs in terms of their ‘cooperation’.  
 
4.3 Interactions: Taking advantage of established systems 
   From the existing NGO study and several pieces of field research, five major types 
                                                   
27 A section manager of MOFA, letter to Satoru Matsumoto, quoted in Satoru Matsumoto, 
Mekon-Gawa Kaihatsu: 21 Seiki no Kaihatsu Enjyo (Mekong River Development: Development 
Assistance in 21st Century), (Tokyo: Tsukiji Syokan, 1997), 177. 
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of interactions between NGOs and the government in Japan can be observed.28 They 
are: ‘Meeting’ type interaction, ‘Workshop’ or ‘Symposium’ type interaction, ‘Personal 
Relation’ type interaction, ‘Network’ and ‘Petition’ type interaction, and ‘Media 
Cooperation’ type interaction. The following sections will closely examine each of 
these interaction types. By doing so, this chapter will present the indicators for 
analysing case studies of this thesis.  
 
‘Meeting’ interaction type 
    Both official and unofficial meetings have been used by both the government and 
the NGOs to exert influence on each other. The government has established some 
institutional cooperation schemes for NGOs, stating that, “to forge equal partnerships 
between the government and NGOs through the exchange of opinions between the two 
sides concerning the state of international cooperation and how it can be improved.”29 
The two main aid conducting ministries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF), have started holding regular meetings with NGOs since 
the mid-1990s. This scheme constituted part of “Close Dialogue”, which has already 
been discussed. ?  
   One point to make here, is that the financial support system (which will be discussed 
later) started in 1989, but the institutional cooperation scheme had to wait for its 
establishment until the mid-1990s. The government has not made any comments with 
regard to this. However, it could be assumed that the emergence of NGOs was 
accelerated in the mid-1990s. It is common knowledge among the scholars that the year 
1995 was the epoch-making year for Japanese NGOs when people came to realise the 
                                                   
28 Other interactions may exist, but when restricted to interactions within Japan (i.e. excluding 
Japanese NGOs activities overseas), these five comprise the main interaction types. 
29 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1996 (Tokyo: APIC, 1997), 186. 
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importance and effectiveness of NGOs. However, Kawano (2004) conducted research 
and found out that the number of articles on Japanese NGOs drastically increased after 
1993.30 Nevertheless, 1995 is still considered to be the most important year for the 
emergence of Japanese NGOs’. The biggest reason for this is that in 1995, NGOs’ 
effective and nimble activities at the Great Hanshin Earthquake caught public attention, 
which was in vivid contrast to the late arrival of the government’s rescue teams. In 
addition to the Great Hanshin Earthquake, NGOs’ rescue activities at an oil leak disaster 
in the Sea of Japan in 1997 also won public attention and recognition.31 These two 
major incidents, the earthquake and oil tanker accident in the mid-1990s, altered the 
government’s attitude toward collaboration with NGOs, not only financially, but 
institutionally as well. However, the government has not wanted NGOs’ participation 
too much, so the introduction of institutional cooperation was delayed compared with 
financial support. 
The drastic change of the government’s attitude toward NGO participation in aid 
during the 1990s shows two sides of its strategy. One side reflects international 
criticism of Japan’s “faceless” ODA. The Japanese government intended to utilise the 
NGOs as a ‘name-carrier’ for their activities at a grassroots level in developing 
countries because the Japanese NGOs had already gained a good reputation from their 
activities with the local people. The other side is an inward strategy aiming to 
‘legitimise’ the government’s aid activities. After the failure in the above two incidents, 
engaging NGOs into its new aid policy was essential for the government’s popularity 
and efficiency. At the same time, the government has provided an arena for Japanese 
                                                   
30 Masao Tao and Yuji Kawano, Boranthiya - NPO no Soshiki-ron: Hieiri no Keiei wo Kangaeru 
(Organisational theory of Voluntary and NPO: to think about management of NPO), (Tokyo: 
Gakuyo Syobo, 2004), 31. 
31 Asahi Newspaper, “Nahotoka Disaster”, Sea Accidents in the Past, n.d., 
<http://mytown.asahi.com/toyama/news02asp?c=11kiji=191>. (15 October 2003). 
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NGOs to grow stronger by establishing an institutional cooperation system.  
Based on these strategies, regular meetings held by the two ministries and other aid 
implementing agencies under their jurisdiction have taken place. There have been active 
exchanges of opinions between the NGOs and the government officials. From the 
government’s perspective, regular meetings ensure the transparency and legitimacy of 
Japan’s foreign aid. From the NGOs perspective, regular meetings provided 
opportunities to express their concerns and ideas. Hirata (2002) remarks: 
 
The policy dialogue between NGOs and MOFA/JICA staff have created an 
environment where both parties listen to each other and learn about their 
different beliefs…In other words, these policy dialogues allow NGOs to gain 
many points of access to policy making – an important character of 
pluralism.32 
 
It seems both sides enjoyed the benefit of holding these meetings. However, it is 
important to note that these meetings are open to the public and this possibly makes 
them be less serious than those held exclusively with decision-makers.33 There are no 
promises that any of the opinions or ideas that come from these people will actually be 
institutionally taken into account in aid policy-making. Although there are some 
exceptions, these are few compared to the number of meetings.  
In this section, two objectives are set for analysis. The first addresses how 
influential these regular meetings are on Japan’s ODA. The second addresses how 
Japanese NGOs are making use of the unofficial interaction to put pressure on the 
                                                   
32 Keiko Hirata, “Whither the Development State? The Growing Role of NGOs in Japanese Aid 
Policy Making,” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis 4, no. 3 (2002): 25.  
33 Michiya Kumaoka, interviewed by author, 30 June 2003.  
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government.       
 
NGO-MOFA Quarterly Meeting  
   MOFA’s explanation for cooperating with NGOs is given as follows: “Cooperation 
has also reached the point where NGO’s specialised knowledge is being made available 
for official aid activities.”34 On this point, it is clear that the government’s cooperation 
with NGOs was more for the government’s good than for realising partnerships with 
them.  
NGOs - MOFA quarterly meetings started in 1996, right after the Great Hanshin 
Earthquake. There are also plenary meetings and two subcommittees in addition to the 
regular meetings that provide other opportunities for communication. At the 
conferences, agendas from the four subordinated committees are confirmed. The four 
subordinated committees each have special focuses such as “consultation for ODA 
policy”, and “NGO activities support and encouragement”. The MOFA mentioned that 
these meetings, committees and conferences have been promoting interactions between 
the government and NGOs.35 
   On the other hand, there was a different viewpoint from the NGOs side. Michiya 
Kumaoka of Japan International Volunteer Centre (JVC) mentioned at the second 
meeting in 2001, that “too few efficient results have been drawn from meetings for 
times and hours we have spent.”36 He has also shown his suspicion of the back door 
relationships between the MOFA and particular NGOs in receiving subsidies; that is, 
                                                   
34 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1998, (Tokyo: APIC, 1999), 77. 
35 MOFA, “the governmental support for NGOs”, MOFA’s cooperation for NGOs, n.d., 
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/seisaku/seisaku_4/sei_4.html.> (20 May 2003). 
36 Japanese NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC), “NGO-the MOFA meetings 
Gijiroku (NGO-the MOFA Meetings Records)”, n.d., 
<http://www.janic.org/res/teikikyogikai2001-2.html> (20 July 2003).  
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whether there have been any “secret promises made”.37 The MOFA officials at the 
meeting denied this. However, it is important to note that as there were doubts posed by 
a NGO. It can be assumed that there was something that prompted them. The suspicion 
of a secret linkage between the MOFA and some particular NGOs has affected relations 
between the Japanese NGO community. As stated by Donowaki (1999), competition 
among NGOs is getting harder.38 Hirata (2004) regarded this phenomenon as “partisan 
battles”.39 There are now more than 400 NGOs seeking official subsidies. Michiya 
Kumaoka has said that in the 1980s, his leading NGO, JVC, was able to obtain funds 
from the Japanese government with ease for there were few competitors. However in 
the 1990s, obtaining official funds became difficult for JVC as it faced competition 
from other powerful NGOs.40 Any suspicion of secret deals such as indicated earlier, 
could be obstructive to building cooperation among the NGO community. 
The outputs and suggestions from these meetings have indicated some changes in 
the government’s policies on NGOs. These changes include expanding the amount of 
GGP; and implementing the joint evaluation in October and November 1997 of an ODA 
programme in Bangladesh.41 This was the first joint action to evaluate past projects. 
Another example of output from these meetings was a new financial assistance scheme 
for NGOs, Grant Assistance for Japanese NGOs Projects, which was mentioned earlier 
under “Support”.42 The idea came from the meeting and it was discussed at these 
meetings several times and was released in 2002.      
   As a whole, however, issues at meetings have appeared vague and lack definite 
                                                   
37 JANIC, 20 July 2003. . 
38 Mitsuro Donowaki, Introduction to Preventive Diplomacy, (Tokyo: Japan International Forum, 
1999), Chapter 3.  
39 Keiko Hirata, “Civil Society and Japan’s Dysfunctional Democracy,” Journal of Developing 
Societies 20, no.1-2 (2004): 19 
40 Michiya Kumaoka, interviewed by the author, 24 June 2003. 
41 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 2000, 77. 
42 MOFA, Plaza for International Cooperation 94, April (2002): 4.  
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plans when compared with those of the NGO - MOF meetings on bilateral aid. At the 
meetings, NGO participants and the MOFA officials have talked about how their 
partnership ought to be realised such as through ‘building equal relationships’. However 
they have not talked about each project as they have at the NGO - MOF meetings.   
   Murai (2002) casts doubt about the transparency of NGO-MOFA meetings as the 
government claims, especially in terms of its selection of NGOs. He does not deny that 
the meetings are efficient but adds, “it is unclear who is in charge of selecting NGOs for 
participation by what measure”.43 Kiyotaka Takahashi, a NGO person on policy 
advocacy issues, says that NGOs with a different attitude towards ODA than the 
government’s were rarely chosen to take part in the meetings. The government makes 
no mention of this.44 Specifically on this respect, NGOs themselves are inclined to 
frame their activities by ‘self-regulation’ in order to be chosen by the government as 
participants. This ‘self-regulation’ is also evident in accessing and obtaining the 
governmental funding, which will be discussed in the next section.     
   The Japanese government gives no evidence regarding its NGOs selection according 
to preference, but there is circumstantial evidence to prove the government’s intention. 
It has already been discussed in this thesis several times, but suspicion surrounding the 
selection of NGOs at the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to 
Afghanistan could explain the attitude of the government toward NGOs. The details 
have not been given at this point, but the government did not allow Peace Winds Japan 
to participate in the conference as it was reasoned that its director has an unfavourable 
opinion about the governmental policy.45 As Murai (2002) comments, it is easy to 
                                                   
43 Yoshinori Murai, “ Watashi tachi no Teigen (Policy Advocacy for ODA legislation),” in ODA wo 
do Kaereba iinoka (How should we change Japanese ODA), ed. Yasushi Fujiwara and Rie Nagase, 
(Tokyo: Commons, 2002), 268-269. 
44 Kiyotaka Takahashi, interviewed by the author, 22 April 2003. 
45 For details of the incident, see Katsuhiro Harada, Document: NGO Kyohi, Gaimusyo, Suzuki 
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apply this to the NGO-MOFA meeting’s selection process. 
   Establishing institutional support for NGOs was nevertheless important and a 
promotion of the partnership between NGOs and the government. Before 1996, there 
were no joint meetings among them, except for the exchange of private opinions. 
Therefore, NGO-MOFA Regular Meetings and other similar meetings can be 
highly-valued. However, as long as the government holds the power in selecting 
attendance, NGOs have to play within the rules set by the government. The balance of 
power is still in favour of the government and far from a ‘partnership’ relationship, 
which is meant to be an equal balance of power. 
 
 NGO-the MOF Quarterly Meetings  
   The start of the NGO - MOF meetings has involved one politician, which forms a 
part of the “Iron Triangle” system. In February 1997, MP Tadatoshi Akiba and a NGO 
exchanged views on the decision-making process of Japan’s bilateral loan within the 
Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs),46 and accountability of the MOF in relation 
to aid. After the exchange, MP Akiba argued strongly for having regular meetings to 
exchange opinions with the MOF regularly at the Zaimu Iinkai (Finance Committee) 
and obtain positive feedback from the MOF officials.47 MP Akiba insisted that having 
regular meetings would secure the “Accountability of the Japanese government”.48 
Before then, the position or the strategy of the Japanese government in MDBs had been 
                                                                                                                                                     
Muneo tono Koubo 90 nichi (True Story of Rejection of the NGO, 90 days of conflicts against the 
MOFA and Muneo Suzuki), (Tokyo: Gendai Jinbunsha, 2002).  
46 Ministry of Finance (MOF), “MDBs Division,” Japan’s Effort to MDBs, n.d., 
<http://www.mof.go.jp/mdbs/p2002_01.htm.> (3 August 2003). 
47 Japan Center for Sustainable Environment and Society (JACSES), “Hossoku made no Haikei to 
Keii (Background of Establishing Meetings),” Teiki Kyogikai no Rekishi (History of MOFA-NGO 
regular meetings), n.d., <http://www.jacses.org/sdap/mof/background.html.> (25 July 2003).  
48 Refer to JACSES website for more information. JACSES 
<http://jacses.org/sdap/mof/background.html>, (9 December 2005).  
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private. The MOF influences the Yen Loan in ODA (Refer Chapter 3: 68), so NGOs 
were eager to observe and make comments to the MOF in order to put pressure on what 
they consider, ‘unsuitable’ projects. The establishment of the regular meetings created 
an arena for NGOs to express their concerns. 
   The meetings were open to the public, and have occurred on a regular basis, there 
being 21 up to February 2003. The meetings were three hour sessions, held four times a 
year and began in April 1997. Each agenda for the meetings was influenced by 
important contemporary issues such as the financial crisis in Asia in 1997, the 
integration of OECF and the Japan Export and Import Bank (Exim Bank) in 1998, both 
of which were bilateral aid-related agencies of the MOF, and the ADB Annual Meeting 
in 2000. Apart from these issues at the macro level, a number of queries and opinions 
were made by NGOs in terms of several Yen Loan projects, for example; Namtun Dam, 
the second hydro plant issue (NT2) of Laos since 1997, which some NGOs considered 
‘unsuitable’.      
   In comparison with NGO - MOFA regular meetings, which often have been vague 
and ineffective despite the length of time spent on them by the NGOs’ side, as noted at 
the second meeting in 2001.49 The NGO - MOF Meetings have considered concrete 
issues posed by both sides.  
   NGOs’ participation in the decision-making processes is as follows; NGOs 
suggested an inspection panel in JBIC in reference to the World Bank in the 20th 
Meeting; requested information disclosure and NGO’s participation in setting 
environmental guidelines of ODA projects in the 10th Meeting; and NGOs requested an 
explanation of how ‘public comment’ was taken into account in setting the guidelines in 
                                                   
49 JANIC, “NGO-the MOFA Meeting Gijiroku (NGO-the MOFA Meeting Records),” 
<http://www.janic.org/res/tekikyogikai2001-2.html.> (3 August 2003).  
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comparison with the World Bank in the 17th Meeting. Issues have also been raised on 
Japan’s bilateral loan system itself; and NGOs criticised the increase of the ‘tied’ rate 
since 1997, raising suspicion at the MITI’s (renamed the Ministry of Electricity, Trade 
and Industry: METI since 2001) intention to favour Japanese firms in the 7th Meeting.50 
In the 5th Meeting, a representative of Mekong Watch, an environmental advocacy 
NGO, made a comment on the government’s so-called “participatory approach” 
research on ODA project. It was said that with the presence of government officials, the 
true opinion of village residents would not be heard for fear of getting into trouble 
later.51 Not only was there pressure on the government, but also the participation of 
NGOs has allowed the government to obtain information from the grassroots level.  
 
‘Workshop’ or ‘Symposium’ interaction type 
   As the Japanese government has made regular meetings ‘open to the public’ to scale 
down their impact, NGOs have organised ‘workshops’ or symposiums with the 
participation of government officials. The aim is to make the discussion agendas more 
public and eye-catching than the government’s expectation.  
   In the 1990s, many workshops and symposiums on aid issues were held by both the 
government and NGOs. The government has held meetings on environment issues, 
“Peace Building” schemes for conflict-stricken areas such as Cambodia, Africa and 
Afghanistan, and the banning of landmines issue. NGOs also have chaired symposiums 
in the 1990s on similar issues.  
  The tactics of NGOs in holding these workshops and symposiums lie in making them 
                                                   
50 JACSES, “Gijiroku (NGO-the MOF regular meetings mandates),” Kako no Gijiroku (Mandates 
in the past), n.d.,  <http://www.jacses.org/sdap/mof/gijiroku/mof07.txt> (4 August 2003). 
51 Mekong Watch Japan, ed., Development, Environment and Human Rights in Burma/Myammer – 
Examining the Impact of ODA and Investment (Tokyo: Mekong Watch Japan, 2001), 7. 
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public to put pressure on the government, by making them ‘open to the public’ and 
updating records to the public. Hirata explains it as, “In order to pressure Japan’s aid 
programs to improve, they held seminars and meetings and frequently appeared in the 
media, exposing ODA failures, corruption, mismanagement, and misuse of funds.”52 
Thanks to improvement in media technology, NGOs are able to publicise coming 
workshops and symposiums effectively, which used to be limited to people eager to be 
involved. Updating records of workshops and symposiums straight after them also have 
provided people with less interest easier to access to the issues. Their low cost has 
helped NGOs facing financial difficulties.  
   The difference between NGO workshops and symposiums and those of the 
government lies in the time they are held. Usually, the government set regular meetings 
of NGOs - MOFA, NGOs - MOF, NGOs - JICA and - JBIC starting at 1 o’clock in the 
afternoon on weekdays. For example, JICA’s meeting started at 1:10 pm on Monday 
with participants from academics, the MOFA, governmental consultants, and the NGO 
field. Records of the regular meetings have shown clear typology of participants: the 
MOFA officials, MPs and NGO personnel. The early time on weekdays is inconvenient 
for ordinary people, such as those working at companies and shops or busy with 
household work. Thus, even if people are much interested and have the will to attend 
participation is not possible. Naturally, possible participants are limited to people in 
governmental occupations, academics, and NGOs, whom the government considers 
either friends or competitors, which do not represent ordinary voters. Conversely, 
workshops and symposiums held by NGOs usually start around 6:30 or 7:00 in the 
evening. An example is, the “ODA meeting” by ODA-NET which people are able to 
                                                   
52 Keiko Hirata, “Wither the Development State? The Growing Role of NGOs in Japanese Aid 
Policy Making”, 20. 
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attend after work.53 If they are held at mid-day, they are on weekends.     
   The NGOs’ tactics also aim to put pressure on the government through influencing 
the governmental officials when attend. There is usually discussion and question time 
among participants, and attending governmental officials are required to answer any 
questions posed. Knowing records will be open to the public, officials are unable to 
ignore questions. Moreover, when they leave in the middle of sessions, to avoid being 
questioned it leaves suspicion among other participants that the government has 
something to hide. All four NGOs that are to be analysed in the following case studies 
have held these workshops and symposiums.  
 
‘Personal Relation’ interaction type 
   Historically, Japanese domestic politics have been dominated by the sentimental 
attitude of people in power, as is in the case in most countries. In other words, a policy 
change is likely if one can impress high-power decision-makers. This so-called 
“Naniwa-bushi” is deeply rooted in the Japanese culture, and often appears in both 
traditional and contemporary literature and drama.  
Japan’s aid policy decision-making is no exception. It has been affected by 
high-powered people. However, the phenomena can work in positive and negative ways. 
On the negative side, the 2001 incident involving the former MP of the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP), Japan’s long time ruling party, is a clear example. MP Muneo 
Suzuki indicated that he wished the MOFA to refuse one NGO’s participation at the 
conference on rebuilding Afghanistan hosted by the Ministry because of his personal 
discontent with the organisation. This NGO was actually one of the best emergency 
                                                   
53 Having said this, Japanese workers tend to work longer times due to the economy recession or 
fear of restructuring. Still, it is much easier to attend than during lunch time on weekdays.  
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relief NGOs in terms of self-finance and project handling. Apart from that, the director 
of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) had a long history of being 
selected from retired MOFA officials so as to provide second opportunities for 
obtaining a high-salary and social position after their early retirement.54 Retired MOFA 
officials usually have a strong relationship with the home ministry even after they have 
left. Therefore, JICA has been keen to obtain the governmental agency’s favour before 
it obtains public support in its aid projects. As can be seen, the worst drawback here lies 
in obstructing effective aid policy implementation. According to JICA officials, there 
have been a number of ‘doubtful’ acceptances of aid applications that could be affected 
by an individual Ambassador or powerful politicians.55  
   This culture can also work well for NGOs by creating opportunities. An example is 
the case of Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), which will be discussed in 
Chapter 6. Analysis will not be provided here. Other than the mine issue, the 
Cambodian case should be included. Yasushi Akashi, a Japanese UN staff member was 
in charge of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and the 
Japanese government eagerly participated in peace building activities in Cambodia 
during the 1990s. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has 
also received large donations from the Japanese government. That was because Sadako 
Ogata was the commissioner for the organisation. According to Takeda (2002): “Ogata 
was a Japanese appointee to the position of UNHCR commissioner and that the 
Japanese government, including its foreign ministry, created a system to provide her 
with its full support. In that sense, Ogata diplomacy can be seen as an extension of 
                                                   
54 In August 2003 JICA made the major change in its organisational structure. After being 
independent from the MOFA (so-called Dokuritsu Gyosei Hojin, an autonomous administration 
body), Sadako Ogata was appointed a new director. She is the first director chosen from non-MOFA 
retirees.  
55 JICA ha Dokuritsu dekirunoka? (Can JICA be independent)?” Asahi Simbun, 19 June 2003:4. 
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Japan’s foreign policy.”56 
   Much of both inward and outward policies of Japan, including international aid 
strategy, has been affected by people in power. It is considered that Japan itself does not 
have a principle for its behaviours so it is possible to move the government to a 
direction desired by influential outside groups. They even make use of people’s pure 
sympathy, if necessary. 
 
‘Network’ and ‘Campaign’ interaction type 
   As NGOs are too small by themselves, they have traditionally tried to build 
networks within and beyond their borders in order to exert more influence and launch 
larger activities. This is not only applicable to Japanese NGOs but also to other NGOs 
in the world as well, especially in Asia.57 The networking works both positively and 
negatively and the following case studies illustrate this interaction. Therefore, this 
section will provide only a general understanding of this interaction.  
The importance of a domestic network lies in information sharing and forming a 
bigger influential group. Naturally, the larger the number of participating NGOs, the 
more they can operate activities to influence by their sheer force of numbers. A problem 
here though is that, when there are too many leaders in one group the group tends to 
lose its unified objective and be easily fragmented. In addition, it is often hard to 
achieve a unified objective among a lot of groups with different interests and aims.    
Building an international network is a crucial aspect which Japanese NGOs can 
                                                   
56 Isami Takeda, “Humanitarian Aid Diplomacy: From Cambodia to Afghanistan,” Gaiko Forum 2, 
no.2, (2002): 23. 
57 Vincent Kelly Pollard, Globalisation, Democratisation and Asian Leadership: Power Sharing, 
Foreign Policy and Society in the Philippines and Japan, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 150. Pollard 
mentioned importance of networking between NGOs in Asian countries and used the Philippines as 
a case study.  
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create that through their international counterparts. There are many branches of 
powerful international NGOs located in Japan such as Oxfam Japan, CARE Japan, 
Amnesty International Japan, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) Japan, Greenpeace 
Japan, and Friends of the Earth (FoE) Japan. A third case study of this thesis focuses on 
two environmental NGOs listed above to analyse the advantages and disadvantages of 
being branches of stronger international NGOs.  
Apart from these branches with international origins, some locally established 
Japanese NGOs try to connect to international NGOs in order to gain outside support, to 
learn their efficient operational strategies and to hold joint campaigns. The following 
three case studies show the advantages of relating to each other internationally but they 
also show some issues can arise from working too closely to powerful and stronger 
international organisations.  
Frequently, this ‘Network’ type interaction involves ‘campaign’ type activities when 
several NGOs, Northern/Western and Southern/Asian NGOs, jointly launch campaigns 
on issues such as human rights, poverty, trade, and the environment. Often, ‘campaign’ 
type activities are described as part of lobbying activities. Those come under ‘personal 
relationship’ type interaction in this thesis because a major campaign activity is to 
influence decision-makers through motivating public populations.58  However, this 
thesis defines ‘campaign’ as a mobilisation of populations led by NGOs on issues such 
as development through public appeals such as the demonstration of public opinion, and 
petition.      
As stated earlier, a petition is an important campaign activity to facilitate the 
presentation of public opinion on issues. NGOs jointly working on issues often jointly 
                                                   
58 See John Clark “Policy influence, lobbying and advocacy’ in Making a difference: NGOs and 
development ed. by Michael Edwards and David Hulme (London: Earthscan, 1992). This examined 
the linkage between lobbying and campaign.  
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launch public petitions. This is simply because the larger the size of petitions, the larger 
the impact of the petition. It is important to note here that this petition type activity is 
not only used by NGOs against the government’s decision but also used by others who 
oppose NGO opinions. This is illustrated by the trade issue. The Chamber of Commerce 
sometimes believes NGO opinion defending the local benefits in developing countries is 
an obstacle to its trade promotion.      
 
‘Media Cooperation’ interaction type 
   There is no doubt the media has the power to influence public opinion. One 
prominent example is the Kosovo war where an American public relations firm used all 
media tools to visualise positives or negatives by using a created term, “ethnic 
cleansing”.59 By doing so, it is partly true that this PR firm contributed a lot to 
influencing where ‘justice’ lay in the conflict. 
   Taking advantage of the media’s power, almost all NGOs have their own media 
strategies, regardless of their size. Those international NGOs, especially groups about 
the environment, have their own publications which are a strong tool of advocacy, as 
well as having their own internet homepages which provide a direct link to the public. 
Many of these websites are well-made so as to catch attention. Through publications, 
NGOs can provoke interest, popularity, and a basis for encouraging pressure on central 
governments.  
   Japanese NGOs often use the media efficiently as well. It is well known that Japan’s 
ODA issue itself drew strong public attention through some publications by scholars at 
the beginning of the 1990s. One of the following case studies will clearly show how 
                                                   
59 Refer to Tohru Takagi, Document Sensoo Koukoku Dairiten: Jyohoo Soosa to Bosnia Funsoo 
(Document-War PR Firm: information control and the Kosovo), (Tokyo: Koodansya, 2002).   
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NGOs have used the media to get their message directly to people to create public 
pressure. However, NGOs face a possible backlash from the media too. The media can 
easily make someone a hero when they are useful, but when they misbehave or are no 
longer useful, the media can pull them down easily too. This is because the story of a 
hero who lost his/her prestige is an interesting story that will receive much attention, a 
key goal of the media.      
 
4.4 “NGO Divide” 
   Having seen the five interactions, it appears likely that the government and NGOs 
are trying to get hold of each other from both directions. These dynamics have affected 
the Government-NGOs relations in Japan, which has often been excluded from the 
existing research. Yet it is important to note that Japan’s NGO community is not one 
solid group.  
There are some strong NGOs and other weak NGOs, and whether one can use the 
aforementioned interaction or not is dividing them into two groups; those who have and 
those have not. The author calls this the NGO Divide. Not only is this gap appearing 
between Japanese NGOs, as the relationships of some NGOs have become closer to the 
government and have become primary actors in a network, some other NGOs have 
moved away from the government and refuse financial support. Hirata observes this 
phenomenon and notes as follows: 
 
These groups are most active at JANIC [a coordinator NGOs in Japan] and 
represent the NGO coordinating center. Excluded from the interaction with 
MOFA are small NGOs located outside the Tokyo area…In short, the Japanese 
NGOs community is diverse and only certain types of NGOs have direct 
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contact with MOFA and have the opportunity to influence the ministry’s aid 
policy.60 
    
Peace Winds Japan (PWJ) and the Japan International Volunteer Centre (JVC) are 
two examples belonging to the respective cases; PWJ is a fast-growing NGO in Japan 
in emergency relief, although its focus has started moving towards gender and 
development issues. PWJ has become a main actor of the Japan Platform and now is 
one of the most powerful NGOs in Japan despite only starting in 1996. Although PWJ 
does a large amount of self-funding, it receives financial assistance from Japan 
Platform, whose funding comes from Grant for Japanese NGOs in 2001 and 2002.61 
JVC is illustrative of the latter case. It is one of the oldest and largest Japanese NGOs 
specialising in overseas development projects. JVC received financial support from the 
government at 8.4 percent in 2001.62 However, JVC staff has said that it has started 
trying to decrease the amount of money received from the Japanese government, 
although it still totals around 11.8 percent in 2002.63 JVC personnel’s reason for 
attempting to decrease official subsidies was to avoid “self-restriction”. If the 
governmental subsidy continues to make up a large share of its finance, it would 
self-impose a restriction on JVC’s aid activities. JVC does not participate in the Japan 
Platform partly for that reason. Kiyotaka Takahashi of JVC stated in an interview that: 
“Although we understand money is money and we need it, but we cannot accept having 
a large share of the government’s assistance in our resources when we are against what 
                                                   
60 Hirata, “Whither the Development State?: The Growing Role of NGOs in Japanese Aid Policy 
Making”, 27 
61 Mitsuhiro Saotome, “Nihon no ODA ni shimeru NGO/NPO no Yakuwari (Roles of NGO/NPO in 
Japanese ODA)”, Kokusai Mondai (International Affairs) 517, (2003).  
62 Japan International Volunteer Center (JVC), “ Fiscal 2001 Financial Report”, Activities Guideline, 
(JVC: Tokyo, 2002), 26.  
63 JVC, “Finance,” Trial and Error 223, September (2002): 14. 
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the Japanese government pursue especially in development field.”64 
   It is important to acknowledge that there are various attitudes within the NGO 
community. Some utilise the government’s assistance for their activities, while others 
refuse. This ‘NGOs Divide’ shows the possibility of not only a gap between the 
government and NGOs, but also competition among NGOs which will grow in the near 
future. 
        
4.5 Conclusion: How have been interactions working? 
   It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese government has tried to have control 
over the Japanese NGO community using the financial subsidies system, capacity 
building, and regular meetings. For example, in order to obtain the government’s 
approval for funding, NGOs learn to self-restrict their activities. There is little doubt 
that the government systems in place since 1989 is helping NGOs. This is because most 
Japanese NGOs are financially supported by these systems.65 However, while the 
government describes it as ‘assistance’ or ‘support’ 66 , many NGO staff that I 
interviewed consider it ‘vague control’. The crucial question here is: Is the Japanese 
government actually letting NGOs ‘participate’ in its foreign aid strategy, or just 
‘supporting’ them to be a vehicle to carry the country’s name? 
However on the other hand, NGOs have been trying to put pressure on the 
government using various interactions. As for fighting back against the ‘vague control’ 
imposed by the government, Japanese NGOs have also been utilising the institutional 
cooperation scheme of regular meetings established in the late 1990s, even though the 
                                                   
64 Kiyotaka Takahashi, interviewed by author, 22 April 2003.   
65 Pacific Asia Resource Center (PARC) (Japan), “NGO database”, n.d., <http://www.parc-jp.org> 
(15 October 2002).  
66 MOFA has used these words in a series of annual reports. For example, Japan’s ODA 1997: 121 
and Japan’s ODA 1998: 82. 
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government intended to use them as controlling tool for NGOs. Some important 
outcomes drawn from NGO-the MOFA meetings include as a new subsidy scheme for 
Japanese NGOs. In comparison, NGO-the MOF meetings have raised questions from 
the ‘grassroots level’ of the NGOs, which the ministry implementing the aid would not 
have known had it not been informed at these meetings.  
   Having said that, the Japanese government has changed its aid strategy in small 
ways. This has included expanding governmental subsidies or implementing joint 
evaluations of overseas projects as NGOs demanded and suggested, though only 
changing its aid policy when faced with international requirements or criticism. The 
change of aid policy from vast bilateral relationships to “Peace Building” streams was 
the biggest example. However hard NGOs have pushed the adoption of human rights 
issues into Japan’s ODA policy at the meetings, the government shows no sign of taking 
it into account. Yet, some NGOs have been producing successful outcomes to put 
pressure on the government to change its attitude in foreign aid policy using many 
interactions. Four NGO activities will be analysed in the next chapters using case 
studies to clarify how the operation modes of Japanese NGOs is different from those of 
the Western or other Asian NGOs in terms of pressuring the Japanese central 
government.     
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Chapter 5 
Case Study 1  
Japanese Development NGO: Fight against the Established Authority 
 
5.1 Introduction 
     The late emergence of the Japanese NGO community has already been discussed 
in Chapter 1. Even so, there are some NGOs that started their active operations after 
the 1970s. The Japan International Volunteer Centre (JVC) is one such NGO and it has 
become one of the most powerful and influential development NGOs in Japan. Since its 
foundation, JVC has been carrying out a number of overseas projects to practise 
“efficient aid”.1   
JVC operated many overseas projects in the past, including projects in Thailand, 
Cambodia, and Vietnam. It has been operating aid activities separately from the state 
government for a few decades, but it started pouring much of its energy into the policy 
advocacy field in the 1990s. This was out of a need to promote the Japanese 
government to practise better Official Development Assistance (ODA). That means 
JVC has more interactions with the Japanese government than before in its policy 
advocacy activity, and it has brought some successful outcomes. The most outstanding 
outcome in the advocacy area in the 1990s was the cancellation of the export of harmful 
                                                
1 According to Bertin Martens, “efficient aid” is usually assessed on the following criteria as, “are 
programme objectives achieved in a sustainable manner, have policy reforms been implemented, and 
do they produce results in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction?” (Bertin Martens, “Aid 
Agencies and Aid Effectiveness”, Development Outreach: Putting knowledge to work for 
development, March 2004, <http://www1.worldbank.org/devoutreach/march04/article.asp?id=240> 
(16 March 2006). JVC has used this term to improve quality of Japanese aid, not quantity, to lobby 
the Japanese government. (JVC, Annual Report/ Fiscal 2004 and Fiscal 2005, [2004]: 24).  
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agricultural chemicals to Cambodia in 1993.2 Until the present time, JVC has been 
working actively in pursuing the government for a ‘better ODA’ in networking with 
other domestic NGOs.  
    This chapter examines the mode of operation of JVC by analysing its interactions 
with the government. It will conclude that JVC has used interactions as means to exert 
influence on the Japanese government, a practice learnt from both Western and Asian 
NGOs.  
   For the detailed analysis, a number of questions are raised relating to the case of 
JVC: How have they tried to be influential in order to promote the government to better 
its foreign aid policy? What means and interactions have they used? Which interactions 
are most commonly seen? Are there any drawbacks? 
   The reasons for choosing JVC as the case study over 300 - 400 NGOs (the 
government estimation in a series of Japan’s ODA) in this thesis are for the following 
reasons. Firstly, JVC is a purely Japanese domestic NGO, with most of the staff being 
Japanese. Some powerful international NGOs have their branches in Japan, such as 
Care Japan, Oxfam Japan, Save the Children Japan and Greenpeace Japan. It is often 
observed that these branch type NGOs possess similar modes of operations to their 
international headquarters, most often located in Western states. For this reason, they 
are not considered as ‘purely Japanese NGOs’. This will be discussed further in the 
third case study. In the case of JVC, because it is merely a domestic organisation which 
has its head office in Japan, it is possible to extract some particular essential mode of 
operation practised by Japanese NGOs. 
                                                
2 JVC itself delivered a brochure on this issue in 1993 and Hirata Keiko described this success story 
in detail in her work, refer to Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Role of NGOs in Tokyo’s Aid 
and Development Policy (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 107 - 113. 
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   Secondly, with its experience and history over the last two decades, JVC has been 
one of the leading development NGOs in Japan. Therefore, JVC has several clear 
interactions with the government that are valuable for analysis. In addition, JVC could 
be considered a model of a local development NGO. Based on the above reasons, this 
chapter will reveal JVC’s effective style of operation that may be applicable to other 
local development NGOs in dealing with the government.  
   There is an argument of how to assess the impact and effectiveness of NGOs when 
studying actual cases. Interaction, an international development NGO working in 
overseas assistance field, makes a statement and concludes that it is a very difficult task 
to evaluate. It says as follows: 
 
In order to share our success with our stakeholders and the wider public, 
we must provide evidence of our progress and achievement…Measures 
such as lean administrative-to-program ratios and large total budget size 
are very limited indicators3 
 
NGOs’ self-claim of impact in foreign aid has always been questioned that they often 
evaluate themselves higher than actual in order to attract more support. This is partly 
why this thesis does not rely solely on NGOs’ resources. Matsumoto made a comment 
in Newsweek that even if the Japanese government claims in similar to what Japanese 
NGOs claim, it did not mean Japanese NGOs successfully influenced the government 
because international politics was not that simple.4  
                                                
3 The Working Group on Evaluation and Program Effectiveness (2005) Interaction Position Statement on 
Demonstrating NGO Effectiveness: Approved by the IntreAction Board of Directors, September 20, 2005, 
Interaction, p.8.  
4 A comment by Professor Tsuneo Matsumoto, quoted in Newsweek, 29 March 2006, 27. 
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   Realising this difficulty of assessing impact of NGOs in foreign aid, it is very 
important to note here that NGOs impact can be read from government’s reaction to 
issue. If government adopts similar concepts which would not have been without 
NGOs’ interactions, it can be assumed that NGOs actually influence policies. For 
example, concepts such as ‘sustainable’, ‘good governance’ and ‘software’ were 
originally suggested by NGOs. Of course, this discussion of how to assess impact 
should be ongoing for future study but this thesis is grounding on the above statement 
to conduct the following case studies to analyse NGOs’ interaction to be influential.   
 
5.2. What is the Japan International Volunteer Centre (JVC)? 
History and Organisational Structure  
    Any research on NGOs is insufficient if it does not study the history of each 
organisation. This is because every organisation has its own way of developing 
operational strategy and no one is exactly the same as another. As such, the 
examination of the history of the NGO can be equivalent to analysing its own mode of 
operation. Thus, before moving on to study the behavioural modes of JVC in pressuring 
the Japanese government, its history and structure will be studied in this section.  
 
History 
In the “Vision” portion of its Mission Statements, JVC declares it activities as: “to 
realize a society where we all can live in harmony with each other”.5 Its activities were 
started in Bangkok in the late 1970s by a small number of Japanese volunteers who 
were eager to provide support for Cambodian refugees in Thailand. Michiya Kumaoka, 
                                                
5 Japan International Volunteer Centre (JVC), Activities Guideline:, (JVC: Tokyo, 2002), 28. 
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one of the founding members and the current director of JVC, recalls these days when 
he began working as a volunteer in Thailand. “no one would be able to turn his head 
away from those struggling people [Cambodian refugees]. Just wanting to do anything 
for them, I arrived in Bangkok and joined a volunteer group, which later grew into 
JVC.”6 Out of a need to integrate these people in order to practise more effective 
voluntary activities in Bangkok7, JVC started taking the form of an NGO in the late 
1970s. It was led by Syunsuke Iwasaki, the former Director and Masako Hoshino, the 
former Secretary of JVC, and was officially established on 27 February, 1980. 
   In the past, JVC concentrated on carrying out overseas development projects rather 
than on policy advocacy.8 Its main focus is still set on implementing actual projects in 
states such as Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, South Africa, Afghanistan, and the 
Middle East. However, at the same time, JVC realised that policy advocacy needed to 
be carried out in collaboration with the actual projects to promote better aid activities. 
In other words, JVC was able to pursue its own policy advocacy with the government 
based on its rich field experience as backup. Having developed strong confidence in 
practising projects to support people at grassroots level, JVC moved into policy 
advocacy in the early 1990s. 
 
Organisational Structure 
    What makes JVC stand out from other development NGOs in Japan is its strong 
organisational structure. The structure was developed in order to operate four missions: 
                                                
6 Michiya Kumaoka, interviewed by the author, 24 June 2003.  
7 Kumaoka, Michiya, Cambodia Sai-zen-sen (Frontline in Cambodia), Tokyo: Iwanami Press,1993, 
12 - 15. 
8 JVC’s mission statements are; 1) community-based sustainable development, 2) post-conflict 
reconstruction and reconciliation, 3) disaster relief and reconstruction, and 4) grass-roots 
networking. (Refer to JVC, Activities Guideline, [Tokyo: JVC, 2002], 28.) 
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1) community-based sustainable development, 2) post-conflict reconstruction and 
reconciliation, 3) disaster relief and reconstruction, and 4) grass-roots networking. Four 
important aspects can be observed in JVC’s organisational structure; sufficient human 
resources, a good fundraising basis, an efficient and quick decision-making process, 
and a strong leadership.  
 
Large Number of Staff 
Compared with other Japanese local NGOs, JVC has a large number of staff both in 
Tokyo and overseas to support its projects. It may be a little too harsh to put JVC and 
other NGOs on an equal footing for examination owing to the fact that many other 
NGOs are very small and possess far less experience, but there is a big difference in the 
number of staff. Smaller NGOs have only two or three full-time, paid staff. Quite often, 
they have no full-time staff and are all volunteer- based.  
On the other hand, JVC has around 40 full time staff, which is one of the largest  
among Japanese NGOs (Appendix 2: Table 2). Interestingly, the large staff numbers in 
organisations that are engaged in education or emergency relief, are also present in 
development NGOs. For example, the Japanese Red Cross Society, for which the 
Empress Michiko serves as an honorary president, employs 53,879 staff.9 Peace Winds 
Japan, a fast-growing emergency relief NGO, counted 290 regular staff. The difference 
in the staff numbers indicates that there is already a gap within the NGO community in 
Japan, even though the community was slow to grow in Japan.  
 
Fundraising Strategy 
                                                
9 There is argument about whether the RCSJ can be defined as an NGO or not, but in this case it 
will be analysed because its particulars match those of NGOs.  
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While many other NGOs do not, JVC has a good fundraising basis. As mentioned 
in the official report, ‘financial weakness’ is the key term that describes the weak point 
of Japanese NGOs. JVC, however, has remained financially strong on the following 
three fundraising strategies: donations (general donations and annual charity concerts), 
selling calendars and the membership system. In addition to this, there is the occasional 
prize money awarded by some fund organisations that contributes to the finance, but 
this will not be discussed here because it is rather an irregular strategy.10  
Approximately, one third of the whole financial basis of JVC is provided by 
personal donations.11 The donation manager of JVC states that donations for 
‘emergency relief’, or any popular causes such as Afghanistan and Iraq, received much 
more attention and drew larger donations. However, once they became out of date, 
donations quickly decreased.12 JVC has had to face a quick shift in the interest of 
people in donations; “a long-term issue such as development assistance that JVC has 
focused on is certainly less appealing than visible and fast-result emergency relief for 
people”.13 This is also why the Japanese government showed enthusiasm for 
emergency relief aid activities recently, since it draws much attention from the public 
which is good PR.      
One source of donations, the annual Christmas concert in Tokyo and Osaka, 
gathered a large amount of money when the Japanese economy was in good form. 
Donations and the sales of tickets, which companies in sympathy and cooperation 
                                                
10 Governmental agencies and firms have prizes with award money for those organisations engaged 
in improving society. Often, powerful NGOs for good relations recommend and refer each other for 
these prizes and the prize money contributes to their finances.  
11 It estimated by JVC that 30 million Japanese yen were donated in 2001 and 54 million in 2002. 
(JVC, “Financial Basis of JVC,” Structure of JVC, 2 April 2003, 
<http://www1.jca.apc.org/jvc/projects/annual_2001_2002/2002budget.html> (30 July 2003).  
12 Michiya Kumaoka, interviewed by the author,17 June 2003. 
13 Yoko Ogino, interviewed by the author, 10 June 2003. 
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bought in bulk, once earned 10,000,000 JPY (almost equivalent to US $ 100,000).14 
This was because the friendly companies bought them in bulk. However, owing to a 
protracted recession in Japan, the amount decreased to 5,800,000 JPY in 2001. The 
amount increased again in 2002, but it was still far from what was achieved at the peak 
period of Japanese economy.15  
The second strategy is selling calendars, from which profit is formidable. For 
instance, the gain from this strategy in 2001 was 9,153,178 JPY.16 The amount 
decreased in 2002 to 6,707,018 JPY but went up again to 9,153,178 JPY in 2003.17 
This strategy is made possible by voluntary help from camera men/women who provide 
photos for the calendars every year.      
The third strategy, the membership system, profits from membership fees from 
individuals. This is not a large but a stable income. The aim of the membership system 
is to focus not only on the financial gain but to involve Japanese people in JVC’s aid 
activities, in addition to obtaining credibility and transparency for its operations from 
the public.18  
    By operating these three main fundraising strategies, JVC maintained a strong 
financial basis for a long time. However, it is also true that much of this was owed to 
the prosperity of the Japanese economy until its burst started in 1991. Since the crash of 
the Japanese economy, the amount of money raised in the three strategies all decreased, 
as shown above. In this regard, what JVC needs and tries to do is to keep attracting the 
public to become involved in JVC’s activities.   
                                                
14 Tomoko Ishikawa, interviewed by the author, 7 May 2003. 
15 Tomoko Ishikawa, interviewed by the author, 2 May 2003.  
16 JVC, “Fiscal 2001 Financial Report,” in Activity Guide, (Tokyo: JVC, 2002), 26.  
17 JVC, 26. It was also reinforced by Kunio Iwama, interviewed by the author, 30 September 2003.  
18 Ikuko Nakayama, interviewed by the author, 25 May 2003. 
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   With these difficulties, JVC started slowly depending on the governmental 
subsidies. About 20 percent of all revenue in 2001 was from governmental resources 
and it was expected to be around 25 percent for 2002.19 The sources were the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), The Postal Saving for International Voluntary Aid in Japan, 
the Japan Environment Corporation Association for International Cooperation of 
Agriculture and Forestry, the National Land Afforestation Promotion Organization, 
Green Fund, the Tokyo International Foundation, and the Hiroshima sub-national 
Government. Among these, the largest donor was the MOFA since other funding was 
for specified issues such as deforestation. There has always been a concern that by 
accepting large amounts of government financial assistance, JVC would come to feel 
dominated by the government.20 Because of these concerns, it started trying to keep a 
certain distance from the government by trying to obtain support from other sources 
such as international organisations and local governments.21 
 
Open Ended Decision-Making Process 
The third aspect of JVC’s strong organisational structure is its open and quick 
process of decision-making. Anyone, including visitors and young student volunteers, 
can attend meetings every two weeks, at which casual issues including daily project 
assessment are discussed. By doing this, JVC is not only securing the transparency of 
the running of the organisation, but also various opinions from all directions had the 
chance to be heard.  
                                                
19 JVC, Activities Guideline, (Tokyo: JVC, 2002), 26 - 27. 
20 It can be reflected by the recent Grant for Grassroots Project (GGP) subsidy application where the 
amount that JVC received was less than what it applied for. The MOFA holds the right to decide the 
funding amount for each applicant NGO.  
21 Michiya Kumaoka, interviewed by author, 24 June 2003.  
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    The more important issues are sent up to Daihyo-sya Kaigi or the board of 
directors after regular office meetings. Members of this meeting are the leaders of each 
of the activity groups of JVC. Because the board comprises not only executive 
members from outside but JVC staff, who work closely on a daily basis, the meeting 
are normally very casual and easy to access.  
   In this open-ended casual decision-making structure, who holds leadership can be 
crucial. Usually, an NGO board is not made by election or examinations, unlike 
governmental agencies and firms. Despite the level of the impact on policy formation, 
most often, founding and active members take over executive positions as the 
organisation grows larger. On these terms, leadership is a crucial concern in 
organisational strength. 
     
Leadership 
    It is commonly known that strong leadership is required to manage any 
organisation effectively.22 NGOs are no exception. Michiya Kumaoka, the successor to 
the founding director23 especially exerted his leadership and managed the organisation 
to become one of the most powerful NGOs in Japan. He was named as an advisor in 
many government-NGO related committees, and asked to give public lectures. With his 
high reputation, JVC also gained a high reputation by having him as a leader.  
   On the other hand, there are several downsides to strong leadership. Two possible 
downsides are: the government’s cooption of strong leaders causes them to lose their 
sharpness and the reputation for strong leadership only belongs to leaders individually, 
                                                
22 For instance, see Masao Tao, Jissen NPO Manejimento (Practical NPO Management), 
(Kyoto:Minerva Shobo, 2004), Chapter 6.  
23 Michiya Kumaoka is the current director following the founding director, Syunsuke Iwasaki. 
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not to organisations. Clerk (1991) describes this as applicable not only to JVC but also 
to those powerful NGO leaders in Japan; 
 
 Many liberal governments are coopting NGO leaders on to various official bodies or 
commissions. This also is a double-edged sword. On the one hand it gives an important 
forum for NGO opinions. On the other hand it can dull the sharp edge of NGO criticism 
and occupy the attention of much of the rest of NGO talent.24 
 
There is an issue regarding the fame that belongs to charismatic leaders. The director of 
JVC gained a good reputation from all directions including the government, journalists 
and academics. Because of this reputation, he had been named in several government 
committees as an advisor and lecturer. It is undeniable that his well-known name 
brought JVC a certain popularity and credibility for its operations. However, what has 
to be mentioned here is that for the most part, he gained that fame individually. 
However, the fame of the organisation is based on his individual honour and distinction. 
It is possible to foresee that once he has left the position, the fame for the organisation 
could vanish as well. Hernandez and Leslie (2001) conducts a study of what would 
come after a charismatic leader in a volunteer organisation, and found there was strong 
resistance to such organizational changeover.25 
          
How Has JVC Secured Its Position?  The Legitimacy that Secured JVC’s 
Position 
                                                
24 John Clark, Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organizations, (Connecticut: 
Kumarian Press, 1991), 68. 
25 Refer to Chintia M. Hernandez. and Donald R. Leslie, “Charismatic Leadership: The Aftermath,” 
Nonprofit Management + Leadership 11, no.4 (Summer 2001), San Francisco: Mandel Center for 
Nonprofit Organisations, 2001). 
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The history and structure of JVC were analysed in order to understand why JVC has 
come to interact with the central government to promote better aid. Therefore, it is now 
time to question the legitimacy of JVC as the NGO to carry out political advocacy.  
The importance of the legitimacy of any political entity to carry out any campaign 
is stated as follows: 
 
All the actors in a campaign, both the NGOs and their targets, spend time 
and energy establishing and maintaining their legitimacy and contesting 
that of their opponents. This is often essential for the NGOs in terms of 
campaigning successfully and raising adequate resources.26 
 
How do NGOs secure their legitimacy? According to Alan Hudson (2000), NGOs 
claim their legitimacy for their advocacy work on the following three bases:  
 
1) Their institutional survival, track record and reputation, which are history, 
organisational structures, principles, rights, values, and southern roots;  
2) Organisation of the NGO itself; governance structures and staffing policies 
such as democratic membership structures;  
3) An international code of conduct where the “position being advocated was a 
basic right, a moral or ethical principle or value”.27  
 
The long history and experience of JVC fulfils this first point. The second point is to be 
exercised by the membership system. In order to secure JVC’s credibility and 
                                                
26 Jennifer Chapman and Thomas Fisher, “The effectiveness of NGO campaigning: lessons from 
practice,” in Development Advocacy, ed. Debora Eade (London Oxfam Great Britain, 2002), 123.  
27 Alan Hudson, “Making the Connection: Legitimacy Claims, Legitimacy Chains and Northern 
NGOs’ International Advocacy,” in New Roles and Relevance: Development NGOs and the 
Challenge of Change, ed., David Lewis and Tina Wallace (Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 2000), 92.  
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transparency as well as legitimacy, a Kaiinn Sookai (General Members Meeting) is held 
once a year, usually in June. This meeting is an opportunity for JVC supporting 
members to get together and present opinions directly to the staff. Lastly, the third point 
will be addressed with its internationally recognised reputation for the implementation 
of past projects.   
   It is now clear that JVC possesses the legitimacy to practise policy advocacy. The 
next section will analyse the interactions undertaken by JVC in order to become more 
influential in policy advocacy in the 1990s.  
     
5.3 Interactions by the Japan International Volunteer Centre  
   All available interactions have been used by JVC for promoting a ‘better ODA’. In 
its past activities, both the ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ interactions are utilised. The 
interactions can be grouped roughly into seven categories which were set out in the 
previous chapter. According to this categorisation, each interaction of JVC will be 
analysed to examine its mode of operation in order to specify its features as the leading 
development NGO, as well as what problems really lie underneath.   
   
‘Meeting’ interaction type     
The previous chapter has already discussed the way a ‘meeting’ can be taken 
advantage of by the government to secure the transparency and accountability of NGOs 
in official aid activities. This type of interaction was considered to be a tool of the 
government’s loose control over NGOs. It was analysed that possibly by making them 
more casual the government gives no guarantees to involve them into decision-making. 
On the other hand, NGOs have taken advantage of ‘sub-official meetings’ by displaying 
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records of these meetings in internet archives. This section will discuss how JVC has 
taken advantage of these meetings and how it has worked to create pressure on the 
government.  
JVC policy advisers have tried to attend as many meetings as possible, not only at 
meetings between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), but also Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and anything else that has 
concerned official aid policies. Some meeting organisers have invited JVC as official 
advisor and some were just open for all concerned people or organisations. When the 
policy advisors could not attend, other staff and even volunteer staff were sent instead. 
This was to raise any concerns at question time, observe the government’s intentions in 
aid policy and also obtain official handouts and resources delivered at meetings. After 
attending these meetings, any questions and concerns were brought back to the Tokyo 
office and they were used in creating JVC’s next advocacy movement. Hirata (2002) 
describes JVC’s involvement in governmental meetings as follows: 
 
As a leading NGO in JANIC [Japan NGO Centre for International Cooperation], JVC 
often represents the Japanese NGO community in government-NGO negotiations. Many, 
if not all, MOFA-NGO conferences and councils include JVC members as participants. 
Even though JVC is outspoken about its opposition to Japanese infrastructure-based aid, 
the MOFA has thus far been willing to work with the group, partly because of the 
influence of the group over other NGOs in Japan.28 
 
                                                
28 Keiko Hirata, Civil Society in Japan: The Government Role of NGOs in Tokyo’s Aid and 
Development Policy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 144. 
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JVC also attended on behalf of other smaller NGOs with fewer staff. The other 
smaller NGOs that had only two or three full-time staff (or sometimes none), were 
unable to send extra staff to attend these meetings. Instead, JVC sent staff to these 
meetings and showed NGO’s attendance. In a summary of activities in 2001, it was 
mentioned that: “JVC attends a regular consultation or a study meeting hosted [on ODA 
reforms] by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)…While keenly advocating, we 
present gathered information regarding ODA issues to the public to draw people’s 
attention.”29   
 As well as showing records of these meetings to the public, JVC also displayed its 
analysis on the issues from the meetings, both on its website, and by quarterly 
magazines. By asking for any suggestions and opinions from the public on these 
information tools, bilateral communications was carried out between JVC and the 
public. Through this communication, JVC stimulated the public to have an interest in 
issues concerning official aid policies, which otherwise would have been known only 
through the government’s official claims and information.     
 
‘Workshop’ and ‘Symposium’ interaction type 
It is traditional to hold workshops and symposiums to create pressure on the 
Japanese government.30 As such, JVC, holds a number of workshops and symposiums 
regarding Japan’s aid policy, often raised from issues analysed from official meetings 
that JVC staff attended. The aim of holding these workshops lies in raising the 
awareness of people toward development issues, and in showing the Japanese 
                                                
29 JVC, Activities Guideline, (Tokyo: JVC, 2000 ), 21.  
30 Hirata, “Whither the Development State? The Growing Role of NGOs in Japanese Aid Policy 
Making”, 20. 
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government that people, potential voters, are getting information about ODA projects 
from non-governmental source. 
The most outstanding outcome of these was stopping the food aid under the 
Bilateral Grant scheme to Cambodia in 1993 as mentioned earlier. This case has 
already been analysed closely by JVC itself, as well as in the work of Hirata (2002). 
Thus, there is no need to go any deeper than to describe what happened and how the 
symposium worked.  
In 1993, Cambodia, where JVC has a long engagement, saw a campaign to stop the 
Japanese government from delivering unnecessary agricultural chemicals under the 
Grant Aid scheme totalling 500,000,000 JPY in food aid. With natural enemies in fields, 
Cambodia did not need these kinds of chemicals. JVC visited the ministries and 
agencies concerned, such as the MOFA and JICA, with other NGOs members and held 
a symposium in 1993. The symposium attracted a great deal of public attention as JVC 
had planned. As a result, the Japanese government withheld the aid, which has not been 
implemented until recently.31 The symposium was not the only driving force that 
stopped the government from delivering the chemicals, but it is undeniable that the 
symposium helped to obtain public support and make the problem visible.  
Apart from this outstanding result, JVC has been actively involved in reforming 
ODA policy in mid-1990s. The movement toward ODA reform had already been begun 
in the mid-1980s by some concerned scholars, and their academic works caught much 
public attention in the early 1990s.32 JVC joined this movement and became the major 
member of the other coalition group named “the Citizen-NGO Liaison Council”. Since 
                                                
31 Mari Nakamura, interviewed by the author, 9 June 2003. 
32 Main scholars of a group which made the ODA issue public were Yoshinori Murai, Kazuo Sumi, 
and Saneatsu Musyakooji.  
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then, JVC has positively committed itself to practising reform of ODA by holding 
seminars, workshops and symposiums.  
In one of many examples of the activities, JVC organised a series of workshops on 
ODA reforms with other networking NGOs, such as “Opinion Exchange Symposia 
between NGO and MOFA regarding ODA Reforms”. This symposium was held to 
target the forthcoming official ODA reform policy. Before the delivery of the official 
statement, JVC and other NGOs planned to show their opinions concerning 
governmental officials directly. At the Symposia, JVC and other organising NGOs 
invited scholars, government officials, NGO staff and also media to raise issues and 
questions for debate. 
 The reform of ODA policy, particularly ODA projects such as food aid to 
Cambodia and environmental issues in Southeast Asia, were popular topics in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. Recent change in the world situation, however, seems to have 
started to have an effect on the topics of symposiums and workshops.  
   “9.11” or “September Eleventh” changed the course of the world in the post-Cold 
War era. Development issues do not get as much attention as the “War on Terrorism” 
does these days. It is no exception for JVC to host symposiums and workshops of 
popular issues that attract many people. The recent symposiums hosted by JVC also 
focused on the relationship between the ODA and Peace Building. Several symposiums 
were already held in 2005 but it is still too early to evaluate the outcomes of them. Yet, 
because peace building is closely connected to sending the Self Defence Force (SDF) 
overseas, which also relates to Japan’s national security issue, it is getting harder for 
JVC to create pressure on the government. That is because national security is one of 
the most sensitive topics of the government, which does not want much public scrutiny. 
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Because of the secretiveness of the government, JVC’s symposium on ODA and peace 
building could not obtain enough information and failed to create much public pressure.    
On international development issues, JVC is now trying to organise a campaign for 
putting pressure on the Japanese government at the United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) to make Japan a major player on this issue.33 This 
campaign is to eradicate poverty in the world, which is an essential development 
problem that JVC has long been working to improve. In regard to this, JVC held a 
symposium in December 2004 and invited a chief of the MDGs’ project, as well as 
succeeding in involving ordinary people by getting them interested. JVC’s goal in this 
area is to pressure the Japanese government to introduce new policies towards 
international development by 2008, when Japan plays host to the G-8 Summit again.       
 
‘Personal Relations’ interaction type 
    Making friends with people with power is not always easy. Yet, some NGOs have 
succeeded in making good friends with high-powered people and moved them to 
pursue favourable policies for them. Understanding that this ‘personal relation’ type 
interaction is influential, many NGOs have tried to practise it. JVC has been no 
exception. 
    JVC has tried to be close to Members of Parliament (MPs), journalists and 
academics, who are considered to be ‘influential’ in aid issues. Regarding MPs, JVC 
policy advisers have created a good relationship with members of the opposition parties 
and at the House of Councillors. Even so, in Japan’s political system, it is necessary to 
                                                
33 There are eight goals set by the United Nations: 1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, 2) 
achieve universal primary education, 3) promote gender equality and empower women, 4) reduce 
child mortality, 5) improve maternal health, 6) combat HIV/AIDS malaria and other disease, 7) 
ensure environmental sustainability, 8) develop a global partnership for development. (See UN 
website: <www.un.org/milleniumgoals/> for more information.)  
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be close to the ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), in order to exert much 
powerful influence. Through organising study groups and face-to-face meetings, JVC 
advocacy staff made some efforts to explain JVC’s opinions and activities, which the 
MPs may have in common. Although Hirata (2002) observes a positive side of this 
interaction on the pesticide issue in 1993,34 in the friendly relationship that has existed 
between politicians, no actual results have been seen yet regarding ODA policy 
recently.  
Why is there such a difference between those who have succeeded and those who 
have not in the this type of interaction? This difference can be explained by the fact that 
politicians choose topics that they hope to work on in order to improve their political 
image with the public. This is supported by Yasuko Matsumoto, the former Greenpeace 
Campaigner, in her answer during an interview, that Japanese politicians tended to join 
NGO campaigns which produced outstanding result such as banning landmines, but not 
creating something new that may cause disruption in politics such as protecting ozone 
layers.35    
In addition to politicians, the policy advocacy staff of JVC have also made efforts to 
befriend journalists. Yet, unlike the Malaysian case where journalists pose questions at 
press conferences on behalf of close NGOs introduced by Oishi (1995),36 Japanese 
journalists are not in a position to write their own articles on their merits. Sponsors of 
major newspapers in Japan are usually closely connected to the central government. For 
this reason, reporters and journalists who belong to the organisations are sometimes 
restricted from writing certain articles. That is partly why, despite the fact that JVC 
                                                
34 Hirata, Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Role of NGOs in Tokyo’s Aid and Development 
Policy, 144. 
35 Yasuko Matsumoto, interviewed by the author, 20 January 2004.  
36 Mikio Oishi, interviewed by the author, 15 October 2002. He has had work experience as an 
NGO staff member in Malaysia therefore his viewpoint is valid as an insider.  
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staff and journalists go for drinks for Nomi-nication37, they have rarely written articles 
in favour of NGOs.  
   Some NGO personnel have tried to create ‘personal relationships’ by being 
politicians themselves. Their aim was to make a breakthrough in the “Iron Triangle” 
type decision-making process from inside. Clark states: “In some countries they [NGO 
leaders] have been persuaded to leave the NGO sector and to move into government. 
This should not be seen as a ‘selling-out’ but as building a more effective platform on 
which to make the NGO case.”38 Those who tried to be politicians or became 
politicians include: MP Nobuhiko Syudo from Interband (House of Councillors), 
Shunsuke Iwasaki from JVC, MP Kiyohiko Toyama from Peace Winds Japan (PWJ) of 
the New Komeito (House of Councillors) and so on. Among them, Kiyomi Tsujimoto, 
a former MP of the House of Representatives can be seen as the most prominent 
example to explain the advantages and drawbacks of this situation.   
The former MP used to be the director of a Japanese NGO, the Peace Boat which 
has gained a reputation for its activities and experience among Japanese people. 
Considering that reputation and Tsujimoto’s popularity, the leader of the Japan 
Socialist Party (one of the opposition parties), asked her to run as an MP candidate in 
1996. At the ODA related money scandal by the then MP Suzuki Muneo in 2002, 
Tsujimoto criticised him and the Prime Minister bitterly, and accused the MOFA of 
being severely manipulated by the politician on the committee. For her 
                                                
37 Nomi-nication is a Japanese English that means communication over drinking, which is 
considered to be more effective way of negotiation in Japan.  
38 John Clark, “Policy influence, lobbying and advocacy,” in Making a difference: NGO and 
development in a changing world, ed., Michael Edwards and David Hulme (London: Earthscan, 
1992), 193. 
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attention-grabbing performance,39 she has become one of the most famous MPs in 
Japan, and her former position as the director of the Peace Boat has been highlighted 
again. A severe backlash, however, followed. A weekly magazine revealed suspicion of 
her spending the salary of her political secretary illegally, a secretary who was paid by 
the government. This forced her to resign as an MP, and she was later arrested. At the 
same time, the name of the NGO that she once directed was covered with mud.  
Creating a personal relationship can be a double-edged sword as shown above and 
not efficient all of the time. Having understood that, JVC has been trying to get behind 
the closed door by being friends with people with power. By doing so, JVC has brought 
some changes to Japan’s aid policy. This strategy was used by other NGOs, and will be 
analysed in the next two case studies. This is because Japanese politics depend largely 
on ’who you know’ more than ’who you are’.   
 
‘International/Domestic Network’ interaction type 
In order to formulate effective influential activities, JVC has built both international 
and domestic networks. International networks especially, that create outside pressure 
(or Gai-Atsu) were proved to be very effective as demonstrated in the previous chapter. 
Using the prominent character of the Japanese government, which is sensitive to 
international opinions of Japan, JVC has been building networks both domestically and 
internationally to form pressure. 
As for a domestic network, JVC has become an umbrella NGO for other smaller 
NGOs. “Umbrella” here means that JVC covers other NGOs with similar interests in 
Japan’s aid policy, such as development issues, ODA Reform, the anti-personnel 
                                                
39 She has chanted “So-ri (Mr. Prime Minister)” twelve times at the Parliament committee and it has 
become a famous phrase among the Japanese population.  
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landmine issue and environmental problems. It is true that the bigger you become, the 
stronger you become. In Malaysia, where the government possesses a strong authority 
in controlling its NGOs, building networks among NGOs has been a common tool to 
put pressure on the government.40  
   Several NGOs in Japan are directly related to JVC, either originating from JVC or 
having overlapping staff with JVC. These examples include Mekong Watch, working 
on policy advocacy in ODA projects around the Mekong area; ODA-NET which 
concentrates on watching the Japanese government’s overall ODA project 
implementations, and working on ODA Reform. In the area of landmines, JVC has had 
strong network relations with the Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL). This 
organisation will be the case study in the following chapter. One of the founding 
members of JCBL has also been a JVC staff.41 This character of each organisation 
makes networks easy to form since there is less competition and more coordination. ? ?  
   The aforementioned JVC’s policy advocacy, the Cambodian pesticide case in 1993, 
serves an example of using a combination of ‘Network’ type and ‘Workshop’ and 
‘Symposium’ type interactions for effective leverage. At the same time, JVC has been 
leading a campaign since March 2000, on postponing the development plan in Pleknot 
under the bilateral aid scheme (Yen Loan), which was requested from the Cambodian 
government in 1999, based on the fact that the projects have not involved people at the 
grassroots level who would be affected the most.42 Other international NGOs, such as 
Oxfam Great Britain (GB), were already involved in this campaign when JVC joined 
                                                
40 Mikio Oishi, interviewed by the author, 24 September 2002.  
41 Toshihiro Shimizu, a JVC Secretary, also commits to JCBL as one of major members. 
42 Source from JVC homepage, “Advocacy Activity in Cambodia,” Projects, n.d., 
<www1.jca.apc.org/jvc/jp/projects/Cambodia/pastprj02cover.html> (3 July 2005). 
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the stream. Despite the late start, by closely watching the Japanese government on a 
regular basis, JVC has been playing a major role on this issue. 
   In addition to domestic networks, building international networks has not only 
become an effective way of pressuring the government, but also building a reputation 
for the reliability of JVC. It has worked jointly with several international organisations, 
starting from its very first activities in Thailand with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Since then, it has been working in a partnership 
relationship with other institutions such as the United Nations World Food Programme 
(UNWFP) for food aid activities in North Korea. These international partnerships with 
outside bodies have given JVC the strength to maintain its autonomous position. This is 
because in the era of NGOs mushrooming, when the number grew from 300 to 400 
within a decade, having partnership relationships with official international agencies 
has proved to have more reliability in providing a good image of JVC to distinguish it 
from the others. This international connection also helps JVC to obtain external funding, 
which allows it to keep a certain distance from the Japanese government, who pulls the 
strings of NGOs through its financial assistance. JVC received funds from UNHCR and 
the Canada Fund in 2001, and that portion has gone up to 13 percent of its total income. 
In 2002, the United Nations Volunteer also provided funds to JVC.   
   JVC also has solid networks not only with international organisations but with 
international NGOs and local NGOs in developing countries.43 Their cooperative 
relationships have also given JVC accountability in that it understands actual 
development situations around the world and takes them into account in its aid 
                                                
43 JVC, “Mo Hitotsu no Sekai Chizu (Another World map)”, in Trial and Error 239, July-August 
(2004): 2 - 7.  
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activities as well as practical collaborations such as launching joint campaigns with 
local NGOs.    
 
‘Media Usage’ interaction type  
   JVC has been reluctant to make its activities too visible out of the belief that its 
activities are for the sake of people in need and not for the organisation itself. However, 
it is undeniable that running the organisation and its operations requires finance, and 
those whose activities are public, receive more funding. For this reason, many NGOs 
use the media as a device to highlight their activities.   
The media is an important tool for NGOs to make their activities visible to obtain 
public support. Public recognition gives them strength and influential power to pressure 
authorities, which are sensitive about public opinion in the next election. Murai (1992), 
who is a scholar specialising in Japan’s ODA to Asian states, has brought a media crew 
to the meeting with the Japanese government officials, understanding what it meant to 
them.44 
    Peace Winds Japan (PWJ), a fast growing emergency relief NGO, is a good 
example of how NGOs utilise the media as an influential tool. Tadashi Onishi, the 
founder and the current director of PWJ, gained his educational background at a British 
university when studying NGO strategy, so he is well aware of the effectiveness of the 
media in NGO management. For instance, in the overseas spots of its aid activities, 
PWJ staff wear T-shirts with the name of PWJ on the back when filmed by media crew 
so they are clearly shown on air. It also let a TV station accompany its overseas 
activities for the filming of a non-fiction programme. On the other hand, it is important 
                                                
44 Yoshinori Murai, Kensyo Nippon no ODA (Examining Japan’s ODA), (Tokyo: Gakuyo Shobo, 
1992), 152. 
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to mention that there could be a backlash from appearing too much in the media. 
During the incident concerning the MP Muneo Suzuki in 2001, Onishi gave a press 
conference while dressed in an expensive suit. The image of himself and the NGO he 
was Director of was immediately damaged by his appearance, for NGOs are expected 
to ‘be contented with honest poverty’ in Japanese society. The amount of the donations 
for PWJ after this press conference was said to have decreased substantially.45  
   Owing to the aforementioned reason, JVC has been hesitant to make media 
appearances, claiming, “we operate aid activities not for letting people know who does 
them, but for the people’s own sake. We prefer invisible aid to visible”.46 Even so, the 
power of the media cannot be ignored and some other efforts, such as publishing books, 
videos, and newsletters have been made. Interestingly, NGOs do not appear very much 
on TV.   
   In addition, JVC has a unique way of making its activities visible to the outside 
world. Every Saturday, it holds volunteer seminars for people who want to support JVC 
activities. It is mainly for gaining volunteer supporters, but at the same time, it 
increases its public appearance through individuals. The so-called word-of-mouth way 
of communication is important in Japanese society. People tend to believe what other 
people tell them based on their actual experiences.  
 
The many volunteers and activists who participate in NGO work typically function 
as opinion-makers in their local communities. They disseminate information about 
                                                
45 Ikuko Nakayama, interviewed by the author, 9 June 2003.  
46 Hideaki Kurakawa, interviewed by the author, 12 April 2003. 
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their experiences, insights and attitudes, and in this way create understanding for 
foreign cultures and for the need for international solidarity and cooperation.47 
 
As a fact, after taking part in these seminars, the number of those who register for 
membership increased after they talked about JVC to other people.48            
   Newspaper articles and publications are other media tools for as to making its name 
and activities visible. Scholars who originally attacked Japan’s ODA in the late 1980s 
used their publications to highlight the issues. As Japanese NGOs have gained public 
attention since 1995, newspapers have followed their activities constantly. JVC’s 
predominant personnel, such as Michiya Kumaoka and Kiyotaka Takahashi, have 
appeared in one of the major newspapers several times to support comments on the 
government’s aid policy. Other field staff, who usually operate their activities overseas, 
also get interviewed on their actual activities by newspapers. More people read 
newspapers than they do books or journals, for they are often ‘delivered’ to people like 
TV programmes. Newspapers have a large impact on people instantly. One example 
can be given of this. When the United Nations World Food Programme (UNWFP) 
Japan Regional Office (where the author was working as an intern in 2001), appeared in 
a newspaper about its operations, the number of queries about donations and activities 
increased drastically on the following days. As well as in the case of PWJ director, this 
explains that newspapers have the ability to influence people’s attitude toward NGOs, 
when they had less interest before. There is a negative aspect, of course, as one JVC 
staff stated that these ‘enthusiastic supporters’ are temporary, and the difficult and 
                                                
47 John Degnbol-Martunussen and Poul Engberg-Pedersen, Aid: Understanding International 
Development Cooperation (London: Zen Books, 2003), 162. 
48 Ikuko Nakayama, interviewed by the author, 23 May 2003.     
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important part was to move them to maintain their enthusiasm after the topic had lost its 
freshness.  
   The more JVC gets public recognition through various media tools, resulting in an 
increase in the number of supporting members and publications such as newspaper 
articles, the less the Japanese government feels it can ignore JVC’s opinions in terms of 
its aid policy. As a result, there are not many meetings and conferences held by the 
government, that NGOs are allowed to take part in, where the name of JVC as 
participant cannot be seen.  
 
5.4 New Challenge: ODA Reform 
NGO’s Joint Effort towards ODA Reform    
The case of ODA reform, which will be analysed in this section, was one of the new 
fields when JVC shifted its focus partly to policy advocacy, after having concentrated 
on carrying out actual development projects for the last two decades. This section will 
examine JVC’s interactions over this case and reveal how JVC has been making use of 
various interactions to promote ‘better ODA’, as well as what has resulted. 
   Since Japan’s overseas aid policy started as a part of war reparations for damages 
during the war, there were many areas considered inappropriate for legitimate aid 
policy due to its heavy commercialism. That is why some scholars who were concerned 
with these issues in Japan’s ODA revealed them to the public from the late 1980s to the 
early 1990s. Some of these publications and the movements are still ongoing. JVC, 
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which has its own ‘Code of Conduct for Development’49 also joined this stream and 
has been trying to intercept Japan’s aid decision-making process by various means.  
Firstly, JVC has joined the already established domestic NGO network (ODA 
Reform Network Tokyo) to tackle this issue.50 Although it joined at a later stage, JVC 
has taken a leadership role in this network using its organisational strength. This 
network has been working effectively, holding workshops, symposiums, and making 
petitions and recommendations with large number of participants for a stronger 
impression on the government (‘Network’ and ‘Campaign’ type interaction). Secondly, 
several meetings and symposiums were held to express their opinions for promoting a 
‘better ODA’. Thirdly, using the opportunity in which one JVC staff was selected as an 
official member for ODA Sogo Senryaku Kaigi (ODA Comprehensive Strategy 
Conference) in June 2002. JVC expressed its view on ODA reform at 22 meetings in 
total in the presence of MOFA officials working on ODA reform, academics and 
journalists (‘Meeting’ type interaction).  
As a result of joint efforts by several NGOs, the following recommendation for 
ODA reform was submitted to the government in 1999 by them: 
1) Clarifying ODA philosophy; 
   “ODA should be used to support ‘self-help’ of the poorest to improve their 
lives economically, socially and culturally with a respect for their tradition and 
                                                
49 They are: “Indigenous knowledge and techniques as well as diverse cultures, community based 
environmental conservation and management, people’s initiative and participation, development of 
people’s potentials and capabilities in diverse fields, people’s self-reliance and equal partnership and 
equal participation of women and men (gender equality)”. (JVC, Activities Guideline, September 
2002, p.28.) 
50 ODA Reform Network was established in September 1996 and it aims to reform the ODA policy 
of Japan. It had 57 cooperating groups and 3 branches (Cyubu, Kansai and Kyusyu) in 2003. There 
are 4 main areas of activities of ODA Reform Networking; building networks between domestic 
NGOs and citizens, building networks with international NGOs (The Reality of Aid), policy 
advocacy for the Japanese government and Members of Parliament and taking the local voice from 
developing countries into activities (Source from ODA Reform Network-Tokyo, Pacific Asia 
Resource Centre ). 
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culture. In implementation, human rights, democracy, environment conservation 
and gender have to be respected.” 
2) Policy Recommendation for ODA Reform 
a. Prioritise ‘Social Development’ 
“Japan’s ODA should be able to spend 50 percent of the budget for ‘Social 
Development’ and especially for the empowerment of women, a half of the 
overall amount of ODA should be spent.” 
b. Single Aid Administration 
“Multiple aid administration of Japan obstructs an effective aid implementation so 
we strongly recommend the founding of a single aid administration.”  
c. Setting Guidelines on projects and legalising the ODA Charter 
   “In order to fulfil the pledge of the Japanese government in a series of 
international conferences, setting the guideline on environment, gender, resident 
removal, and rights of indigenous people is recommended. In the case of 
unsatisfied assessment, guidelines should exert the power to terminate projects.”   
d. A Cooperation System in Project Implementation with a Participatory 
Approach 
   “In order to practise people’s participation, Japan’s ODA should run an 
Inspection Panel such as that of the World Bank.” 
e. Parliament Participation and Information Disclosure 
“For exercising the rights of taxpayers from whom the resources of Japan’s ODA 
come, a committee specialising in ODA should be established within the 
Parliament, where representatives of the Japanese people are to express their 
opinions. Information disclosure is also strongly recommended at every level of 
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the ODA implementation process and the information is to be written in each 
language for outside Japan.”  
f. Development Education51 
 
 After the submission of the recommendations, JVC continued to work on ODA reform 
issues, such as publishing articles on ODA reform. It also held a symposium in April 
2003 called, “ODA Minaoshi ni Kansuru NGO/Gaimu-syo Iken Koukan Kai 
(NGO/MOFA opinions exchange on ODA reform)”, and invited governmental officials, 
NGO staff, the media and many other people (‘Workshop’ and ‘Symposium’ type 
interaction). 
A New Charter: Improvement or retreat?  
Besides these upcoming NGO movements, the MOFA itself regarded ODA reform 
as one of the main pillars for MOFA improvement. ODA efficiency and transparency is 
actually one of ten reforms for the new MOFA stated by the Foreign Affairs Minister, 
Yoriko Kawaguchi. This was because she stepped into this position immediately after 
some scandals within the MOFA regarding ODA policy that caused the ministry to lose 
popularity.52 In order to obtain people’s trust in the ministry again, it was an urgent 
necessity for the MOFA to launch ODA reform. In other words, it was perfect timing 
for NGOs to make a move.   
   The ODA Town Meetings and ODA Sogo Senryaku Kaigi (ODA Comprehensive 
Strategy Conference) were held several times to hear public opinions. The ODA Town 
Meetings were open to the public and anyone could have a say. The Strategy 
                                                
51 ODA-NET “Policy Recommendation for ODA Reform,” Policy Advocacy of ODA-NET, n.d., 
<http://www1.jca.apc.org/oda-net/advocate/teigen.html> (24 July 2003). 
52 Scandals such as the NGO refusal incident in 2001, MP Suzuki’s ODA related money scandal in 
2001-2 and the former Foreign Affairs Minister Makiko Tanaka’s money scandal which led to her 
resignation.   
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Conference was an exclusive meeting that only selected members could attend. The 
members consisted of governmental officials, three private sector personnel, two 
journalists, seven academics and two NGO staff members.53 One of JVC’s staff was 
selected as a member and presented their opinions at the meetings. This meeting 
convened 22 times over the two years.  
   Atsuko Isoda, the Vice-Director of JVC, and also a member of this meeting, later 
contributed an article on this series of meetings in JVC’s magazine. She mentioned at 
the end of the article that the decision-making process of this meeting was totally 
unclear with insufficient discussion.54 Based on her claim from actual participation in 
these meetings, the meeting was held more for the sake of the MOFA, in order to create 
transparency and accountability in ODA reform, than to involve public participation.    
    After the two years of planning, in August 2003, the MOFA announced a new 
ODA Charter as a part of major ODA reform. In the introductory part of the new 
charter, it says: “The objectives of Japan’s ODA are to contribute to the peace and 
development of the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan’s own 
security and prosperity”.55 Surprisingly, it is clear that the new ODA Charter still 
emphasised the national interest of Japan in ODA policy, which had long been 
criticised by other aid donor states.56 This is demonstrated in the portion of the charter 
which states: “it is important to have public support for ODA. It is essential to 
                                                
53 Atsuko Isoda, “ODA Sogo Senryaku Kaigi de Nani ga Hanasarete iruka (What has been talked 
about at a comprehensive strategy conference)” in Trial and Error 236 (January/February 2004),2. 
Ms. Atsuko Isoda, a JVC member for the meeting, expressed a concern about the selection process 
as ‘unclear and no apparent criteria for selecting people’ in her article.  
54 Isoda, 2.  
55 MOFA, “Revision of Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter (unofficial translation),” 
Objectives, n.d., <www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/revision0308.pdf> (15 August 2005).  
56 Isoda, “ODA Sogo Senryaku Kaigi de Nani ga Hanasarete iruka (What has been talked about at a 
Comprehensive Strategy Conference)”, 2. Isoda revealed that it was strongly claimed 3 private 
sector participants at the Conference who rarely opened their mouths other than with this claim 
during other debates.  
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effectively implement ODA, fully taking into account the domestic economic and fiscal 
situation as well as the views of the Japanese people”. Also emphasised is the 
importance of the views of the Japanese people, described as follows: 
 
The Government of Japan has revised the ODA Charter, with the aim of enhancing the 
strategic value, flexibility, transparency, and efficiency of ODA. The revision also has the 
aim of encouraging wide public participation and of deepening the understanding of 
Japan’s ODA policy both within Japan and abroad.57 
 
 There are five main pillars in this charter: (1) supporting self-help efforts of 
developing countries, (2) perspective of “Human Security”, (3) assurance of fairness, 
(4) utilisation of Japan’s experience and expertise, and (5) partnership and collaboration 
with the international community. The two aspects, self-help and utilising Japan’s 
experience and expertise, are traditional and existed before the new charter. What this 
new charter made clear was that Japan would respond and contribute to the 
international community. This was described by using such contemporary global terms 
as ‘human security’ and ‘partnership and collaboration with the international 
community.’ Collaboration with NGOs is clearly stated under this category alongside 
with private companies. 
   The use of recent global terms frequently appears in this new charter. Examples are 
‘poverty reduction’, ‘sustainable growth’ and ‘peace-building’. One needs to be careful 
about these terms used by governments since they could mean different things when 
used by NGOs. As Chapman and Fisher mention: “opponents may try to use similar 
                                                
57 MOFA, “Revision of Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter (unofficial translation)”, 
Japan’s Official Development Assistance, n.d. 
<www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/revision0308.pdf> (1 August 2005).  
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tools for their own ends, thus confusing the public”58, so the Japanese government 
could use these trend terms on purpose as a smoke screen to the people.  
Attention should be paid to the term ‘peace-building’, as the MOFA made it clear 
that this is one of Japan’s priority issues in its official aid policy. This concept is 
constantly used when encountering international criticism of Japan’s foreign policy as 
being ‘faceless’ for not making a human contribution to international crisis scenes. The 
Japanese government says: “Japan will extend bilateral and multilateral assistance 
flexibly and continuously for peace-building in accordance with the changing situation, 
ranging from assistance to expedite the ending of conflicts to assistance for the 
consolidation of peace and nation-building in post-conflict situations.”59 By using this 
argument, the Japanese government can legitimise sending the Self Defence Force 
(SDF) overseas in order to avoid having civilians face security risks. For safety reasons, 
the government does not send civilians into post-conflict areas on official missions. 
Like many other states, the Japanese government has sent the SDF to these areas. The 
trouble is, only the government could decide whether it is ‘post-conflict’ or not. In this 
case, the SDF may be sent to ‘post-conflict’ situations while there is still in a war. By 
doing so, it would breach Article 9 of the Peace Constitution, resulting in debate over 
the issue. This issue needs intensive analysis and discussion, most of which is beyond 
the scope of this thesis.   
 
Positive and Negative Aspects of the New Charter 
                                                
58 Jennifer Chapman and Thomas Fisher, “The effectiveness of NGO campaigning: lessons from 
practice,” in Development and Advocacy, ed., Debora Eade (London: Oxfam Great Britain, 2002), 
129. 
59 MOFA, “3. Priority Issues,” Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter, (Tokyo: MOFA, 
2004), 6. 
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In addition to those prominent points in the new charter, there appeared several 
positive and negative aspects when comparing it to the NGO recommendation. For the 
positive aspect, the new charter has included the ‘human security’ perspective, in which 
more value was placed on ‘Social Development’. The perspective of gender equality is 
also emphasised in “Basic Policies”. Other ‘trendy’ terms addressing global issues such 
as ‘poverty reduction’, ‘sustainable growth’ under “Priority Issues”, have also appeared 
in the new charter. However, there are also some concerns about the charter.   
  Establishing a single aid agency had long been a central concern for Japan’s foreign 
aid decision formation since it was distributed among too many actors and ministries, 
which were believed to obstruct the effectiveness of aid implementation (See Chapter 
3: 75-76). NGOs favoured the establishment of a single aid administration. However, it 
was not mentioned in the new charter. Instead, it called for, “Collaboration among 
related government ministries and agencies”, and “Collaboration between government 
and implementing agencies” in “a unified and coherent manner”. 
   Public participation was another area which was emphasised in the new charter. The 
charter suggests the strengthening of human resource development and research, 
development education, information disclosure and public relations, but no mention is 
made of a participatory approach. This can be interpreted as meaning the Japanese 
people are still mere receivers of information, not participants in Japan’s aid activities. 
This is the same for local people in aid receiving countries, who will be merely 
‘disseminated’ information regarding Japan’s ODA.  
   It is important to mention again, that the term, ‘peace-building’, is a major concern, 
which helped to send the Japan Self Defence Force to launch aid-like operations in 
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conflict affected areas. Under the peace-building scheme, ODA will be used to provide 
the following: 
 
…assistance to facilitate the peace process; humanitarian and rehabilitation 
assistance, such as assistance for displaced persons and for the restoration of 
basic infrastructure; assistance for assuring domestic stability and security, 
including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants 
(DDR), and the collection and disposal of weapons, including demining; and 
assistance for reconstruction, including social and economic development and 
the enhancement of the administrative capabilities of governments.60 
 
Amongst these ODA usages, there are some things that clearly require JSDF 
cooperation. Therefore, with anxiety over future active involvement of the JSDF in 
Japan’s ODA activities, JVC has started pursuing policy advocacy activities such as 
symposiums, publications and consultation with politicians.       
   The new charter includes some compromises with NGO recommendations. 
However, there are still many challenges remaining for Japan’s ODA, including the 
issue of SDF involvement in Japan’s aid activities, JVC faces need to lead policy 
advocacy against these issues.  
    
5.5 Conclusion: Taking a political position or remaining at the grassroots?        
   The style of JVC activities, and how it tried to make them effective, has been 
examined in this chapter. With several issues, from the financial situation to the slow 
outcome of policy advocacy activities, JVC has been pursuing its principle of making 
                                                
60 MOFA, Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter, 6. 
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Japan’s ODA better by use of its reputation, experience and given opportunities under 
the Japanese government’s new aid strategy, “Visible Japanese Aid”, with NGO 
involvement.   
It is clear to see that some modes of operation of JVC are distinguishable from those 
of Western NGOs or Asian NGOs; JVC has not been given the opportunity of being at 
official governmental meetings like Western NGOs, but by making meetings such as 
the NGO- MOFA Meetings ‘visible to the public’ through the internet or in quarterly 
magazines, it is possible to pressure the direction of the official aid policy in some 
cases. JVC is also eager to build networks, both internationally and domestically, in 
order to construct outside pressure (Gai-Atsu) that the Japanese government historically 
has responded to with sensitivity. While international networking can be observed in 
the Western NGOs, this is not the case for Asian NGOs, for fear of being suspected of 
‘selling out’ their own countries as was seen in the Indonesian case.61  
While JVC is distinguishable from Western NGOs, it has been operating much of its 
activities in accordance with the Western style. The big difference here is that JVC does 
not possess an institutionalised position to participate in high-level governmental 
meetings, which surely affects official aid policy decisions. So although JVC seems to 
operate as effectively as Western NGOs, the power to influence aid policy still remains 
on the government’s side.  
   Concerns remain in terms of the future direction of JVC. According to Kumaoka, 
the Japanese NGOs community is at a crossroads of whether they would become 
political actors, or remain at the grassroots.62 
                                                
61 Seamus Cleary, The Role of NGOs under Authoritarian Political Systems, (London: Macmillan 
Press, 1997), 14. 
62 Michiya Kumaoka, interviewed by the author, 17 June 2003. . 
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  Involving politicians is one way to make NGO activities effective but this would risk 
the non-governmental status. Furthermore, if they lost their legitimacy as politicians, 
they also put the legitimacy of NGO activities at risk. A clear example was shown with 
the illegal usage of a salary of the political secretary of the former MP Kiyomi 
Tsujimoto in 2002.  
As an outstanding operational NGO, the future of JVC indicates the direction of 
local Japanese NGOs. Although it has been trying to make a breakthrough in the 
established decision-making process, and produced some outcomes in cooperation with 
the Japanese government, it is still hard to change Japan’s overall attitude to ODA. 
Refusing to be controlled by the government, JVC has slowly started drifting away 
from the centre stage of the Government-NGO partnership system. After a decade of 
honeymoon in terms of cooperation, the most powerful operational NGO in Japan has 
started going its own way.   
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Chapter 6 
Case Study 2 
Japan’s Own Path in Aid? : Anti-Personnel (AP) Landmine 
 
6.1 Introduction 
   On 3rd of December 1997, at the Ottawa Conference, the Japanese Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Keizo Obuchi, signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction 
(commonly known as the Ottawa Treaty), on behalf of the Japanese government. When 
the Japanese government signed the Ottawa Treaty, the world was taken by surprise, 
because Japan had shown uneasiness over the Treaty because of many ‘national 
interests’. After signing the treaty, some actions have been undertaken by the Japanese 
government in order to clear Anti-Personnel (AP) landmines and support victims, such 
as a special aid scheme.   
In the beginning, Japan’s behaviour demonstrated its anti- treaty stance, which was 
clearly leaning towards that of the United States. So it was against expectation when 
Obuchi, signed the treaty. 
There were some reasons for Japan to resist the global ban on AP landmines. The 
biggest of these reasons was Japan’s national security issues, which are intimately 
related to its close relationship with the United States. The United States was opposed to 
the Ottawa Treaty from the beginning because of its international military strategy. 
Therefore, Japan naturally took the US position to the Ottawa Treaty by proxy. 
Having realised Japan’s uneasy attitude towards the landmine issue, 40 Japanese 
NGOs gathered to form a unified movement, which gave birth to the Japan Campaign to 
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Ban Landmines (JCBL), a national branch of International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
(ICBL). NGOs such as the People’s Forum on Cambodia, the Japan International 
Volunteer Centre (JVC) and the Association for Aid and Relief (AAR), which had 
already worked on the landmine issue joined together to lobby to the Japanese 
government. Their work, led by JCBL, moved the Japanese public to support the 
abolition of landmines. After many negotiations and campaigns organised by JCBL, the 
government made the decision to join the Ottawa Treaty and even set up a new scheme 
for removal of anti-personnel (AP) landmines and to support the victims in an Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) scheme, known as “Zero Victim Programme”.   
   Surprisingly, it is less well known that it was a joint effort by Japanese NGOs that 
prompted the Japanese government to sign the treaty and take further action toward a 
global ban on AP landmines. JCBL used many official and unofficial interactions to 
pressure the central government to encourage Japan’s participation. It is a very 
interesting case that several leading NGO practitioners and scholars have conducted 
study this issue such as Mekata (1998), Hirata (2002) and Osa (2003). However, many 
of them only told the story of the extraordinary success of the Japanese NGOs, and have 
not analysed the interactions of NGOs and the Japanese government sufficiently.  
Therefore, this chapter will focus on the Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL) 
to analyse its mode of behaviour in influencing the aid decision-making process. This 
will reveal how it behaved in order to make the breakthrough which led Japan to sign 
the Ottawa Treaty. There are three reasons to make JCBL the second case study:  
 
1) JCBL was specifically founded to address the landmine issue, combining 
a few organisations with the same interest.  
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2) As it is part of a network NGOs - the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (ICBL), which originated in the United States - a study of JCBL 
will provide a comparison to Northern/ European NGOs.  
3) JCBL has been one of the most powerful and influential NGOs in influencing 
Japan’s landmine policy.     
 
Through analysing the case, this chapter will reveal JCBL’s effective interactions 
with the government on the specific topic of AP landmines, which is closely related to 
Japan’s national security issue that the government surely wanted to keep from public 
scrutiny. In addition to the success of JCBL, other relevant issues, especially after 
‘September Eleventh’ will be examined in the chapter as well.   
 
6.2 What is the Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL)? 
   This section will analyse the history and organisational structure of JCBL in order to 
highlight its features. In order to do so, it is important to examine them from a global 
anti-AP landmine movement perspective, as JCBL was born as a national branch of the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). Therefore, this section will also first 
give an overview of the global movement prior to addressing JCBL itself.  
6.2.1 The Global Movement 
Why Should Anti-Personnel Landmines be abolished? 
Why was the anti-personnel landmine (AP landmine) focused on in particular rather 
than many other weapons systems in the 1990s? The reason is the long-term activation 
and cruelty of AP landmines, which may make victims suffer permanently, if they are 
not instantly killed. The weapon became of international concern in the 1990s because it 
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began to affect development efforts in post-conflict countries such as Cambodia, 
Afghanistan, and Somalia because people were unable to access, or make use, of their 
land for fear of possible landmine explosions. A significant work on a global movement 
to ban landmines, To Walk without Fear (1998), describes the particular cruelty of AP 
landmines; 
 
They cannot discriminate between a combatant or a civilian. While the use 
of the weapon might be militarily justifiable during the days, weeks, or even 
months of the battle, once peace is declared the landmine does not stop 
killing – a unique feature that has earned the landmine the moniker the 
‘eternal sentry’.1     
 
To address the cruelty and huge impact on development in post-conflict states where 
people have started to re-build their lives, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
(ICBL) was formed in 1992 to promote a global ban on this weapon. The next section 
will give quick review of ICBL, a host campaign of JCBL.   
 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)  
To realise a global ban on AP landmines, the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (ICBL) was formed from a coalition of six international NGOs2 Following 
the establishment of ICBL, many national campaigns were founded and started their 
own campaign towards a global ban and JCBL was one of them. It was the start of a 
                                                
1 Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, Brian W. Tomlin, To Walk Without Fear: The Global 
Movement to Ban Landmines (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998), 21. 
2 These six international NGOs were Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico 
International Mines, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights and the Vietnam 
Veterans of American Foundations.  
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very long path leading to the Ottawa Conference that declared a total ban on AP 
landmines and which achieved the goal beyond anyone’s expectation at the time of 
ICBL’s inception.  
   The Ottawa Process, which brought about the Ottawa Conference, was basically “a 
series of meetings designed to develop and negotiate the ban Convention as well as 
build the political will to sign it.”3 It was mainly driven by ICBL and a few friendly 
governments. In terms of the campaign, although the movement to ban landmines had 
ICBL as a centre body and Williams as the coordinator, each national campaign 
operated on its own agenda because each state had its own atmosphere for NGOs. Some 
were friendly while others were adversarial. It is described as follows:  
 
While united behind the call for a ban, this vast and diverse coalition has 
been tremendously flexible in its day-to day work…member organizations 
were few to pursue the achievement of the campaign’s goals as best fit their 
own mandate…  
It was clear that NGOs in the developed North, with their political culture of 
NGO/government dialogue, would not engage their governments precisely 
the same way that NGO partners in emerging democracies would.4 
 
   In its campaign, ICBL itself sponsored a number of activities to influence 
governments toward the global ban. They included organising an international coalition, 
travelling to build personal relationships, publishing documents for public awareness, as 
well as information sharing with each member of ICBL. The most important aspect of 
                                                
3 Cameron, Lawson and Tomlin, To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines, 
36.  
4 Cameron, Lawson and Tomlin, 22. 
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ICBL activities was its cooperation with UN agencies such as United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the pro-ban governments:5  
 
The much remarked upon close co-operation between governments and 
NGOs during the Ottawa Process was more the result of face-to-face 
meetings than anything else. From its very beginning, the ICBL has been 
built on networking, both individual and organisational.6 
 
The “face-to-face meetings” helped to build mutual confidence between ICBL and 
government leaders, but also allowed ICBL to cooperate with ‘authority’, which 
secured its institutional credibility. It is considered that back up from ’authority’, makes 
organisations more eligible for outside funding. Securing the credibility of an 
organisation is an important point for Japanese NGOs since the government does not 
spend taxpayers’ money in vain.  
   Each national campaign has implemented its own advocacy activities. For instance, 
the Italian national campaign cooperated with a TV talk show and the staff of a mine 
industry to appeal for the global ban and organised a demonstration to pressure the 
Italian government. The Swedish national campaign pushed the Swedish parliament to 
vote for the global ban on landmines, which pressured the government.7 The French 
movement launched a global ban on landmines campaign named the “Coward’s War” 
and gathered signatures. The French campaigners also held a number of meetings with 
                                                
5 Cameron, Lawson and Tomlin, 28. 
6 Cameron, Lawson and Tomlin, 25. 
7 Japan Campaign Ban Landmines (JCBL), “Kakkoku Kyanpeen (Each national campaign),” 
Newsletter 13, June 2000, 5.  
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government ministries and gave seminars at the government offices about AP 
landmines issues to encourage the government towards a pro-ban policy.8 
   The movement for the global ban on landmines was not undertaken only in the West, 
but also in Asia, where there are many landmine-affected countries. Cambodia, for 
example, held the third ICBL conference in its capital city, Phnom Penh in June 1995. 
The Cambodian campaign also operated a massive signature gathering campaign at the 
same time. By the end of the conference, the campaign gathered 340,000 signatures 
including that of King Sihanouk. This success inspired other national campaigns around 
the world. Here again, an advantage of an international coalition appears to be that they 
learn from each other.          
On this free basis of activities for each national campaign, JCBL had to search for 
its own mode of campaign. As repeatedly described, although Japan is a part of Western 
nations, most notably shown as a member of G-7, the political culture surrounding 
NGOs is far from friendly. Chapter 3 of this thesis has already shown the Japanese 
government’s way of exerting influence and controlling NGOs. However, JCBL has 
found the way to pressure the government, and it has resulted in Japan being one of first 
parties to sign the Ottawa Treaty. The next section will analyse the mode of behaviour 
of JCBL on Japan’s own policy towards the movement to ban landmines.      
 
6.2.2 The History of JCBL: Born from a Domestic Coalition 
   The Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL) was formed in July 1997, which 
was late in comparison to other national campaigns. In order to understand the 
background of JCBL, it is necessary to address Japan’s position towards the AP 
                                                
8 Cameron, Lawson and Tomlin, To Walk Without Fears: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines, 
28. 
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landmine issue since its ambivalent attitude gave birth to JCBL and also opened a door 
to its further activities. Therefore, this section will address Japan’s changing position 
towards the AP landmine issue at first and then overview and analyse the history and 
the organisational structure of JCBL.  
  The Japanese government showed a difficult and contradictory attitude towards the 
global movement to ban landmines from the very start and hesitated to make an active 
commitment. It changed positions frequently and JCBL had to keep pace with the 
frequent changes in the government’s attitude.  
At first, Japan made the following statement of its active attitude towards a global 
ban on mines at the Lyon Summit in 1996: “Japan supports international efforts towards 
a global ban on anti-personnel landmines”9. The Japanese Prime Minister once again 
made an official address to support the total ban at the United Nations General 
Assembly in September. In March 1997, the then Prime Minister (PM) Ryutaro 
Hashimoto even hosted the Tokyo Conference on Anti-Personnel Landmines with the 
participation of 27 states and 10 international organisations. At the Conference, Japan 
declares, “…the participants noted the need to make efforts to work towards the total 
ban on anti-personnel landmines”.10 However, at the same time, the Japanese 
government showed a passive attitude toward the Ottawa process, which was already 
suggested to the world by the Canadian government in October 1996.11       
                                                
9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), “Japan’s Decision to Support a Global Ban on 
Anti-personnel Landmines,” G7 Lyon Summit Information, n.d., 
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economu/summit/1996/landmines.html.> (11 July 2003). 
10 MOFA, “Tokyo Conference on Anti-Personnel Landmines Chairman’s Summary,” 7 March 1997, 
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/landmine/tky_conf97/summary.html.> (5 March 2004). 
11 JCBL, Jirai to Ningen- hitorhi hitori ni dekirukoto (Landmines and Human: what can individual 
do) (Tokyo: Iwanami Syoten, 2003), 35.  
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There was a reason for Japan’s ambiguity. Having been a close ally of the US, Japan 
was siding with the US’s attitude toward the treaty.12 Japan and Australia were labelled 
as the countries uncertain about the global ban on mines. The United States, Russia, 
China, India, and Pakistan, most of which were major actors in international relations, 
were considering refusing to sign the treaty.13 The US government, especially, was 
reluctant to participate or sign the treaty unless reservations were allowed for the 
Korean Peninsula and anti-tank mines. Later, US President Bill Clinton made a 
comment on the US’s withdrawal from the proposal of the treaty saying, “as 
Commander in Chief, I will not send our soldiers to defend the freedom of our people 
and the freedom of others without doing everything we can to make them as secure as 
possible.”14  
The possession of AP landmines by the United States army based in Japan under the 
U.S.- Japan Security Treaty was another area of concern for the Japanese government.15 
Because of the possession of landmines by the US armies within its border,16 the 
Japanese government was unable to clearly show its attitude towards the issue of 
banning mines. It showed concerns in regard to the possession of AP landmines at the 
US bases in Japan on the following three aspects: Japan’s authority to remove the AP 
landmines from the US army, use of AP landmines by the US army located in Japan and 
                                                
12 JCBL, 35. 
13 JCBL, “Nihon no Ayumi (Japan’s action)”, JCBL Newsletter 3, July 2003, 5. 
14 Clinton’s comment was quoted in Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin, To Walk Without Fear: The 
Global Movement to Ban on Landmines, 233. 
15 The treaty was signed between Japan and the United States in 1951 to allow the US army to be 
based in Japan even after the signing of San Francisco Peace Treaty to secure peace and security in 
Japan. Under this treaty, the US armies were located in Okinawa, Yokosuka, and Iwakuni. 
16 The US government has not disclosed its information about landmines possessed by the US 
armies in Japan. JCBL gathers information from an international NGO, Human Rights Watch. 
(Yasuhiro Kitagawa, interviewed by the author, 14 December 2003)  
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the transport of AP landmines from the US bases by Japanese personnel.17 In summary, 
the Japanese government showed strong hesitation on this issue in response to the US 
bases in Japan.  
   In this difficult situation, JCBL was formed by several Japanese NGOs that were 
already working on the issue separately and were concerned about the uneasiness of the 
Japanese government towards a global movement to ban mines. The establishment of 
the organisation was decided at a conference organised by several Japanese NGOs, the 
‘NGO Tokyo Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines: Toward a Total Ban on 
Antipersonnel Landmines’ in March 1997. At the conference, an appeal to move the 
Japanese government to sign the treaty was undertaken, and also launched the Japanese 
Campaign to Ban Landmines to undertake an integrated operation from several NGOs 
such as AAR. This was the official start of JCBL. 
   Despite its late start, there were already many NGOs which were working on AP 
landmine issues such as AAR, JVC, and the People’s Forum on Cambodia (PFOC). So 
when JCBL was established, some core members already had rich experience in 
landmine issue. Yasuhiro Kitagawa, the director of the People’s Forum on Cambodia, 
who had worked in Cambodia as an electrician, became the leader of the JCBL. His 
strong leadership was based on his actual experience in Cambodia and sympathy 
towards landmine victims and played a crucial role in JCBL activities. The next section 
will examine the organisational structure of JCBL and reveal its strengths.     
 
 
 
                                                
17 For more detailed explanation of the Japanese government’s concern regarding the US bases in 
Japan in terms of anti-personnel landmines, refer to Hirata (2002): 120-121.  
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6.2.3 Organisational Structure of JCBL   
As mentioned earlier, the hesitation of the Japanese government to support the 
global movement to ban mines created the unfriendly political atmosphere towards the 
NGOs. Needless to say, it is better to have a friendly authority than hostile one. But it 
could work in reverse and “hold organisations together often in the face of adversity”18, 
which is often observed in NGOs working in Asian states. JCBL also held organisations 
and people close together and managed to succeed in changing the course of the 
government. It made full use of the advantages of its organisational structure, 
networking nature, a fast and flexible decision-making process, a simple but strong 
operational target and strong leadership and strength of members. 
  
The Nature of Networking: Collaborating and Sharing 
   The major peculiarity of JCBL lies in its networking nature. As shown in the case of 
the Japan International Volunteer Center (JVC), networking creates mutual benefits for 
participating NGOs through the exchange of information, human resources and actual 
office facilities. Some NGOs, such as JVC and AAR, have particularly close relations 
with JCBL, therefore they support each other’s activities through several means, 
including writing favourable articles in their own magazines, as well as holding 
campaigns and activities together. By this type of networking, the insufficient number 
of staff of JCBL (which only totalled two) was supplemented with irregular staff from 
other organisations. Having people from different organisations helped JCBL to relate 
to even stronger organisations with various skills and experiences. This helped JCBL 
                                                
18 Ian Smilie and John Hailey, Managing for Change: Leadership, Strategy and Management in 
Asian NGOs (London: Earthcan, 2001), 50. 
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and other related organisations to exchange their strengths and fill any gaps in their 
activities. 
Networking with other organisations with established reputations gave JCBL a 
certain form of credibility and legitimacy. ICBL built its network system with the 
United Nations agencies to gain credibility. Being a national campaign of ICBL, JCBL 
gained legitimacy when ICBL was given a Nobel Prize in 1997.   
     
The Simple and Strong Activity Target of JCBL 
JCBL has set out three primary aspects of its campaign; 1) lobbying the government, 
2) sharing and providing information, and 3) building networks with overseas 
organisations. There are tactics to implement each of the three targets. Three tactics 
were undertaken for advocating to the government; a) cooperating with the mass media 
to build favourable public opinion for JCBL’s cause, b) a signature collecting campaign, 
and c) putting on workshops and symposiums for Members of Parliament (MPs) and 
governmental officers.19 Publishing newsletters of information from other domestic and 
international groups was also adopted as a means of information sharing.20 By building 
networks internationally, JCBL gained strength through mutual cooperating. By setting 
these clear activity targets, JCBL managed to concentrate its activity on them, 
something which many other NGOs fail to do and lose their goals.  
The JCBL administration was fully run by donations from 1) membership, 2) 
individual donors and 3) projects implementation. The number of members and the 
amount of donations increased as the AP landmine issue received public attention.21 It 
                                                
19 JCBL, “JCBL no Katsudo Hooshin (JCBL’s tactics),” Newsletter Preparation version, ,August 
1997, 1.   
20 JCBL, Newsletter Preparation version, 1.  
21 Yasuhiro Kitagawa, interviewed by the author, 14 May 2003. 
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has only applied for the governmental subsidies for campaign activities, despite the 
importance of the issue.  
 
Leadership 
   Yasuhiro Kitagawa, a leader of JCBL, was a crucial figure in Japan’s campaign to 
promote the government to sign and ratify the Ottawa Treaty. He had worked in 
Cambodia, the state most affected by AP landmines, in the 1960s and he has worked on 
the issue ever since, motivated by his strong concerns for the victims. Other than JCBL, 
he has organised and directed several other NGOs in Japan and his rich experience and 
personal enthusiasm for the issue has gathered people. Toshihiro Shimizu, another 
leading person in JCBL, also has experience of working in Cambodia.  
   What these charismatic leaders are faced with today is how to pass on leadership to 
the next generation of the organisation. As already analysed in the previous chapter, it is 
never easy to change a charismatic leader to a more bureaucratic leader within 
organisations. This issue is not unique to the Japan International Volunteer Centre 
(JVC) and JCBL. Many other Japanese NGOs experience this as the first generation 
leaders come closer to their retirement.   
 
6.3 Interactions of JCBL  
6.3.1 Signing the Ottawa Treaty: Using various interactions 
   In order to change the course of the government in favour of banning landmines, 
JCBL used various types of interactions. These types of interactions are personal 
relationships, symposiums and workshops, publications, campaigns and networking and 
petitions. This section will examine these interactions by JCBL towards signing the 
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Ottawa Treaty by following Japan’s see-saw policy changes towards AP landmines. The 
structure of this chapter will be different from that of JVC, since JCBL specialised in 
one topic, so it is clearer to analyse JCBL’s activity as one story, rather than 
categorising their interactions as with JVC.  
.  Having known the difficult attitude of the Japanese government, JCBL employed 
several strategies to boost its activity to move the government to sign the Ottawa Treaty. 
Collaborating with Members of Parliament (MP) was one of them. This collaboration 
was implemented through working together with a non-partisan groups of MPs to ban 
landmines. This was called Taijin Jirai Zenmen Kinshi Giin Suishin Renmei (a League 
of Diet Members to Promote a Comprehensive Ban on Antipersonnel Landmines: “the 
League” will be used in this chapter for the organisation hereafter). The League was 
unique for having an NGO member turned MP as a leading person. This connection 
bonded JCBL and the League very closely.  
In cooperating with MPs, three targets were set by JCBL such as 1) demanding the 
PM’s decision on a total ban, 2) lobbying the Defence Agency22, and 3) demanding a 
change in attitude of the US government through mutual exchange between the MPs of 
Japan and the US.23 JCBL followed these targets one by one through the League. The 
importance of this relationship soon appeared. MP Gen Nakatani, who was the vice 
president of the League and was in collaboration with JCBL, submitted a request to sign 
the Ottawa Treaty at the Prime Minister’s official residence on 19th of August. If it 
were only JCBL personnel who attempted to hand a paper in, they would not have had 
access to the residence. That is because, in Japan, NGOs have a very limited 
institutionalised way of accessing the government directly.  
                                                
22 The Japanese Defence Agency was the one of the opposition forces to signing the Ottawa Treaty. 
23 JCBL, NewsletterPreparation Version, 1. 
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   JCBL submitted another request for the Japanese government to take part in the 
Ottawa Treaty with no reservations on August 30, 1997. The request had the signatures 
of 56 groups and it was to be delivered to the Prime Minister (PM) Ryuichiro 
Hashimoto. One thing to mention here is that the signatures were collected from 
organisations of the same interest, but not from the public. That means the campaign of 
JCBL had not penetrated the Japanese public at this stage. Therefore, JCBL’s next task 
was to raise public awareness in Japan.  
   It was the work of AAR, an NGO collaborating with JCBL on the issue that raised 
public awareness by publishing a picture book, Jirai deha naku, Hana wo kudasai (Not 
Mines, But Flowers) in 1996. Children read the book and then talked about the story 
with their parents, who eventually became interested in the issue. It was a powerful tool 
to influence the public broadly, and as the book sold well, the politicians became also 
interested since parents are voters.   
   Meanwhile, there occurred an important step in the international arena for the 
Ottawa Process. On the last day of the Oslo negotiation (18th September, 1997), which 
was a prior international negotiation concerning the banning of mines, a proposal for the 
Convention (treaty) on a global ban on AP landmine was adopted. Eighty-nine 
governments came to the Oslo negotiation and they were greeted by NGOs and people 
from all around the world demanding the negotiation be conducted with ‘no loopholes, 
no exceptions, and no reservations’. As a result, in Article One of the general 
obligations, the treaty clearly states that “Each State Party undertakes never under any 
circumstances:  
 
a) To use anti-personnel mines; 
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b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to 
anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines; 
c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any 
activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.”24 (Italics added 
by the author) 
 
After blindly following the US government, Japan suddenly decided to participate in 
the Oslo conference. Jinbo (1997) bitterly comments that some mass media welcomed 
Japan’s decision and praised it as wise and brave, but Japan and the United States were 
regarded as disrupting the process.25 The countries demanding reservations, such as the 
US, China, Russia, and Japan had withdrawn from the convention proposal.   
Around this time, two events happened which were important for the global 
movement to ban mines. They were the sudden death of Princess Diana in August, who 
was well known for her action towards banning landmines, and an award of the Nobel 
Peace Prize to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) in October. The 
death of Princess Diana attracted media attention toward the movement to ban 
landmines and the Nobel Prize award gave the movement legitimacy and authority. 
Networking worked for JCBL this time, as JCBL, part of ICBL, gained this legitimacy 
and authority in Japan all of a sudden.     
In addition, a very fortunate situation occurred in Japan for JCBL around this time. 
Keizo Obuchi, known for his strong sympathy towards AP landmine victims, became 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He made a prominent statement on 17th November 
                                                
24 Handicap International, “General Obligations: Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction,” Summary, 
7 July 2000, <www.landmine.ro/legislat4.htm> (18 March 2006).  
25 Tetsuo Jinbo, Jirai report (Landmine Report) (Tokyo: Tukiji Syokan, 1997), 286. 
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1997 that said it was illogical that Japan was disagreeing with the treaty and clearing 
landmines in Cambodia at the same time.26 He also said that Japan would have to 
follow the current international trend and consider signing the treaty against the 
government’s policy.27 Osa (2003) analysed this official statement by Mr. Obuchi, 
stating “it could be a completely unexpected slip of the tongue for those pro-the US 
government.”28 Obuchi became a key person in the later stage of Japan’s policy toward 
the global ban on landmines and it will be analysed later in a framework of leadership. 
Yet, there was an ambiguous force in Japan. The very next day after the Oslo 
proposal was adopted, the Japanese government presented a report on anti-personnel 
landmines, named the “Current Situation and Problems”. In the report, Japan made a 
clear standpoint in a global ban on AP landmines. “Japan thinks that to step up 
international efforts in the following four areas are important. (a) Efforts towards 
achieving a global ban on anti-personnel landmines…”29 In the same report, Japan’s 
efforts toward a global ban on landmines were described as follows; 
 
(a) At the G-7 summit held in Lyon in June 1996, Prime Minister Ryutaro 
Hashimoto expressed support for international efforts toward a global ban on 
landmines and announced that Japan had decided to take a series of 
measures on its own initiative. 
                                                
26 His comment was quoted in Yukie Osa “Iraku Senso to Tai-jin Jirai no Haiki kanryo (The Iraq 
War and completion of abolition of anti-personnel landmines),” Sekai to Gikai (The World and the 
Parliament) (June 2003): 23. 
27 Osa, 23. 
28 Osa, 23. 
29 MOFA, “Anti-personnel landmines: Current Situation and Problems,” 27 November 1997, 
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/landmine/current.html> (5 March 2004). 
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(b) Japan participated in the international conference on the global ban on 
anti-personnel landmines organised by the Canadian government in October 
1996. 
(c) Japan co-sponsored the U.N. resolution on An International Agreement 
to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 
December 10, 1996. This resolution urged the pursuit of international 
agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines. 
(d) Japan has been participating in international efforts to achieve a global 
ban on anti-personnel landmines at the Conference on Disarmament in 
Geneva and through the Ottawa Process.30   
 
It is interesting to observe the contrast between the comment by Obuchi and this official 
statement. It shows the clear contradiction that Japan was facing. 
Despite the convincing statements that emphasised Japan’s attitude toward the 
Ottawa Treaty, the government’s attitude was still of hesitation towards the signing of it, 
and as a result, it received continual criticism for siding with the US government. ICBL 
has named Japan as the only country supporting the US concept of trying to make the 
Korean Peninsula an exemption in the treaty.31 Motoko Mekata, a former AAR staff 
and a founding member of JCBL received an email from ICBL claiming that Japan was 
siding with the US government and spoiling the Ottawa Treaty with the possibility of 
adding reservations.32 She mentions that the Oslo Conference, which was a previous 
                                                
30 MOFA, 5 March 2004. 
31 JCBL, “ICBL no Hookoku (ICBL Report),” Newsletter: Special Edition, September 1997, 5.  
32 JCBL, “Oslo kaar no Hookoku (Report from Oslo),” Newsletter 2, September, 1997,3.  
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international conference on the mine issue, was all about “how Japan acts badly”.33 
This resulted in pungent criticism that made it necessary for JCBL to take urgent action.     
 JCBL and other related NGOs were deeply concerned about the attitude of the 
Japanese government and decided to start a campaign to lobby the government with 
public support. JCBL coordinated a campaign of collecting signatures from Japanese 
people to inform the government that it had public support behind its activities. 
Collecting signatures is thought to be one of the most effective tools for policy 
advocacy in Japan, where NGOs possess little official access to the central authority. 
   The other advantage of signature collection campaign is information sharing. 
Through signature collecting, JCBL was able to share information about the landmine 
issue with people which gave feedback about the activities. As well as fulfilling the 
strategy of advocating to the government, JCBL also educated people which inspired 
interest in people.   
   Improving the organisation’s own image was used as a strategy to dramatise the 
campaign. JCBL invited a Cambodian landmine victim, Tun Channalet of ICBL with 
the help of a Catholic group to Japan in November 1997. He had lost both legs in a 
landmine accident in 1982 and his figure in a wheelchair directly demonstrated the 
cruelty of AP landmines. Channalet toured all over Japan to give seminars on what the 
landmine issues were, what people could do and how to achieve these goals. As a result, 
the campaign had collected 35,283 signatures by 15 November34, which was a huge 
                                                
33 JCBL, “Oslo kara no Hookoku (Report from Oslo),” NewsLetter 2.5, September 1997:,3.  
34 JCBL, “1997 nen no JCBL no Katsudo (JCBL activities in 1997)”, Newsletter: Special Edition, 
(December 1997), 6.    
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number for Japan, where often people hesitate to identify themselves in political 
action.35 
This time, with a large number of signatures, Tun Channalet handed the petition to 
Keizo Obuchi in person along with two other Members of Parliament,36 and demanded 
again Japan’s participation in the Ottawa Treaty without any reservations. He certainly 
made a strong impression on Obushi, as he later recalled when he met the then Minister 
for Foreign Affairs of Japan, “He had tears in his eyes and said ‘landmines have to be 
abolished’.37  
   These efforts by JCBL and other cooperating NGOs and people changed the course 
of the Japanese government toward the AP landmine issue. Obuchi signed the treaty 
with no reservations in Ottawa. He stated at the Ottawa Signing Conference; 
 
The decision to sign the Ottawa Treaty was not an easy one because 
the signing of this milestone treaty is very closely related to our 
national defence. But as a country making vigorous demining efforts, 
Japan has made the decision to sign it for the high cause of 
humanitarianism.38 
 
                                                
35 Some reasons can be considered for the Japanese people’s hesitation towards giving signatures, 
such as disclosing personal details. Another reason is they are not keen on appearing to be siding 
with particular political action for fear of being tracked down in case the action turned against the 
authority. It was said that the Defence Agency made a list of people who required information 
disclosure according to the Free Access to Information Law Act (Mainichi Newspaper, 28 May 
2002). There are several other examples regarding information disclosure on personal details, which 
were not supposed to be open at all. 
36 JCBL, “Channalet shi ni yoru Syomei Teisyutsu (Petition handed in by Mr. Channalet),” 
Newsletter: Special Edition, December 1997,3.   
37 JCBL, “Tun Channalet shi heno Intabyuu (Interview with Mr. Tun Channareth),” Newsletter 13, 
June 2000, 4.  
38 MOFA, “Address by Mr. Keizo Obuchi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan Ottawa Signing 
Conference December 3, 1997,” Japan signed the Total Ban Treaty on Anti-Personnel Mines, 3 
December 1997,  <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/landmine/otawa97/address.html> (15 July 2003).   
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  The then Minister for Foreign Affairs also noted the visit of Channareth in his speech 
and concluded; “every time I think of the many victims of landmines who like these 
people have overcome their hardship to live with such vigour, I renew my determination 
to tackle the landmine problems.”39 At this conference, the Japanese government 
declared that it would set up a new scheme named the “Zero Victim Programme” within 
its Official Development Assistance (ODA). It stated that “Japan is determined to work 
positively on this matter in cooperation with other countries so that this goal of “zero 
victim” can be achieved as early as possible in the 21st century.”40 
 
6.3.2. Ratifying the Ottawa Treaty: Collaborating with Politicians 
Japan’s sudden signing of the Ottawa Treaty was a surprise to the world. As 
Williams and Goose (1998) have described in To Walk without Fear; “it seemed at this 
point extremely unlikely that Japan would sign the ban treaty. But in a rather startling 
public statement, not long after the Peace Prize, Japan’s newly appointed Foreign 
Minister, Keizo Obuchi, announced his intention to review Japanese policy with a mind 
to being able to sign the treaty.”41 After having urged the Japanese government to sign 
the Ottawa Treaty, the next goal for JCBL was to promote the government to ratify the 
Ottawa Treaty.  
The timing was fortunate for the movement to ban mines. At this time, Keizo 
Obuchi, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs had become the Prime Minister, and 
made the decision to join the Ottawa Treaty. His personal interest in and sympathy 
                                                
39 MOFA, “Address by Mr. Keizo Obuchi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan Ottawa Signing 
Conference December 3, 1997”, (15 July 2003).  
40 MOFA, 15 July 2003. 
41 Cameron, Lawson and Tomlin, To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines, 
46. 
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towards the AP landmine issue and victims created the time for the movement to ban 
mines. JCBL mentioned his importance in realising Japan’s early ratification as follows: 
 
The PM Obuchi has been enthusiastic and planning Japan’s early 
ratification of the Ottawa Treaty. He was getting vexed at a delay in 
administration within the government for the ratification, so our signature 
collection was received with enthusiasm as a means to encourage 
administrators.42    
 
At this stage, the AP landmine issue was crucial for the Japanese government in terms 
of linking it to other foreign policy concerns such as post-conflict reconstruction and 
development.43 It became the centre stage for Japan to show its presence in the 
international scene through making a commitment to AP landmines, which was a great 
humanitarian concern. However, Japan’s next move to ratify the Ottawa Treaty was 
slow despite the dramatic signing of the Treaty. Hirata (2002) analyses this as, 1) not 
being able to spend enough time on the landmine issue since the nuclear test explosion 
was conducted by India and Pakistan and the government’s focus was more on that 
issue, and 2) the Japanese government was concerned about the treatment of AP 
landmines on US bases in Japan once Japan ratified the Treaty.44 To move the hesitant 
government to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible, JCBL had to use various 
interactions to promote the government to move forward to ratification.   
                                                
42 JCBL, “JCBL activities 1998,” <http://www.jca.apc.org/banmines/organisation/record.html.> (10 
May 2004). 
43 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1998, (Tokyo: APIC, 1999), 45. 
44 Hirata, Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Role of NGOs in Tokyo’s Aid and Development 
Policy, 120.  
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Major JCBL activities at this time included a new campaign of signature collection 
and collaborating with politicians. Having been able to influence the government with 
the signature gathering campaign, JCBL launched a second campaign in April 1998. As 
a result, it collected more than 200,000 signatures from the public in six months, which 
were submitted to the Prime Minister on 11th September.  
For the signature campaign, JCBL tried to intercept and collaborate with politicians. 
There were already some politicians working on this issue, but among them, Yukihisa 
Fujita of the League played an important role in the ratification campaign. In June 1998, 
a questionnaire survey about the AP landmine issue was undertaken among members of 
the parliament. The object of this survey was information sharing amongst the MPs and 
to change their views towards the ratification through proving them with more 
information from JCBL.   
With the support from the League, a series of petitions were turned in to the Cabinet, 
including the PM himself and leading members of each political party. In July, JCBL 
submitted a petition for an early proposal of a bill related to the Ottawa Treaty to the 
newly established Obuchi administration.  
In addition to the signature campaign, JCBL also held some other public campaigns 
such as a poster competition (September to November) and participating in an 
international cooperation festival in October. The annual international festival was 
especially an important occasion to attract the general public to the issue and raise their 
awareness. A symposium on AP landmines was also held in June. As analysed before, 
hosting symposiums means both arousing public awareness and pressuring the 
government by making the issue public and official. 
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As a result of these campaigns led by JCBL, in cooperation with politicians, the 
Japanese government was pressured to ratify the Ottawa Treaty on 30th September 
1998. Japan’s ratification came in 45th place out of all participating states. With more 
than 40 state ratifications, the Ottawa Treaty came into effect on 1st March, 1999.  
 
6.3.3 How Have They Done It?  JCBL centred actions to promote the government     
   The case of Japan’s sudden signing of the Ottawa Treaty and its ratification 
illustrates a successful example of a Japanese NGO’s advocacy work, although the 
process of making the government sign the treaty without any reservations was not 
easy. Interactions by JCBL have already been discussed in the above analyses, but five 
features are deduced and summarised in addition to the effective advocacy.  
1) Using domestic and international networks, 
2) Obtaining public support through campaigns, workshops and symposiums, 
3) Cooperating with MPs, a major actor in Japan’s decision-making process, to 
make a breakthrough, 
4) Making the campaign visible by using an icon (visit of Tun Channalet), 
5) Building a personal relationship with authorities such as Keizo Obuchi and 
politicians, 
6) Publishing a translation of Landmine Monitor, an annual report on landmine 
issues, and undertaking monitoring activity.  
Firstly, it utilised both domestic and international networks. JCBL has used 
domestic and international networks to obtain support and also influence that they have 
lacked in terms of their relationships with the government, such as outside pressure 
(Gai-Atsu). It was a powerful back up from ICBL for JCBL because ICBL had already 
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established orthodoxy in the area at several international occasions such as 
conferences.45 In addition, as ICBL was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997, it gave 
it more strength for each national campaign. JCBL also cooperated with a Korean 
Campaign to Ban Landmines and launched a joint postcard campaign in 2002. This 
cooperation in the campaign also helped each other to build networks. Secondly, 
signature collection educated people. The more they know about the landmine problems 
and its victims, the more the public providing support that NGOs could receive as 
national consensus. A growing number of signatures was strong evidence of the public 
support. Besides the signature collecting, many symposiums/ workshops and publishing 
of works were also undertaken that also helped to inform people about the issue.  
   Thirdly, collaboration with Members of Parliament (MPs) cannot be ignored in 
JCBL’s activities. MPs naturally consider their next elections and frequently come up 
with policies that contribute to supporting themselves, but pictures of landmine victims 
were too terrible to ignore. Some MPs organised the non-partisan working group and by 
using their insider position in the decision-making process, they exerted influence on 
the government, such as making queries at official meetings. As stated above, when the 
signature collection was submitted to Obuchi by Channalet, two MPs accompanied him. 
Fourthly, the visit of the landmine victim apparently made the Foreign Minister 
sympathetic towards landmine victims, which led him to take a stronger position on the 
global ban on landmines.  
As the fifth point, strong leadership has also played a crucial role. At that moment 
when Japan was showing an ambiguous attitude, the two most powerful men in 
Japanese politics had special interests in the landmine issue. Both the Prime Minister 
                                                
45 Jinbo, Jirai Report (Landmine report), 291. 
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Hashimoto and the Minister for Foreign Affairs Obuchi had personal feelings about the 
landmine issue. Obuchi’s personal sympathy has already been discussed. Hashimoto 
committed himself to gathering the ashes of Japanese troops in Saipan, and visiting a 
mine field in the Korean Peninsula. Mekata (1998) points out especially, the importance 
of Obuchi, who sympathised with AP landmine victims and understood the importance 
of the issue.46 MP Yukihisa Fujita, one of the active members of the non-partisan 
working group on AP landmines also regarded his personal emotion as important for 
joining the Ottawa Treaty.47 Osa (2003) comments;  
 
Japan is not the only one country that has a sensitive relationship with the 
US government, there are some other countries as well. However, having 
delicate foreign relations and facing strong opposition from army-related 
power, people regard the AP landmine issue as a humanitarian issue and 
politicians, who are not afraid of taking risks in each state made brave 
decisions on the total ban on AP landmines.48   
 
Sixthly and lastly, JCBL keeps informing the Japanese public of AP landmine issues by 
publishing a translation of the annual Landmine Monitor. A Press conference is usually 
held when the translation comes out and JCBL takes advantage of the opportunity to 
cooperate with the media. Through providing inside information obtained by JCBL to 
the media, JCBL is hoping the media to keep AP landmine issues alive in the media.   
 
                                                
46 Motoko Mekata, Jirai naki Chikyu he - Yume wo Genjitsu ni shita Hitobito (The World without 
Landmines: Dream Makers) (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1998), 230. 
47 His comment was quoted in JCBL, “Symposium,” Newsletter 6 (December 1997), 3.  
48 Osa, “Iraku Senso to Tai-jin Jirai no Haiki kanryo (The Iraq War and completion of abolishment 
of anti-personnel landmines)”, 25. 
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6.4 Japan’s Aid Policy on AP Landmines after the Ottawa Convention  
   Keizo Obuchi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time of the Ottawa Conference 
and the Prime Minister after that, pledged a special aid scheme on AP landmines to 
show Japan’s support for global mine ban movement. It is called the “Zero Victim 
Programme”. The amount of aid given to the landmine issue has totalled 5,499 million 
JPY (equivalent to $ 494 US million) up to 2002.49 With this amount, Japan has 
become the top donor of all aid donors in relation to the landmine campaigns. As a 
result, aid allocation in the landmine issue has reached 10,340 million JPY (2003) and 
therefore, the promise of providing 1,000,000 million JPY by the Foreign Minister has 
also been met within the five years. 
   Japan may seem to be making substantial progress on landmine issues, however, 
Japan’s aid policy has not been developed to keep up with JCBL’s expectations. While 
it is true that the aid amount reached the goal set by the Prime Minister in 1997, its 
allocation was heavily concentrated on areas where the Japanese government had its 
own foreign policy interest.  
Criticism arose against Japan’s style of providing aid in the AP landmine issue from 
the very start. After the announcement of the “Zero Victim Programme” in December 
1997, the Japanese government had provided 100 million JPY (equivalent to USD 865 
million) among six countries and multilateral agencies.50 According to JCBL’s own 
data examination, bilateral aid was only for mine clearance activity in Cambodia and 
other funding was through multilateral aid. On this partiality, Toshihiro Simizu, a JCBL 
staff member, bitterly comments on the government funding situation that only operated 
‘indirectly’ through multilateral agencies such as the United Nations. He considered 
                                                
49 JCBL, “Zero Victim Program (Zero Victim Programme),” Newsletter, 27, September 2003, 13. 
50 JCBL, “Zero Victim Program nit suite (About Zero Victim Programme),” Newsletter 14, 
September 2000, 4 - 5. 
 189 
that this showed the government was just trying to spend a certain amount of 1000 
million JPY in a promised time of five years as was declared.51  
JCBL Newsletter, volume 14, presented an overall result and analysis of Japan’s aid 
provision in the AP landmine scheme. According to its examination, aid was provided 
among 17 countries in 1999. Around the amount of JPY 160 million was distributed 
among multilateral agencies such as the United Nations, Organisation of American 
States (OAS), and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The amount for 
multilateral institutions was increased by 1.5 times in comparison to that of 1998.52 The 
overall comment concluded that this situation that characterised Japan’s ODA tended to 
flow funding through governmental bodies or semi-governmental entities of AP 
landmine relations. Therefore, the funding tended to go for mine clearance projects 
rather than supporting victims. JCBL criticised this phenomenon as against the third 
content of the programme, “Assistance to the Victims of the landmines”.53   
Including this aid provision, there are some issues that JCBL currently faces. They 
will be discussed in the next section to reveal a new challenge for JCBL, which had 
once achieved a significant result in Japan’s foreign policy in the 1990s.  
 
6.5 At the Turning Point: New challenges for JCBL  
  In addition to the questionable provision of the aid for the AP landmines clearance 
and victim support, there are five other major issues that JCBL has been addressing. 
These issues are: losing public attention, disappearance of high-powered persons, 
organisational survival after the completion of the special aid scheme, possession of AP 
                                                
51 JCBL, “Shimizu Ypshihiro kara Hitokoto (A comment by Toshihiro Shimizu of JCBL),” 
Newsletter, 9, May 1999  
52 JCBL, Newsletter, 14, 4. 
53 JCBL, Newsletter 14, 4.  
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landmines by the US army located in Japan, and the Japanese government’s new 
attitude towards the “War on Terror” since 2001.  
   The first issue is the loss of attention on the issue. The Japanese public attention 
toward the AP landmine issue suddenly grew to a large extent immediately before the 
signing the Ottawa Treaty in 1997. The passion, however, was also fast to disappear 
after the ratification of the Treaty in 1998. JCBL is now struggling to maintain the 
public awareness of AP landmines, and it has shifted the focus to cluster bombs by 
recognising them as another form of AP landmines.54  
   It is argued that one reason for the fast disappearance of public enthusiasm in Japan 
towards the issue comes from the lack of spontaneous interest from Japanese people in 
the first place. The sudden rise of the public interest in this issue shows it was caused 
not by a spontaneous growth of interest, but mostly by external factors such as the death 
of Princess Diana and the Nobel Prize award to JCBL’s host organisation.55 The efforts 
of JCBL and other network NGOs were undeniable, but Keizo Obuchi, who was a key 
figure as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan and later the Prime Minister, made 
the issue crucial to Japan, though he was moved by hidden NGOs efforts.  
 The other possible reason for the lost interest in AP landmines in Japan can be a 
shift in foreign policy by the government towards a more active international 
contribution after “September Eleventh” in 2001, by sending the Self Defence Force 
                                                
54 JCBL, Jirai to Ningen (landmines and human beings), 66 -69. The similarity of cluster bombs and 
AP landmines is described as,”it can be said that there is broad agreement that cluster munitions that 
fail to explode as designed, do function similarly to antipersonnel mines.” (source from Mines 
Action Canada, “Cluster Bomb” <http:// 
www.minesactioncanada.org/documents/ct_cb_7June01htm>, [6 October 2005]) 
55 In committing to the cluster bomb issue, JCBL faces a reduction of impact of ICBL for its back 
up because ICBL stated it would concentrate on the AP landmine issue, but did not have a formal 
advocacy on cluster bombs. The decision was made at ICBL Coordination Committee meeting in 
September 1999 and the information was updated on the JCBL homepage. Refer to JCBL, “ICBL 
Position on Cluster Bombs,” Cluster Bombs, 11-12 September 1999, <www.jca.apc.org/landmines/> 
(17 March 2006). 
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(SDF) overseas. The government was eager to make a contribution to the so-called 
“Peace-Building” field of foreign policy. This is because sending SDF overseas 
presents an ever stronger presence of Japan in the international community as another 
form of “Visible Japanese Aid”. It can be easier to highlight Japan’s contribution to the 
outside with Japan’s national flag attached than by cooperating with NGOs. 
Particularly, enthusiastic attention was given to Afghanistan, and this eagerness was 
shown in chairing the conference on Afghanistan recovery in December 2001. The 
landmine issue was included in the topics of the conference. 
 
Tokyo’s sponsorship of the first big international conference of Afghan 
non-governmental organisations which began yesterday, and a 
ministerial-level summit for donor countries in January, point to a more 
active role for Japan than in past international conflicts.56   
 
One important point here is that a part of the funding for the “Zero Victim Programme” 
was also going to be spent in a post-conflict Peace Building scheme in Afghanistan.57 
There was a high number of landmines laid in Afghanistan, so this is not saying that the 
funding was out of the parameters of the programme because it was still valuable for 
removing them and supporting victims in Afghanistan. However, the point is that the 
funding was not purely for the AP landmine issue, but also for the sake of Japan’s new 
aid policy line, Peace Building strategy. Because the need for peace building in 
Afghanistan occurred within the five years of the time the Japanese government 
                                                
56 Alexandra Herney, “Tokyo poised for rebuilding role HUMANITARIAN AID,” Financial Times, 
12 December 2001, 8. 
57 JCBL, Newsletter, 27, 13.  
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promised to provide funding, this aid to Afghanistan seems to mark the end of this 
programme. 
   In order to maintain interest in the AP landmine issue by the Japanese public, JCBL 
now has a Katari-be Koza (speakers training course) for young people. The course is to 
train young people to be able to give a public talk about the AP landmine issue around 
the world and JCBL also aims to encourage young people be more interested in the 
issue through the course, to hand down the activity as well as maintain concerns among 
them.    
The second issue – the disappearance of influential people from the AP landmine 
scene - is also crucial. Keizo Obuchi, whose personal sympathy toward the AP 
landmine issue was one of the major driving forces, suddenly died in 2000. After his 
death, the subsequent administration showed no further aid strategy towards the AP 
landmine issues after completing five years of the “Zero Victim Programme” at the time 
of 2003. Although there are countless AP landmines still laid in the world, the 
government official concerned stated that a further aid provision would be considered 
“case by case”, which meant there was no plan at the moment but maybe in the future.58 
JCBL has been keen to explain the importance of continuing aid provision to AP 
landmine areas and has tried to pressure the government to make an official 
announcement for further aid strategies, but has not been successful so far.   
   Depending too much on collaboration with MPs can also be risky. They face 
elections eventually, and when they are not re-elected, they turn out to be nothing more 
than ‘ordinary people’. Yukihisa Fujita of the League, who contributed to the 
ratification of the Ottawa Treaty, lost the election in 2000 (re-elected in 2003). He 
                                                
58 JCBL, Jirai to Ningen – hitori hitori ni dekirukoto (Landmines and Human: what can individuals 
do?), 38. 
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opened the door for JCBL to access the authority. Therefore, with his disappearance, 
JCBL lost one an important point of access to the decision-making process.  
   The third issue is related to the use of aid to a develop landmine clearance 
technology. Japan declared further funding of 500 million JPY in research and 
development of new technology for demining in December 2000. JCBL has concerns 
about this because, “it would benefit primarily private companies and that Japan would 
not have competitive advantage in development of demining equipment over 
experienced Western countries.”59 
Japan is well-known for its high-technology production, so it is natural for Japanese 
construction firms to penetrate into a new business field with their advanced technology. 
JCBL, however, considered that enough technology and equipment has already been 
given by ICBL and other states, and commented as follows: 
 
Japan showed interest in producing main clearance technology. However, 
the new technologies already provided the result that they were not effective 
compared to ones brought by ICBL and European Committee. Continuous 
use of already existing technology is important and not inventing new 
ones.60     
 
The fourth issue is about the possession of AP landmines by the US army stationed 
in Japan. The issue was already an obstacle for the Japanese government joining the 
Ottawa Treaty in the first place. Even after signing and ratifying the Treaty, the 
                                                
59 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) Landmine Monitor Report 2001: Toward a 
Mine-Free World, (New York: Human Right Watch, 2002), 461. 
60 JCBL, “Jirai Jyokyo Kyoryoku nit tsuite (About cooperation in destruction of landmines),” 
Newsletter, 18, September 2001, 6.   
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Japanese government refuses to disclose information on AP landmine possession by the 
US army. 
The Landmine Monitor Report 2001 has addressed the US AP landmine problem in 
Japan. It says; 
 
 Japan did not report in any of its three Article 7 reports the presence of 
US antipersonnel landmines in Japan. The US is believed to have some 
115,000 self-destructing antipersonnel mines stored in Japan, and perhaps 
some portion of the 1.2 million non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines that 
the US is retaining for use in Korea. 61 
 
In this regard, even though the Japanese government has declared the completion of its 
mine destruction, it does not mean ‘every landmine has been destroyed’. The claim 
made by the MOFA in this respect was that, Japan had to understand that the US 
government needed to possess landmines to protect its own soldiers.62 The implication 
of this was that the soldiers were supposed to protect Japan under the US-Japan 
Security Treaty. It was clear that the MOFA was repeating the claim made by the US 
government.   
   The last issue of concern is regarding the Japanese government’s active attitude to 
the “war on terrorism” after “September Eleventh”. As the ’international community’ 
led by the United States, has declared “War on Terror”, the Japanese government has 
shown enthusiastic participation and sent the Self Defence Force (SDF) to Iraq for 
Peace Building purposes. It was obviously an attempt to overcome “the Gulf War 
                                                
61 ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 2001: Toward a Mine Free World, 458. 
62 JCBL, “Nihon Seihu no Kenkai (A comment by the Japanese government),” Newsletter: Special 
Edition, 6.5, July 2004, 5.  
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Trauma” in order to receive appreciation by the international community, especially the 
United States (See Chapter 1 for “the Gulf War Trauma”). There is a concern with 
regard to this strategy, that if Japan continues to play an active role in international 
Peace Building schemes, there will be a possibility of operating in unstable areas that 
AP landmines would become ineffective in terms of securing the SDF’s operational 
areas. The direction of the government is yet to be observed carefully but it has to bear 
in mind that there is a dangerous possibility.  
 
6. 6 Conclusion: “Did JCBL make the breakthrough in the decision-making 
process?” 
   JCBL’s activities in the 1990s were successful in terms of pressuring the Japanese 
government to change its attitude toward the Ottawa Treaty. Conversely, regarding 
Japan’s aid policy in the AP landmine issue and continuing current issues, it is hard to 
say whether it was successful or not.  
   JCBL has greatly influenced and moved the government to sign (1997) and ratify 
(1998) the Ottawa Treaty using several effective interactions. This includes using the 
international network with ICBL and the domestic networks with fellow Japanese 
NGOs. In addition, several other circumstances sided with JCBL, such as the Peace 
Nobel Prize for ICBL that impressed the Japanese government, which was sensitive 
towards international criticism.  
Building a personal relationship with Keizo Obuchi, who personally gave sympathy 
to AP landmines victims, helped JCBL to access the central authority. The MP Fujita 
also played a crucial role in bringing the government to participate in the global 
movement. He was closely connected to JCBL and other associating NGOs. JCBL 
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made a good use of the media, such as publishing newsletters and books and inviting a 
high-profile person from overseas to highlight its campaigns. Through these various 
interactions, JCBL seemed to have made a breakthrough in the established 
decision-making process in Japan and achieved its goal. 
     However, in line with Japan’s aid implementation in AP landmines, JCBL can 
hardly be said to be as effective. Although the Japanese government has set up the aid 
scheme for AP landmines, it was made use of for implementing a post-conflict Peace 
Building scheme, Japan’s new aid policy line. The JCBL was unable to influence the 
Japanese government concerning the possession of AP landmines by the US armies in 
Japan. It can be considered that this was connected to Japan’s national security situation 
which constitutes an important factor in the decision-making in terms of bureaucracy 
and politicians. That is, addressing the issue could violate the bilateral relationship with 
the US government.  
   Based on these reasons, the following consequence can be drawn: The Japanese 
government still considers its national interest most in its foreign aid policy, despite its 
continuous reverse claims. Although there are still serious issues around AP landmines, 
Japan has terminated its aid activities and no further aid is planned for the time being.63 
   Considering the situation around it, JCBL is now at a turning point. In terms of 
relations with the government, JCBL keeps pressuring the programme. However, the 
Japanese government has made it clear by holding a completion ceremony in 200364 
that the AP landmine issue in Japan had been solved, not to mention the US armies’ 
possession of AP landmines in Japan. If there is to be no further aid strategy from Japan, 
                                                
63 JCBL, Jirai to Ningen – hitori hitori ni dekirukoto (Landmines and Human : what can individuals 
do), 37-38. 
64 JCBL, Jirai to Ningen – hitori hitori ni dekirukoto (Landmines and Human : what can individuals 
do), 65.  
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it is difficult for JCBL to commit its activities to the government. Especially since the 
government feels it has fulfilled its own responsibilities by signing and ratifying the 
Ottawa Treaty and completing the destruction of AP landmines in its own hands. The 
possession of AP landmines by the US army within Japanese border is still a debatable 
issue, but the Japanese government prefers to remain silent. 
   While it may sound like an exaggeration, the objectives of JCBL remain important 
to educate people both inside and outside Japan about AP landmines. For example, 
JCBL has started a new project to train storytellers among interested people. Its aim is 
to raise the awareness of people about AP landmines and also stop the issue from being 
forgotten. While acknowledging the importance of these awareness raising projects, it is 
clear that JCBL is now being pushed aside from centre stage in dealing with the AP 
landmine issue in Japan.            
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Chapter 7 
Case Study 3 
Environmental Conservation Strategy: Ideal Collaboration? 
 
7.1.1 Introduction 
   The previous two case studies have discussed how the Japanese government 
attempted to practise a new aid strategy, “Visible Japanese Aid (VJA)”, and the impact 
of Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) participation. This third case study will be 
discussed in light of the other new foreign aid strategy of Japan in the 1990s, which was 
‘environmental conservation’. Japan’s foreign aid provision in the environmental field 
increased to about 4000 million JPY in 1996 (Appendix 2: Figure 5). NGOs were 
heavily involved in this new strategy as well as in cases which were discussed in the 
previous chapters. The unique difference in this chapter is that NGOs were given a clear 
opportunity to take part in the decision-making process to bring about a new 
environmental policy for Japan’s aid strategy. This chapter will analyse 
this ’environmental conservation’ scheme of Japan’s foreign aid and the mode of 
operations of the NGOs involved.  
   Two Japanese environmental NGOs will be focused on in this chapter: Greenpeace 
Japan (GP Japan) and Friends of the Earth Japan (FoE Japan). They are both among the 
top environmental NGOs in Japan and each has brought about a significant change in 
Japan’s environmental policy and its related aid scheme in the 1990s. This chapter will 
examine the impact on the Japanese government made by NGO interactions through GP 
Japan, and the establishment of a new guideline for Japan’s environmental policy with 
NGO participation through FoE Japan. For these analyses, this chapter sets two objects: 
1) to study environmental NGOs’ impact on governmental policy and Official 
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Development Assistance (ODA) through examining their interactions and 2) to analyse 
whether the Japanese government has really gained a favourable international reputation 
in the environmental area not only in terms of monetary power, but also in taking an 
active role in solving problems.  
   The chapter will start with the background of Japan’s environmental policy to reveal 
why it became one of the more important aspects of Japan’s aid policy and contributed 
to “Visible Japanese Aid (VJA)”. This will be followed by analysis of the interactions 
and impacts of the two environmental NGOs in order to satisfy the aforementioned 
objectives. Through this analysis, this chapter will reveal the mode of operations of 
environmental NGOs that made a seemingly more effective breakthrough, in 
comparison to the previous two cases, in the established decision-making process.  
   
7.1.2 Background of Japan’s Environmental Policy in the 1990s 
Highlighting Its Name at International Conferences 
   The Peace Constitution and its concerns for neighbouring Asian states, which 
suffered from Japan’s aggression during World War Two, caused Japan to be hesitant 
about playing an active role in current international relations, which often requires 
military action. In global environmental issues, on the other hand, Japan could play an 
active role because the issues are devoid of any armament involvement that Japan 
would be unable to provide. In addition, the issues involve fewer political aspects such 
as refugees and human rights problems, which were often the subject of simmering 
debate at the United Nations and issues that Japan often falls between the West and 
Asian states in respect to.1 Among these major issues discussed in the international 
                                                   
1 For instance, Japan positioned itself between the Western nations and Asian states in terms of the 
human rights issue when the international debate started to simmer. The former possessed a concept 
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arena, the environmental field was considered as the only area where the Japanese 
government could strongly voice its attitude toward the outside world. Therefore, it was 
a great opportunity for the Japanese government to regain a favourable reputation in the 
international arena after its humiliation during the Gulf Crisis. Based on that, it was 
natural for Japan to become eager to show its contribution to global environmental 
issues.  
 At first, the Japanese government tried to highlight its presence at international 
conferences on the environment by holding them themselves and making statements of 
strong commitment. Japan made a clear statement of its commitment to global 
environmental problems at “Our Common Future” in 1987 held by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development, which was actually advocated by Japan. 
It stated that it would expand its Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the 
environmental field.  
Financial assistance has been recognised as an important aspect of the contribution 
of Japan’s environmental policy for a long time:  
 
Japan’s assistance in the environmental field has traditionally included cooperation in 
such areas as environmental conservation projects and human resource development. 
                                                                                                                                                     
of ‘global human rights’, but the latter supported ‘Asian Values’ or the ‘human right to live’. Despite 
its close ties as a major donor with the United Nations,, which firmly supports the ‘global human 
right’ from the Western perspective, Japan rarely makes its standpoint clear. Its deep concern arises 
for the following two reasons: 1) sensitivity towards Japan’s past aggression in violating the human 
rights of people in Asian states occupied by the Japanese military, 2) fear of ‘political refugees’ 
flowing into Japan because their ‘global human rights’ have been violated in their own countries. In 
line with the second reason for hesitation toward accepting the ‘global human rights’, the prospect of 
a refugee problem displays Japan’s uneasy attitude. As a matter of national policy, Japan rarely 
opens itself to accepting refugees. By not accepting refugees, Japan is in no position to make active 
statements on this issue.   
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The provision of both financial assistance, and also technical support based on 
knowledge and experience gained through long years of effort in the area of 
environmental protection, will be a vital element in Japan’s future efforts to 
contribute to the world.2  
 
Furthermore, “it is likely that in the future, aid from developed countries to developing 
countries will be a key to solving issues related to environmental preservation on a 
global scale.”3 With regard to the financial assistance, at the Paris Summit in 1989 
Japan resolved to use ODA for environment purposes, strengthening Japan’s 
environmental ODA to 300 billion JPY for three years. It was the first concrete financial 
move from the country. At the same summit, “Environmental ODA policy” was also 
declared to represent Japan’s attitude of utilising its financial power for environmental 
conservation promotion. There were three points in this new strategy:  
 
1) In dealing with global environmental problems, it is necessary to support 
environmental conservation efforts in the developing countries. Consequently, Japan 
will expand and strengthen bilateral and multilateral aid in the environmental field up 
to the approximate amount of JPY 300 billion over the next three years.  
2) Japan will deal positively with cooperation in the conservation and research of 
forests, particularly topical forests, and with cooperation for improving the ability of 
developing countries to cope with environmental problems. In this connection, Japan 
will promote measures to help the poor farmers by taking into account poverty and 
other problems that are the basic causes of tropical rain forest losses, step up 
                                                   
2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), Japan’s ODA 1991, (Tokyo: APIC, 1992), 136. 
3 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1992, (Tokyo: APIC, 1993), 143.  
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technical cooperation in human resources development in developing countries’ 
environmental field, and make better use of international development finance 
organisations.  
3) Japan will make further efforts to expand and strengthen measures giving 
consideration to the environment.4   
 
In the same year, Japan hosted the Tokyo Conference on the Global Environment 
and Human Response toward Sustainable Development. As was shown in the previous 
case study on anti-personnel landmines and as will be shown on Japan’s hosting of the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) 3 later, being a chair for an international conference 
was regarded as a major contribution to the field by the government.5  
   Much effort was made by the Japanese government at these international 
conferences using the power of money (ODA). However, Japan made a big mistake at 
the biggest environmental conference, the United Nations Conference on the 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992. The mistake led Japan to a second 
attempt at adopting a crucial protocol in 1997 to try and regain a positive reputation 
from the international community. The next section will discuss Japan’s failure at the 
UNCED, an example which displays Japan’s traditional method of conducting foreign 
policy.  
 
Failure at the Earth Summit: Domestic issuse have a priority for Japan 
   The United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED), 
                                                   
4 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1993, (Tokyo: APIC, 1994), 176. 
5 MOFA, “Cikyu Kankyo Mondai to Wagakuni no Gaiko (Global environmental issues and our 
foreign policy),” <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kankyo/genjyo.htm> (14 February 2004).   
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which was held in 1993 in Rio de Janeiro, was also called the “Earth Summit”. The 
conference was the biggest global conference ever on environmental issues with 182 
participant states and 102 leaders. At the conference, a number of important 
international declarations and frameworks were established, such as the Rio Declaration, 
Agenda 21, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. 
   Japan, as a top donor of foreign aid in a total quantity at the time of 1992, was 
expected to play an active role in this field with its economic power.6 In addition to the 
international expectation, Japan’s past history of getting over domestic pollution 
problems in the 1970s7 gave it the confidence to play a crucial role in confronting 
environmental matters.   
   Based on its intention to highlight Japan’s active contribution to this cause, a new 
environmental aid strategy was presented in their official address to the Summit by the 
Japanese government. A major aspect of the proposed new strategy was to expand 
Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) up to one trillion JPY over the 
following five years.8 In Japan’s ODA 1992, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
proudly quoted an article of the Reuters News Agency to demonstrate Japan’s 
contribution to environmental conservation as follows: 
 
Reuters News Agency, for example, released a wire on June 14 1992 to the effect that 
                                                   
6  Kokuren Kankyo to Kaihatsu Kaigi (United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development),” Asahi Simbun, 13 June 1992,  
7 Japan had experienced a number of public pollution problems and related diseases in the 1970s 
such as Minamata disease (Kumamoto), Itai-itai disease (Toyama), Yokkaichi asthma (Mie). All 
these issues became court cases and the Japanese government made apologies and compensated 
victims.  
8 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1993, (Tokyo: APIC, 1994), 48. 
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“the world leadership Japan showed in its pledge of environmental assistance was 
encouraging. UNCED, while expected to be the first step in rescuing the planet from 
destruction, has served to expose the ill-preparedness of the nations of the world. In 
that context, [Japan’s new monetary goal] in the last stage of this conference was a 
breath of good news.9 
  
Despite the positive official statement, in reality, Japan not only failed to show 
its ’face’ as an active player, but also it was given the shameful “Golden Baby Award” 
by international NGOs for being unable to advance things on it own and being 
dominated by other powers such as the United States.10 What went wrong at the 
Summit? 
   Japan showed its priority was still its domestic stability rather than global issues 
through the Prime Minister’s absence from the Earth Summit. The possibility of the 
absence of the Japanese PM, Kiichi Miyazawa, from the UNCED was leaked by media 
just two days before its start. A reason for the possible absence was that he would have 
to attend the Diet for a discussion about a Peace Keeping Operation (PKO) and 
legislation (“Law Concerning Cooperation for the United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operation and Other Operations”).11 Domestic discussion on this topic was crucial at 
that time because it was the first time Japan had decided to send its Self Defence Force 
(SDF) overseas since its foundation - even under the United Nations. By not turning up 
for the Summit himself but rather attending the domestic debate, the Japanese PM was 
                                                   
9 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1992, (Tokyo: APIC, 1993), 144. 
10 Kenichi Miyamoto, “Rondan,” Asahi Simbun, 11 December 1997, 29. 
11 Syusyo UNCED kara Kesseki (Prime Minister will be absent from UNCED),” Asahi Simbun, 10 
June 1992, 1. 
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seen to have placed a higher priority on this domestic issue to stabilise his position, 
than on global concerns.  
   The Japanese government knew that it would damage Japan’s image if the head of 
the state did not appear, considering the importance of the “Earth Summit” to 
negotiating global issues. However, on 11th of June 1992, the PM Miyazawa officially 
commented that he would be unable to take part in the Summit but was considering the 
possibility of attending via vision or voice message as a compromise.12 
  Yet, even the ‘voice attendance’ option was not taken. Asahi Simbun reports that 
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) prepared a video recording of the Prime 
Minister’s speech to be played at an official address at the conference. However, the 
video speech was suddenly terminated when it came to Japan’s turn. It was said that the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros-Ghali, would not treat the Japanese 
government differently from other participating states. 13  Some said that national 
leaders specially made time to attend the Summit although they were extremely busy, 
and if they could have made a recorded address, they certainly would.14 MOFA staff 
were said to have been in panic at the time and distributed papers of the official address 
at the conference site as a last resort to compensate for the Prime Minister’s absence.  
   It is rather strange to find in Japan’s ODA 1993 that it was written as if Miyazawa 
had actually attended the Summit to make the official address. It is stated as:  
 
In an address delivered at the meeting of UNCED in 1992, then Prime Minister 
Kiichi Miyazawa of Japan stated to the effect hat Japan would try to sharply increase 
                                                   
12 Syusyo Video de UNCED ni Syusseki (Prime Minister will attend via video speech),” Asahi 
Simbun, 11 June 1992, 1. 
13 Confusion at Prime Minister’s video speech,” Asahi Simbun, 14 June 1992, 2.   
14 Asahi Simbun, 14 June 1992.   
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its bilateral and multilateral environment related aid to the tune of JPY 9000 billion 
to 1 trillion over the five years from FY 1992.15 
 
An accurate explanation for not stating the fact of the Prime Minister’s absence has not 
been given anywhere; however, Japan’s ODA reports, especially the English versions 
are frequently used to “advertise” Japan’s foreign aid strategy. They do not always 
reflect the facts. The way in which the Japanese government’s absence was covered up 
in the official report highlights the importance of its need to attend such conferences to 
save Japan’s ‘face’. 
  With regard to Japan’s absence at the UNCED, critics said that Japan had lost its best 
opportunity for Syusyo-Gaiko (the Prime Ministers’ foreign negotiations). This type of 
negotiation is usually carried out through giving an official address to clarify the state’s 
standpoint or meeting other leaders face-to-face before or after conferences to build 
mutual understanding. This opportunity could have been realised at the Earth Summit if 
the Prime Minister had attended, which could have brought a huge advantage for Japan 
in showing its presence.16 Japan not only missed its chance to display its importance in 
the international arena, but also gained a bad name as a ’self-centred’ state for 
prioritising a domestic issue, the PKO, ahead of global concerns such as the 
environment.   
 
 
Adopting the Kyoto Protocol: Retrieving an honour 
  Having failed to promote Japan’s name at the UNCED, the country was left 
                                                   
15 MOFA , Japan’s ODA 1993, (Tokyo: APIC, 1994), 48. 
16 Asahi Simbun, 14 June 1992, 2.  
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searching for another opportunity to regain its reputation as an active leader in the 
environmental field. If the situation was left as it was, Japan would suffer from another 
“Gulf War trauma”. The next opportunity came in 1997 when the third Conference of 
the Parties (COP), an international dialogue on climate change, was held in Kyoto.  
   Japan made a clear statement on environment issues at the United Nations General 
Assembly Special Session on the Environment and Development (UNGASS), prior to 
the COP 3. The PM Ryuichiro Hashimoto announced the Japanese government’s 
“Initiatives for Sustainable Development toward the 21st century (ISD)”, which had 
five key points:  
 
1) Measures to fight air and water pollution, 
2) Global warming,  
3) Water issues, 
4) Protection of the natural environment, and  
5) Environmental education.17  
 
There is one global environmental aspect missing from these points: over population. 
Although the Japanese government recognised that over-population often underlies and 
worsens environmental problems18, and often occurs in the Least-Less Developing 
Countries (LLDCs) who were in the most need of aid, the issue was not included 
among the five aspects. This is because the over-population issue sometimes relates to 
                                                   
17 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1997, (Tokyo: APIC, 1998), 24. 
18 Jessica T. Mathews, “Redefining Security,” Foreign Affairs, 68, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 168. She 
described a spread of “environmental refugees” as follows: “Whenever refugees settle, they flood the 
labour market, add to the local demand for food and put new burdens on the land, thus spreading the 
environmental stress that originally forced them from their homes.”  
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immigration issues for those who are pushed out of their homelands, an issue the 
Japanese government has taken steps to avoid.  
The other point to be mentioned in Japan’s standpoint was a continuous Asian 
concentration for its environmental aid. The Japanese government justified this as 
follows: 
 
One additional noteworthy feature of Japan’s ODA policy is its fundamental 
orientation toward Asia….For some years now, Asia has been a scene of dramatic 
economic growth. That trend, however, has triggered an array of discernible 
environmental strains ranging from pollution to over-logging, to the contamination of 
the seas. Unless it can pursue its economic development hand in hand with serious 
efforts to address its environmental woes, Asia could conceivably compromise its 
own chances for sustainable growth…19    
 
   The COP 3 was the third international conference to discuss climate change and it 
sought to adopt a protocol. Upon its adoption, the protocol was to be named after the 
hosting city, which was Kyoto, the old Japanese imperial city. Therefore, the Japanese 
government had to take any risk to adopt this protocol as it was a good means of 
highlighting Japan’s contribution to the environmental field.20 
   In addition, Hatano (1997) analyses reasons why the Japanese government was 
eager to chair the COP3 according to the following four points: 
                                                   
19 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1998, 28. 
20 The Environmental Agency, ed., Kyoto Giteisyo to Watashi-tachi no Cyosen- Kiko Hendo ni 
kansuru Kokusai Rengo Wakugumi Jyoyaku ni motozuku Dai Ni-kai Nihon Hokokusyo (The Kyoto 
Protocol and our efforts: the second national report on the UNCED), (Tokyo: Ministry of Finance 
Press, 1998), 2.  
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1)  The Environment Agency of Japan showed an eagerness for hosting, 
2)  A great opportunity to educate or enlighten Japanese people about environment 
issues, 
3) The possibility of the Japanese government being pressured by academism, 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and also politicians, 
4)  A rare chance for Japan’s  Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to play a 
significant role at the United Nations.21    
 
   Based on Hatano’s analysis, it is not difficult to draw conclusions about the 
Japanese government’s desire to host the conference. It was mainly driven by domestic 
demands to take advantage of the COP 3 to announce Japan’s eagerness in the 
environmental field, rather than tackling actual environmental issues.   
The government also made use of this opportunity to educate and enlighten 
Japanese people about the possible use of new energy, such as nuclear power. The 
Environment Agency has written an interesting document on how nuclear power could 
reduce the danger of global warming.22 One can guess that the government has used 
environmental education as an excuse to justify the usage of nuclear power, which 
Japanese people are often very critical about because of the memory of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki.  
   The COP 3 itself faced a number of difficulties. The main reason for these 
                                                   
21 Toshio Hatano, “Kyoto Giteisyo (Kyoto Protocol)”, Asahi Simbun, 1 December 1997, 4. 
22 The Environment Agency, Kyoto Giteisyo to Watashi-tachi no Cyosen- Kiko Hendo ni kansuru 
Kokusai Rengo Wakugumi Jyoyaku ni motozuku Dai Ni-kai Nihon Hokokusyo (The Kyoto Protocol 
and our efforts: the second national report on the UNCED), 146.  
 210 
difficulties was that each participant state had its own interest to consider with regard to 
allowable levels of gas emissions. No matter whether they were a developed or 
developing country, they all hoped for a continuation of the economic growth that had 
been brought by industrialisation. Moreover, the industrialisation process is considered 
to require a certain amount of gas emission. Broadly speaking, there were three key 
points argued in the COP 3: 
 
1) How much each state has to cut back on gas emissions, 
2) What kind of gas emissions are to be decreased, 
3) North-South confrontation as to who holds the responsibility for the past global 
warming. 
 
Of these three points, the third point, the confrontation between North-South 
became the most severe obstacle at the negotiations. The South (developing countries) 
has claimed, “developing countries have taken the view that their right to develop 
should not be restricted, and that the burden of environmental preservation should fall 
on the developed countries which are responsible for the deterioration.”23 On the other 
hand, the North (developed countries) has recognised that “the burden should therefore 
be distributed fairly.”24 As the hosting country, with a desire to have a protocol 
adopted in its name, Japan had to lead this confrontation towards successful agreement 
at any cost. A major tool for Japan to do that was again monetary power.    
 
 
                                                   
23 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1992, (Tokyo: APIC, 1993), 143. 
24 MOFA, 143. 
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“Carrots and Carrots”: Japan’s new environmental aid strategy 
   Japan realised that this North-South problem could be the crucial obstacle for a 
successful conclusion to the COP 3. Failure of the conference would result in the 
protocol being unable to be named after Kyoto. In order to ease the confrontation, the 
Japanese government offered a new scheme of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) to developing countries.   
 
…Japan will offer the most favourable conditions (0.75 percent interest rate and a 40 
year repayment period) on yen loans for projects designed to address global warming 
in the developing countries.25 
 
Projects that qualify for this loan included; (1) energy saving technologies; (2) new and 
renewable energy sources; (3) forest conservation and afforestation; and (4) the 
reduction of air pollution.26 The MOFA proudly says that “yen loans for such projects 
in advanced developing countries will be offered at a preferential 1.8 percent interest 
rate and 25 years repayment period.”27 This repayment condition is no worse than the 
general Yen Loan, which has a 34 year repayment period and a 1.4 percent interest 
rate.28 This notwithstanding, a question posed here is, ‘Why does it have to be a loan, 
and not a grant?’ The answer to this question remains unknown and it shows, again, 
Japan’s lack of altruism philosophy in its foreign aid strategy.    
This offer of a low-interest, long-term repayment yen loan caused a stir among 
                                                   
25 MOFA, Japan’s ODA 1998, (Tokyo: APIC, 1998), 54. 
26 MOFA, 54.  
27 MOFA, 54. 
28 Toshio Watanabe and Yuji Miura, ODA Seihu Kaihatsu Enjyo (ODA: Official Development 
Assistance), (Tokyo: Cyuukoshinsyo, 2003), 38.  
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developing countries. Asahi Simbun states that some developing countries showed 
appreciation for the offer but refused because of the requirements regarding gas 
emissions. 29  There was also a poignant criticism from them accusing Japan of 
attempting to win them over, simply to pass the ‘Kyoto’ protocol.30  
   In conclusion, it can be said that by hosting the COP 3 and thereby securing the 
protocol with the name of its old imperial city, the Japanese government has shown its 
‘face’. However, whether it was a successful face, or failed face remains questionable. 
Hayakawa (1998) judges Japan’s hosting to be a failure by quoting negative reactions 
from other official envoys and international NGOs. 31  Although Japan had an 
opportunity to highlight its contribution and to receive an international reputation for 
strong leadership, it once again did not succeed due to its hypersensitivity toward other 
powers.  
   The next section will analyse how Japanese environmental NGOs have pressured 
the Japanese government at these international conferences to reveal their modes of 
operations. A new guideline for the environmental assessment of Japan’s Yen Loan 
projects that achieved a higher standard than expected will also be examined because 
without NGOs’ contribution, the guideline would not have been established to this 
extent.      
 
 
                                                   
29 Hatten Tojyo koku ha Shincho na Shisei (Developing countries’ hesitation),” Asahi Simbun, 8 
December 1997, 11. 
30 Kyoto Giteisyo kara no Nihon no Kitai (Japan’s expectation from the Kyoto Protocol),” Asahi 
Simbun, 8 December 1997, 16.   
31 Tsunetoshi Yamamura, ed., Kankyo NGO- Sono Katsudo, Rinen to Kadai (Environmental NGOs: 
their actions, philosophy and tasks), (Tokyo: Shinzansya, 1998), 79. 
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7.2 Japanese Environmental NGOs: They watch, monitor and campaign 
As global concerns over environmental issues grew following the Earth Summit, the 
number of international NGOs focusing on environmental issues also grew. Iriye (2002) 
defines the Earth Summit as a changeover point for this growth stating that, “the 1992 
conference was notable in the history of international nongovernmental organizations 
because their representatives were included in at least fourteen official 
delegations” 32 …“moreover, a large number of environmentally oriented 
nongovernmental organizations – as many as 1,420 of them, according to a study – 
gained access to the preparatory meetings that preceded the Rio conference.” There is 
no doubt that since this Summit, NGOs have become major actors in the environmental 
area and that has continued to the COP 3 in Kyoto.      
Japan also saw the rapid growth of environmental NGOs in the 1990s. The 
government stated the importance of involving NGOs into Japan’s foreign aid policy.33 
As for Japan’s environmental field, two NGOs can be listed as outstanding and 
influential; Greenpeace Japan (GP Japan) and Friend of the Earth Japan (FoE Japan). 
Both have relatively short histories in Japan but have worked effectively throughout the 
1990s to push the Japanese government for better environmental policy by using 
                                                   
32 Akira Irye, Global Community: The role of international organisations in the making of the 
contemporary  world, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 178. 
33 The government stated that, “Social development projects, including poverty alleviation and 
environmental conservation, constitute a steadily increasing share of Japan’s overall assistance to 
developing countries. For this reason, there is a growing demand for finely tuned assistance that 
directly reaches local populations. Consequently, NGOs have been playing an increasingly important 
role in the process of economic cooperation and there is a growing need for collaboration with 
NGOs in the implementation of ODA projects.” See MOFA. “Partnership with Japanese NGOs 
under ODA,” ODA&NGO, n.d., <www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/seisaku/seisaku_1.> (7 
February 2003).  
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various types of interaction. The work of FoE Japan, in particular, constituted a critical 
part of the decision-making process in establishing Japan’s new environmental 
guidelines for the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC).  
   This section will focus on the aforementioned two environmental NGOs in 
Japan and analyse their interactions with the central authority. In this analysis, GP Japan 
will be used as a case study to illustrate its modes of pressuring the Japanese 
government and the case of FoE Japan will reveal its interactions with the government 
in setting up the new guidelines. When necessary, comparison with GP International 
and FoE International will be undertaken in order to make the Japanese interactions 
clearer. Through these two case studies in which they managed to influence the 
decision-making process will be analysed.  
Strictly speaking, these two NGOs are not purely of ‘Japanese’ origin since they  
originated from already established international environmental NGOs. However, this 
thesis defines them as ‘Japanese’ for analysis because much of their activities are 
carried out in the Japanese political culture and they deal with the Japanese government. 
They may use strategies learnt from their headquarters (which will be analysed in this 
chapter), but the nature of their organisations is ‘Japanese’ in this sense.   
    
7.2.1 History and Structures of Greenpeace Japan and Friends of the Earth  
Greenpeace Japan 
   Greenpeace Japan (GP Japan) was established in 1989. Needless to say, it started as 
Japan’s local branch of Greenpeace, which is a world-wide environmental NGO, well 
known for its direct and non-violent actions. Its activities are also well known as they 
are eye-catching and attracting media attention based on its policy, “Out of Sight, Out 
of Mind”. Examples are sailing into nuclear test sites, parachuting from smokestacks, 
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and filming whaling. 
   The characteristic attractions of its activities are described as follows: 
 
Greenpeace is able to capture media attention because its actions are visually 
spectacular…The urge is lustful because it requires the novel, the unusual, the 
spectacular. The eye cannot satiate itself on the familiar, the everyday, the normal. 
Greenpeace actions excite the eye.34 
 
Despite its short history in Japan, with the support and positive reputation provided by 
its head office, GP Japan has become one of the three biggest and the most influential 
environmental NGOs in the state alongside FoE Japan and World Wildlife Fund Japan 
(WWF Japan).   
   GP Japan possesses a solid organisational structure, based on the following five 
factors: clear activity objects; support from its head office; a large number of members; 
a stable financial basis and utilising a good public image.     
   Firstly, GP Japan follows the three guidelines for its activities set by Greenpeace 
International: 1) non-violence, 2) political independence, and 3) financial independence 
in that it relies solely on financial support from individual supporters.35 Having these 
clear guidelines helps GP Japan to keep its focus, which so many Japanese NGOs fail to 
do which results in the loss of organisational integration.   
Generally speaking, Greenpeace has an international head-office centralised structure 
                                                   
34 Paul Wapner, Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics, (Albany: University of New 
York Press, 1996): 51. 
35  Greenpeace Japan, “Finance,” Organisational Structure of Greenpeace Japan, n.d., 
<www.greenpeace.or.jp/info/simmary_html> (16 March 2006).  
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and this works both in positive and negative ways. As a positive aspect of the second 
factor, having the head office with its excellent reputation and popularity creates 
automatic credibility and popularity for GP Japan domestically. GP International also 
supports the Japan branch financially by covering its budget shortage.36 The advantage 
of having a strong head office, however, could work in reverse. As GP Japan has a 
strong connection to the head office, its activities and management are also dictated by 
it.37 In other words, GP Japan is subordinate to orders from the GP International. This 
structure can be a “republic” type of linkage, according to the definition of Wapner 
(1996).38 
    The third factor in GP Japan’s strong organisational structure is its financial 
independence from official subsidy through financial support from the head office and 
by having a large number of members. As seen in the previous two case studies, 
financial issues represent the biggest obstacle for NGOs’ operations so fundraising 
tactics are crucial. In regard to this, GP Japan has a large number of members, whose 
individual membership fees constitute 80.7 percent of all its income.39 GP Japan has 15 
                                                   
36 Greenpeace Japan had a 40,000,000 Japanese yen shortage for the financial year ending 2000, but 
the head office covered it (Source: Greenpeace Japan, “Current Finance,” 17 October 2001, 
<http://www.greenpeace.or.jp/info/index_en_html> [3 March 2005]). 
37  Yasuko Matsumoto, “Kokusai Kankyo NGO to Kokusai Kankyo Kyotei (International 
environmental NGOs and international environment framework)”, Kouza: Kankyo Syakaigaku 
(Seminer: Environmental Sociology),ed., Kouichi Hasegawa (Tokyo: Yuuikaku, 2001), 188. 
38 Paul,Wapner, Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics, (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1996), 122. He stated, “individual offices are subordinate to an official council, 
president, or board of directors that oversees international policy and coordinates transnational 
activity. While affiliates can make suggestions and push for particular policies, all major decisions 
must be authorized by the executive of the organization.”   
39  The number was 4500 in 2003. (Source from the following website. Greenpeace Japan, 
“Organisational structure”, 17 October 2001, <http://www.greenpeace.or.jp/info/index_en_html> [3 
March 2004].) 
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staff members40, which is relatively large for a Japanese NGO and shows the strength of 
GP Japan.41 
Since GP Japan’s operation is mainly advocacy work, it requires a relatively small 
budget compared to actual development activities as carried out by, for instance, Japan 
International Volunteer Centre (JVC) (See Chapter 5). As a result, GP Japan enjoys 
independence from governmental funding, where other NGOs are often susceptible to 
the government’s dominance of their activities in return for receiving subsidies.   
Fourthly, in order to gain more public support and donations from individuals, 
creating a good image for the organisation is crucial. This is why NGOs frequently use 
celebrities like members of the royal family for the enhancement of their image.  
 
Large NGOs’ fund-raising operations have also become highly professional and 
sophisticated. Some make use of major celebrities including Hollywood stars, sports 
figures and even former White House aides who have become celebrities [George 
Stephanopoulus is on Save the Children’s board of directors].42   
 
This is similar to the anti-personnel (AP) landmine issue in which Princess Diana had a 
personal interest. She helped to raise its profile in the international media, which put 
great pressure on governments to be pro-ban on AP landmines (see Chapter 6: 175). 
She gave her autograph to the picture book by AAR which helped the sale of the book.    
   Greenpeace uses several images such as pictures of wild animals and other images 
                                                   
40 Greenpeace Japan, 3 March 2004. 
41 Japanese NGOs usually have 2-3 regular staff and it is not unusual for some to have no staff at all 
but rather rely on volunteers.  
42 Thomas M. Dichter, Despite Good Intentions: Why Development Assistance to the Third World 
has failed, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 103. 
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of nature to symbolise its activities. As a national branch, GP Japan uses them as well 
and this helps to show its connection to the well known head office to the public.    
  There is, however, a negative aspect to this factor, especially when using particular 
people as symbol characters. Although having celebrities for PR can create a good 
image and enhance fundraising, it can also work otherwise. A loss of credibility for 
those people with the public due to crime or scandals could directly affect the image of 
the associated NGOs.  
Having too good a person as an associated identity could restrict the NGO’s 
activities. For example, WWF Japan, one employee comments, “although WWF has not 
much worry about  finance because of the good image brought by a good symbol, it is 
questionable whether its operations are following its true agenda or restricting its 
operations in order not to damage the image of a royal family member.”43    
 
Friends of the Earth Japan 
   Friends of the Earth (FoE) Japan began its activities in 1980, about a decade earlier 
than Greenpeace Japan, as a national branch of FoE International, which had already 
built a good international reputation.44 In its mission statement, FoE Japan states, “FoE 
Japan tackles problems such as global warming, deforestation, and development aid to 
the Third World. Our ultimate goal is the creation of a world in which all people may 
live peacefully and equitably.”45 The goal of its activities is also to strive “towards the 
realisation of sustainable society”.46 
                                                   
43 Anonymous resource, 23 January 2004. 
44 Friends of the Earth (FoE) was established in 1966 by David Brower who had been active in the 
Sierra Club, the biggest environmental interest group in the United States. 
45 FoE Japan, “Mission Statement”, About us, n.d, <http://www.foejapan.org/en/> (3 March 2004).  
46 FoE Japan, “Activities,” About us, <http://www.foe.japan.org/en/about/activity.html> (3 March 
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   Although it is a national branch of FoE International, each FoE branch has its own 
structure and activity strategy. Wapner (1996) describes it as a “confederation” in 
comparison to other NGOs that are usually organised as “republics”. He states, “instead 
of a republic, it appears more like a confederation. Individual offices are, for all intents 
and purposes, on their own to decide policy, spend money, take partisan stands, and so 
forth. It is genuinely grassroots in this sense.”47 This characteristic is reflected in FoE 
Japan’s financial situation, for it receives no financial support from the head office.  
   FoE Japan has 18 full time staff (at the time of writing in 2005) which is a large 
number for advocacy - centred NGOs. For example, JCBL, the other advocacy NGO, 
has two full time staff. FoE Japan’s Tokyo office was hesitant to reveal the following 
information, but it was confirmed that the office has 500 supporting members (2005) 
and their membership fees constitute much of its financial basis. Donations contribute 
1.8 percent of the income but so far they have received no governmental subsidies.48   
FoE Japan operates its activities according to its own objectives set by the branch 
itself, although it shares mission statements with the head office. This is because each 
country has its own political and cultural scheme for NGO activities and different 
environmental problems.  
 
7.2.2 Interactions: How do they operate effectively? 
Greenpeace and Greenpeace Japan 
Greenpeace’ operations have always been eye-catching and media attracting. Their 
                                                                                                                                                     
2004).  
47 Paul Wapner, Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics, (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1996), 122. 
48 FoE Japan staff, FoE Japan, “Finance issue”, 30 September 2005. Personal e-mail (30 September 
2005).  
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dramatic actions are observed as conveying a “simple message and making 
environmental problems more visible to the public by seemingly rash activities.”49 
Those activities are carried out according to principles that do not harm people or 
property50, therefore governments find it very hard to stop the activities since they have 
no reason to be stopped. The ultimate object of their activities is described by Wapner 
(1996) as, “disseminating an ecological sensibility”.51 He also summarised operations 
of Greenpeace as, “while bearing witness often works to stop specific instances of 
environmental destruction, in general, it aims simply to present ecological injustice to 
the world”.52  
Greenpeace does not only carry out these eye-catching activities, but also advocacy 
activities such as lobbying at international conferences. For each state government, it 
also uses ‘unofficial interactions’ which constitute an important part of its activities: 
 
Greenpeace obviously does more than perform direct actions. It also lobbies 
government officials, gathers information, organises protests and boycotts, produces 
record albums and other educational merchandise, and carries out scientific research. 
While many of these endeavours, especially lobbying, are directed specifically at 
states, a large percentage of Greenpeace’s work is not meant to change states’ 
policies per se but is aimed at changing the attitudes and behaviour of the more 
general public.53 
                                                   
49 Wapner, Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics, 51. 
50  Yasuko Matsumoto, “Kokusai Kankyo NGO to Kokusai Kankyo Kyotei (International 
environmental NGOs and international environment framework),” 187. 
51 Wapner, Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics, 50. 
52 Wapner, 51. 
53 Wapner, 54. 
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Wapner also analyses two aspects of Greenpeace’s lobbying activities. They are 
identified as; 1) utilising media to inform people and 2) showing the hypocrisy of 
national governments and creating ‘the politics of accountability’ for the people.54 He 
goes on about the aim of Greenpeace to change the way people see the world by 
bringing “the hidden spots of the earth into people’s lives and exposing hypocrisy”.55 
Greenpeace (GP) Japan, in contrast to the more direct activities favoured by GP 
International, has concentrated on advocacy activities. Although it may seem passive, 
GP Japan put pressure on the Japanese government effectively in the 1990s when Japan 
was paying much attention to environmental issues. Through comparing the similarities 
and differences of GP International and GP Japan in their advocacy activities, this 
section will analyse the interactions of Greenpeace, especially GP Japan with 
governments.  
Three strategies that GP Japan attempts to employ in order to exert direct influence 
on the decision-making process are identified as follows: 
 
1) “Focus down”: analyse future representatives of each state and study their attitudes 
toward an issue.   
2) “Making personal contacts”: exchanging business cards at reception parties and 
conferences.  
3) “Make them interested”: lobbying state representatives at the conferences 
themselves.  
4) “Using Media”: leaking sensitive information to the mass media to put pressure on 
                                                   
54 Wapner, 55 - 56. 
55 Wapner, 57. 
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governmental officials. 
 
The first strategy of “focus down” requires information gathering. Therefore, 
‘information’ is regarded as one of the most powerful lobbying tools for NGOs. Local 
human networks, resources from high-level research, monitoring activities by 
Greenpeace-owned ships, and establishing communication systems via emails are 
examples of GP’s information tools.56 GP usually studies who will represent the states 
at important international conference such as the Earth Summit or Conference of the 
Parties (COPs) in advance. Greenpeace gathers information about them from the 
national offices in each state and carefully studies who are the actual decision-makers. 
Then, after accumulating the information, it “focuses down” on each 
future-representative based on their advanced analysis, in order to make breakthroughs. 
Also, research to ascertain who are the ’friendly states’ toward an issue is undertaken 
carefully, and results are sent as feedback to national offices. Following the information 
and its analysis, each campaigner makes contacts with the future delegations.  
The second strategy, “making personal contacts” is practised both at individual and 
official levels. Japan is known to allow less access for NGOs to central authority 
compared to the Western states, so direct lobbying on decision-makers is considered as 
one of the most influential means to building close relations with government officials. 
Meeting actual decision-makers is never an easy job, even for representatives of 
Greenpeace, one of the most powerful international environmental NGOs. Needless to 
say it is difficult for GP Japan as well. These powerful people are simply too busy for 
personal meetings and there are other people queuing up in front of them. In order to 
                                                   
56 Matumoto, “Kokusai Kankyo NGO to Kokusai Kankyo Kyotei (International environmental 
NGOs and international environment framework),” 190. 
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make personal contacts with these decision-makers, GP Japan often took advantage of 
reception parties at international conferences which official representatives attend. “If I 
can give him/her my business card and get his/hers, that is the start. From that time, I 
can contact them personally via the contact address on their cards. Improvement in 
information technology such as email enables us to reach decision-makers much 
easier.”57 
Lobbying decision-makers does not generate enough pressure on its own. As the 
third strategy, it is necessary to make them interested in the topic and make them act by 
themselves.  
Direct lobbying during the Earth Summit (1992) and the COP 3 in Kyoto (1997) 
were undertaken by many NGO personnel, who tried to talk to or share information 
with governmental officials in corridors to make them interested in NGOs’ opinions and 
ideas. Greenpeace Japan sent 30 staff to the Earth Summit for lobbying (15 Japanese 
staff included).58 They made as many official appointments with state representatives 
as possible. If they could not make an official appointment, they tried to talk to other 
officials to exchange information in the corridor.59 The campaigner states, “information 
exchange is one of the most effective ways to make decision-makers interested. We 
sometimes have secret information that they do not have.”60  
Who to directly lobby is another issue in this strategy. In the case of Japan, a former 
campaigner recalls that among the three important ministries in the environmental area, 
                                                   
57 Matsumoto, 190.  
58 Yasuko Matsumoto, “Giteisyo Kousyo wo ugogashita Kokusai NGO (International NGOs alter 
Protocol talks),” Journal of Environmental Sociology 4 (1998): 83. 
59 NGO ni yoru robii katsudo (Lobbying activities by NGOs),” Asahi Simbun, 2 December, 1997, 
30. 
60 Yasuko Matsumoto, interviewed by the author, 20 January, 2004. 
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the Environmental Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the last entity was the hardest with which to 
make contact.61 There was no barrier with the Environment Agency or the MOFA. 
However, when she went to negotiate with the MITI, a Kacho-hosa (an assistant chief 
of section) was the highest ranked person in decision-making that ever came out to talk. 
The fourth strategy is to use the media and Greenpeace highly values cooperating 
with it . It has public relations staff and they train national campaigners in making 
effective press releases. GP Japan’s campaigners are trained on this course. Utilisation 
of mass media by NGOs has already been shown in the previous two case studies of 
JVC and JCBL. However, Greenpeace has prominent experts in media relations. As 
Matsumoto comments on cooperating with the media: “it is very important to keep the 
head offices of main newspapers well informed and interested in the issues. If the 
mainstay becomes interested, articles on the issue would be in the newspaper, even 
though the correspondent did not show enthusiasm in the first place.”62 There are other 
advantages in cooperating with media. Occasionally, GP Japan purposely leaks 
information to the mass media and uses it to gain confirmation with government 
officials when they come out of conferences.63     
As well as cooperating directly with the media, being seen at media-attracting places 
such as large international conferences is also crucial. Yasuko Matsumoto, a former 
campaigner from GP Japan admitted that it was very important for NGOs to make 
themselves visible in the media through direct action at major international 
environmental conferences, such as the Earth Summit in 1992. They followed one of the 
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62 Yasuko Matsumoto, interviewed by the author, 20 January, 2004.  
63 Anonymous source, 23 January 2004.  
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principles behind Greenpeace’s activities, “out of sight, out of mind”. The former 
campaigner stated, however, that it was more important for her to take advantage of 
opportunities to exert direct influence on major players that had power in actual 
environmental policy negotiation.64 In Japan, it is said that direct action taken by 
ordinary citizens is often given little attention by decision-makers. Examples include 
obstructing the US army base in Okinawa in 1995, and disagreeing with Japan’s 
cooperation in the Iraq War in 2003, both of which did not make much difference to the 
government’s policies.   
                      
Interactions of FoE Japan: Setting up a new environmental guideline to a global 
extent 
   In April 2002, Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), which is in charge 
of Japan’s Yen Loan projects, announced new guidelines concerning environmental 
considerations for overseas projects; in the form of the “Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation Guideline for Confirmation of Environment and Social Considerations”. 
The new guidelines implemented on 1 October in 2003, are based on the following 
themes: 
 
… conformity with the prevailing views of the international community including 
those of the World Bank, Asia Development Bank (ADB) and Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development” and “assuring a highly transparent and 
open process.65  
                                                   
64 Yasuko Matsumoto, interviewed by author, 20 January 2004. 
65 Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), “Background of the Unification of Two 
Guidelines”, n.d., <www.jbic.go.jp/english/envion/guide/finance/eguide/index.php> (22 March 
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The new guideline by JBIC was a unified entity under the guidelines of two former 
bilateral aid related governmental agencies, the Japan Export and Import Bank (Exim 
Bank) and the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF). It has been said of the 
guidelines of these two agencies that: “the JEXIM [Exim Bank] had no environmental 
guidelines until they prepared them in September 1999, with many shortages and 
loopholes, and lower standards than those of the OECF.”66 The new guidelines of the 
JBIC have pushed the standard up to international level according to its self-claim, 
covering the shortages and loopholes.67  
It is less well known that there were several environmental NGOs working behind 
the scene encouraging the government to establish the new guidelines. FoE Japan, in 
particular, played a crucial role in pressuring the Japanese government to adopt the new 
guideline with NGOs’ participation. Therefore, the adoption of the new guidelines of a 
higher standard was a victory for FoE Japan. 
   The primary goal in this section is not to assess the guidelines but to analyse how 
FoE Japan was taken into consideration when establishing the guidelines. FoE Japan, 
used the following three interactions to bring about the guideline; 1) lobbying the Diet 
and MPs, 2) using ‘sub-official meetings’ with bureaucrats and 3) lobbying staff of the 
JBIC.    
FoE Japan’s publication describes the success in setting up the new guideline as, 
“establishing the new guideline was a rare case where an NGO has taken advantage of 
                                                                                                                                                     
2004).  
66  “A Giant Is Born” An article for Watershed, March 2000 
<http://www.foejapan.org/en/aid/giant.html.> (23 March 2004).   
67 JBIC “Conformity with OECD’s Common Approaches”, <http://www.jbic.go.jp.> (24 March 
2004).  
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an opportunity in changing international and domestic politics. In addition, it was also a 
rare example where NGOs could participate in the whole decision-making process.”68 
As said in the comment, it is necessary to understand international and domestic 
political circumstances that created favourable conditions for the new guidelines, as 
well as FoE’s actual operations. Thus, analysis of the political situation is undertaken 
first.  
 
The Environment that favoured introducing New Guidelines for JBIC 
   The 1990s experienced the establishment of several environmental guidelines in the 
international community. Ironically, it was not inspired purely by concerns for the 
global environment but by the competitiveness of the United States.  
   FoE Japan has reported a background story to the competition between states, which 
moved the United States to establish higher environmental guidelines. In 1996, 
construction companies of the United States withdrew from competition to win a 
contract to construct the Sanxia dam against other countries such as Japan, Germany 
and Sweden. The reason for withdrawing was a concern for the possibility of a serious 
impact on the environment around the site. Therefore, while other countries with lower 
domestic standards of environmental assessment remained in competition, the firms in 
the United States under higher standards lost business opportunities. Learning from the 
experience, in order to gain equal business opportunities with other countries, the 
United States started trying to establish a universal standard for environmental 
conservation. As a result of the United States’ appeal, preparation for this universal 
standard by the end of 2001 was declared at the G-8 Köln Summit in 1999. Observing 
                                                   
68 FoE Japan ed., Tojyokoku Sien to Kankyo Guideline (Assisting developing countries and a 
guideline for environment), (Tokyo: Ryokuhu Syuppan, 2002), 134. 
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this international trend as a crucial opportunity, environmental NGOs over the world 
started lobbying the OECD for transparency and accountability in negotiations.69  
   Around the same time, the domestic situation in Japan also provided a good 
opportunity for NGOs to penetrate into the environmental field. In March 1995, the 
cabinet meeting decided to merger the two existing Yen Loan related agencies, the 
Exim Bank and the OECF, into a single agency, named the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation (JBIC). Because the cabinet decision presented no concrete philosophy or 
strategy of this new agency, FoE Japan saw the potential to introduce high-standard 
environmental guidelines for the JBIC. Taking advantage of this blank space in the 
political situation, FoE Japan used ‘unofficial’ interactions to exert influence on the 
decision-making process.  
 
General Interactions Used by FoE Japan 
FoE Japan’s activities can be categorised in the following four strategies; 1) study 
and research, 2) making proposals to the government and the business world on the 
issue, 3) cooperation with FoE International and other local groups, and 4) information 
disseminating to raise the public awareness in an easily understood way. Among the 
four categories, the first and the fourth strategies represent the strong advocacy nature of 
FoE Japan as well as Greenpeace Japan.    
The second strategy, lobbying the government and the business world is one of the 
prominent activities by FoE Japan. The business sector in Japan conforms to a part of 
the established decision-making system by exerting its financial power for politicians 
                                                   
69 Ikuko Matsumoto, interviewed by the author,23 January 2004. It is reinforced by the publication 
by FoE Japan. See FoE Japan, ed., Tojyookoku Shienn to Kankyoo Gaidorain (Assistance for 
developing countries and environmental guideline) (Tokyo: FoE Japan, 2002), 135. 
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and providing re-employment opportunities for retired bureaucrats. The two NGOs in 
the previous cases studies, JVC and JCBL, both tried to make a breakthrough in the 
system by connecting to politicians in particular (See Chapter 5: 140-143 and 6: 
180-183 and 6: 190-191 for more detail). Greenpeace Japan also tries to build close 
relationships with government officials and politicians. FoE Japan certainly attempts to 
make contacts with politicians. Additionally, FoE Japan also interacts with the business 
world, in which interest in the environmental issues is growing.  
Connecting to the business world is not unusual for environment-related NGOs, in 
comparison to ones in other fields, because the business industry now seeks their 
chances in new production in ecological and economical ways. Examples are: 
production of an eco-car in the car industry for reducing greenhouse gas emission and 
the health insurance industry has an interest in decreasing ozone layer destruction to 
reduce payment for skin cancer victims. The profit-making firms have good reasons to 
be interested in the issue and that creates space for environmental NGOs to cooperate 
with them.  
Similarly to aforementioned NGOs, politicians are FoE Japan’s target for advocacy 
activity as well. In the case of establishing a new environmental conservation guideline 
for JBIC, FoE Japan was able to seek positive cooperation from them because it was to 
‘create’ something that had not existed.  
By lobbying the business sector, FoE Japan was putting pressure on politicians and 
bureaucrats, the two other major political actors in Japan, at the same time because they 
mutually depend on each other as well as being mutually beneficial. Politicians rely 
heavily on political donations from the business sector. That is why there is a number of 
‘cosy relationships between politics and business’. This phenomenon can also be 
applied to the bureaucracy. As already mentioned, bureaucrats seek out related business 
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sectors for their post early retirement re-employment. Therefore, although the business 
sectors seek favours from both actors for their smooth business operations, it is as 
important as the other two actors are to it.     
The third strategy, being a part of an international environmental NGO, provides 
FoE Japan with a high reputation, credibility and powerful philosophical support. This 
is similar to the character of GP Japan. What is different from GP Japan is that FoE 
Japan receives no financial support from the head office and it only enjoys benefits 
from its already established ‘authority’. Its head office was named one of the top ten 
most influential NGOs in the environmental area in 1973 and still keeps this 
reputation.70 FoE Japan also collaborates with other local branches in other states as 
well as Japan’s local groups of similar interest.  
This international/domestic networking is important for NGOs. Keck and Sikkink 
(1998) study the case of Rondonia and mentioned, “unable effectively to influence the 
activities of the state government and of federal agencies acting in Rondonia at the state 
level, local groups applied pressure at either national or international levels.”71 This is 
applicable to Japanese NGOs. Japan International Volunteer Centre (JVC) 
acknowledged the importance and considered the possibility of networking with more 
powerful international NGOs, however, it still hesitated for fear of being ‘a local office’ 
of them.72 On the other hand, the Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL) started as 
the national campaign of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) in the 
first place, and enjoyed cooperation from its authorised head office, but is now at a 
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turning point because ICBL has become smaller at the time of 2003 for 
self-consideration of reaching to a level for small-governance.73  ?  
 
Connecting to Authorities: The case of establishing JBIC Guidelines 
In the case of establishing the new guidelines for the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation (JBIC), FoE Japan interacted with the authorities actively and gained 
cooperation from them. Despite a general understanding of hostilities between NGOs 
and governments in Japan, Friends of the Earth maintains a positive relationship with 
these authorities.  
 
The key to FoE’s work is the understanding that states play the central role in 
protecting the earth’s ecosystem. States represent the most advanced institutions able 
to influence human activities throughout the world. Thus, their commitment is crucial 
to earnest environmental protection…To win the support of states, FOE many times 
acts like an interest group intent upon lobbying states officials.74  
 
Connecting to authorities is the key point in FoE’s advocacy activities. Having 
‘authorities’ on-side allows FoE Japan to participate in the decision-making process 
from inside. Takamine (1999) describes the importance of being an insider in the 
decision-making process through using the case of Asian environmental NGOs75. 
Having understood the influence that politicians can exert, as mentioned earlier, both 
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JVC and JCBL have tried to connect with MPs as well. Yet, they were not as efficient 
or tactful as FoE Japan.  
   Active participation of politicians or Members of Parliaments (MPs) in establishing 
the guidelines appeared clearly in a process of preparation for the guidelines for the 
JBIC. 
 
Since before the merger, NGOs have focused on demanding unified and rigorous 
environmental guidelines to cover operations of both former agencies, JEXIM and 
OECF. Pressured by several members of the national Diet, the JBIC promised last 
year to prepare basically unified environmental guidelines that “comply with 
international standards”. It was also promised that JBIC would ensure transparency 
and have public consultations with NGOs in preparing the guidelines.76 
 
FoE Japan started lobbying MPs at the ordinary session of the Diet in January 1999, the 
session where they discussed the foundation bill of the JBIC for the first time. 
“Connection with MPs can be an effective tool to influence the government in Japan, 
where NGOs are so limited to access to the decision-making process.”77 This was 
actually advice from American NGOs, which are experienced in lobbying politicians. 
The international network worked in this respect efficiently.  
   There were three means of lobbying MPs by FoE Japan and eventually the national 
Diet.  
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1) Making contact with both the ruling party and opposition parties, 
2) Hosting study meetings for MPs with visiting overseas guest speakers, 
3) Taking advantage of the structure of the decision-making process 78 
 
FoE tells an interesting story with regard to the third point on how it should lobby 
politicians. Some MPs suggested that FoE Japan should lobby politicians before 
consultation within the ruling party for submission of the bill. This is because once a 
bill was ready for official submission to the Diet, it was very hard to make any change 
to the substance as most interests were already taken into account by then. Without 
knowing the structure and process of how decisions were made, FoE Japan would have 
waited to make its move till the last minute, which would have been meaningless. This 
also shows that gaining insider status in the decision-making process helps to get to 
know more about its way of functioning and how to perform effectively.  
   Upon cooperating with insiders of the decision-making process, FoE Japan made 
contact with at least three MPs in order to pass on its opinions and messages to the 
government through them. An outstanding achievement, drawn from cooperation with 
MPs, was that their direct actions made high-powered decision-makers pledge to 
establish an integrated environmental guideline for the JBIC at the budget committee of 
Sangiin (House of Councillors).79 Even FoE Japan was surprised by the pledge for it 
which exceeded their expectations.  
 
We wanted MPs to question at the budget committee, because it is the occasion that 
                                                   
78 FoE Japan, 138. 
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Ministers themselves attend. We knew that the-then Minister for Finance, Miyazawa, 
was the kind of person who preferred to make his own comment, not on paper 
prepared by bureaucrats. Presumably, the pledge the Minister made at the committee 
was more than what bureaucrats expected but because it was the pledge, they had no 
choice but to implement it.80 
 
Furthermore, FoE Japan submitted a petition carrying 12 MPs’ signatures to the PM 
Obuchi, demanding the establishment of new guidelines that measured up to 
international standards of transparency in the decision-making process. As well as 
JCBL, FoE Japan presented the paper at the official residence of the prime minister in 
order to emphasise its importance.81      
   As for effective lobbying, FoE Japan has carefully selected the MPs with which it 
cooperates. This was also the strategy of GP Japan on selecting to lobby friendly states 
at international conferences (see page 205 of this chapter). Among the MPs who 
cooperated with FoE Japan, Kosugi Takashi, the MP of the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP), had personal interest in environmental conservation when he was still an MP of 
the local assembly. 82  As with Greenpeace Japan, this NGO studies who was 
sympathetic to its activities and who were actual decision-makers.   
   As well as cooperating with MPs, FoE Japan also took advantages of regular 
Sub-official meeting opportunities with the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the most 
powerful decision-making ministry in Japan. The regular meetings between NGOs and 
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the MOF  started in 1997 and FoE Japan and the Ministry have discussed  common 
environmental guidelines since 1998 at these opportunities and the topic of a new 
guideline for JBIC was one of them.83 This type of interaction is often used by 
Japanese NGOs and JVC especially made use of for its activities (See Chapter 5: 
135-137).  
Of greatest concern for the new guideline was the passivity of the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI). It was because the MITI feared the domestic 
industries’ loss and weakening in international competition if Japan set its own 
environmental standard at too high a level in comparison to other countries. It happened 
to the United States in the mid-1990s, although it ended in creating a global movement 
for setting common environmental guidelines in the international arena. In order to 
change the MITI’s firm attitude, FoE Japan cooperated with MPs to lobby the 
ministry.84  
Immediately before September 1999, the JBIC announced its own guidelines for 
environmental concerns. Although the guidelines were only tentative, FoE Japan was 
shocked to learn that the JBIC had made the guidelines without any consultation or 
information sharing with NGOs. A fear of ‘transparency and cooperation with NGOs’ 
being specious had arisen, and so the NGOs had tried to set up occasions for concerned 
people including the JBIC, ministries, environmental experts, MPs and NGOs to meet 
in a casual way. It had to be ‘casual’ because if the meeting was ‘official’ or ‘formal’, it 
may have been refused for fear of having too strong an impact from the NGOs’ side. 
NGOs’ intention with regard to these sub-official meetings does not lie in being 
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regarded as an official participant in the decision-making process, but in making 
decision-makers aware of NGOs’ opinions and messages. However, the legitimacy of 
these occasions is weak, and so, the JBIC hosted an international symposium on 
environmental guidelines and NGOs were invited to make official comments.85    
JBIC was positive in including NGOs in setting up the new guidelines. In its official 
publication, collaboration with NGOs was stated clearly in several parts. Their 
examples are: 
 
1) Collecting information by capitalising on the expertise of NGOs and their 
community-based operations, 
2) Cooperation to maximise the development effect of projects financed by JBIC, 
3) Exchange of views with NGOs on JBIC activities.86 
 
JBIC also started regular meetings with NGOs in April 2001. They were to “promote 
information sharing and discuss specific possibilities for collaboration”87 Further more, 
“it was intended to increase the transparency of JBIC operations, increase mutual 
understanding between NGOs and JBIC, and raise the quality of ODA loan operations 
through collaboration with NGOs involved in community-based operations.”88 Five 
meetings were held in 2001 and discussed the establishment of environmental 
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guidelines with 126 organisations in total participating.89 
FoE Japan Programme director recalls why FoE Japan succeeded in bringing the 
government to favour setting a high standard of environmental guidelines. “It was 
human power”, she said in an interview. The programme director of FoE Japan stated 
that those decision-makers were thinking how they could make the country better, so 
there was not much disagreement on establishing high-standard guidelines for 
environmental concerns. Her conclusion on how NGOs should lobby the government is, 
“there is always an intention and interest among these decision-makers. So what we 
should do is create an occasion to bring these intentions and interests for discussion to 
induce implementation.”90 
 
7.3 Facing New Challenges 
   The two Japanese environmental NGOs successfully pressured the Japanese 
government to adopt more environmentally concerned policies in the 1990s. Yet, as 
time has gone by, some new challenges have appeared for them. The challenges are; 1) 
both NGOs are losing a number of supporting members and that affects their financial 
stability, 2) the environmental issues have become too complicated and scientific for 
easy understanding, and 3) the Japanese government seems to be losing its interest in 
global environmental issues with a rise in “Peace Building” as a way of showing its 
‘face’ to the outer world.  
   Among NGOs in Japan, GP Japan and FoE Japan have the greatest number of 
members. However, as well as other influential NGOs such as JVC, they are facing a 
decrease in membership. It is very common that when the issue is hot, people become 
                                                   
89 JBIC, 14 October 2004. 
90 Ikuko Matsumoto, interviewed by the author, 23 January 2004. 
 238 
interested, but when the topic has cooled down, people lose interest in supporting them 
any longer. Therefore, it is necessary to keep the issue ‘hot’. Many development NGOs 
now put more work into emergency relief operations, which gain more immediate 
public interest. JCBL, for instance, has shifted its main issue from only anti-personnel 
landmines, which is considered to be ‘finished’ by the Japanese government, to cluster 
bombs and depleted uranium issue.91 For environmental NGOs, it is hard to keep the 
topic ‘hot’ to gain immediate interest since the environmental crises usually occur over 
a long span.  
As the second concern, the environmental issues became too complicated and 
scientific. From the beginning, the environmental problems were a mix of science and 
politics, but a series of international talks in the 1990s somehow made them familiar to 
the ordinary public. That was because in the 1990s issues such as global warming and 
ozone layer depletion were obvious and easy to understand. Media has also made the 
international environmental talks to seem as if they were exciting games between 
powerful states. Yet, they have now gone beyond these general issues. Matsumoto says, 
“it is getting difficult because the environmental issues themselves are becoming too 
intricate nowadays and people simply lose interest because of the difficulties.”92 To 
maintain continued public support, FoE Japan is shifting its activity principle down to a 
grassroots level and tries to describe environmental issues in a way that is simple and 
easy to understand.    
Thirdly and the most concerning challenge is that the Japanese government talks 
seem to have lost interest in the area. The number of pages in Japan’s ODA in 1991 
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devoted to environmental issues was 15. In 2001, it was only one page. Instead, the new 
scheme of “conflict prevention and peace building” constituted a major part of Japan’s 
ODA 2001 and this trend is continuing. Especially after Japan dispatched the Self 
Defence Force (SDF) to Iraq for recovery operations or so-called “Peace Building”, 
human contributions by SDF seem to have become a new tool for highlighting Japan’s 
international contribution. 
 
7.4 Conclusion: Efficient Strategy at the Turning Point 
   It is undeniable that Greenpeace Japan and Friends of the Earth Japan, by taking 
advantage of international and domestic circumstances, have brought about impressive 
changes in Japan’s environmental policy in the 1990s. Because the environmental 
policy was one of Japan’s crucial foreign policies, it can be said the two NGOs have 
influenced Japan’s foreign policy.     
Compared to the previous two case studies, Japanese environmental NGOs seem to 
have operated more tactfully and effectively in advocacy and have achieved a higher 
standard in Japan’s environmental policy through various interactions.  
The two NGOs have made full use of their international networks. By working 
closely with their international head offices, they were given not only credibility and a 
high reputation, which helped to gain popularity in Japan, but also the rich resources of 
the head office. The resources include advocacy strategy that helped the operation of 
the Japanese branch. In addition to the direct usage, indirect usage of the international 
network was used by GP Japan and FoE Japan as Gai-atsu (outside pressure). By 
possessing a back up from the international head office, the two NGOs could use the 
outside pressure on the Japanese government, which was well known for its concern 
about the states’ international reputation.    
 240 
   Although, there is no doubt that the Japanese environmental NGOs have become 
influential players in the decision-making system on Japan’s environmental issues in 
the 1990s, they are now facing several challenges, which may require future alterations 
in terms of their operations. Greenpeace Japan and FoE Japan have come to a turning 
point in their relations with the government. They advanced their own policy advocacy 
in the 1990s using effective interactions. However, the shift in Japan’s foreign policy 
from providing financial assistance to direct human contribution following the 
international trend has pushed them to be in need of creating new strategies. The 
question here is, are there any new strategies? The answer for the question may be 
given by future research beyond this thesis.  
 
     
   
      ?             
       
   
    
    
 
 
 
 
 241 
Chapter 8 
 
Strategies of Japanese NGOs: 
Exerting Influence through a Variety of Means 
 
8.1 Introduction: Despite the government’s original intention… 
    The earlier part of this thesis has discussed how Japanese NGOs have used the 
NGO cooperation system, which was introduced by the government in 1989, to exert 
influence over the government’s foreign aid policy through various types of interaction. 
Despite the government’s original intention to make Japanese NGOs supplementary 
actors in the policy of “Visible Japanese Aid (VJA)” (see Chapter 1 for more detailed 
analysis), they have grown stronger and far more influential than was expected.  
    This chapter analyses the general modes of operation of the Japanese NGO 
community based on the previous three case studies, and aims to reveal their 
peculiarities in the Japanese political climate. It will be shown whether the Japanese 
NGO community is closer in nature to Western or Asian NGOs or whether a unique 
third type of NGO community is in evidence. The analysis will focus on the scope of 
the Government-NGO relationship. This is important because most NGO related 
literature has failed to discuss this aspect of Japanese NGOs. As such, this analysis will 
fill a gap in the already established field of NGO study.   
The previous three case studies have studied four Japanese NGOs in terms of their 
interactions with the Japanese government: Chapter 5 focused on the Japan 
International Volunteer Centre (JVC), Chapter 6 on the Japan Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (JCBL), and Chapter 7 on Friends of the Earth (FoE) Japan and 
Greenpeace (GP) Japan as examples of environmental NGOs operating in Japan. These 
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chapters have revealed features and characteristics of these NGOs in terms of the 
efficiency of their operations. Examples of this have been JVC’s active advocacy for 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) reform; JCBL’s success in changing the 
Japanese government’s policy towards the global ban on anti-personnel (AP) 
landmines; and the establishment of the high standards of environmental assessment in 
Japan’s Yen Loan projects as carried out by environmental organisations such as FoE 
Japan.  
The results of these analyses have indicated that the course of Japan’s foreign aid 
policy has been influenced and changed by the actions of NGOs in the last decade. 
These changes include reforming the ODA charter, starting a new policy and aid 
scheme for AP landmines and restricting Yen Loan projects overseas in terms of 
environmental concerns. These phenomena have raised the following questions; were 
these changes favoured by the Japanese government? Has the government taken 
advantage of Japanese NGOs as it originally intended? Or have NGOs utilised the 
government’s cooperative attitude to further their own aid agenda? 
These questions were raised in the introduction of this thesis. Therefore, this chapter 
is to be a crucial part of the thesis paving the way for the conclusion, which will be 
given in the following chapter.  
Based on this chapter, consideration will be given in the conclusion to the recent 
trend of the Japanese aid strategy, which has linked ODA and sending the Self Defence 
Force (SDF) overseas. This trend has not appeared suddenly, but has emerged out of the 
government’s possible irritation at the fast-growing influence of Japanese NGOs. By 
introducing the Peace Building scheme, the Japanese government has taken a certain 
role away from NGOs and given it to the SDF. This chapter studies the causes of the 
Japanese government’s possible irritation at NGOs. In addition, it will focus on what 
 243 
prompted the government to make a change in the substance of the Peace Building 
scheme from reconstructing works to providing human resources, which has meant 
sending the JSDF to conflict affected areas.       
     
8.2 Means of interactions available to Japanese NGOs 
   There are seven major types of interactions observed between Japanese NGOs and 
the government. Japanese NGOs may use these to exert their influence, or, conversely, 
the government may use them to control NGOs. They are: 
1) ‘Sub-official Meetings’: Setting up an open discussion space to create social 
pressure. 
2) ‘Financial Support’: Controlling NGOs by financial assistance. 
3) ‘International/Domestic Network’: Securing transparency and accountability of 
NGOs to create outside pressure. 
4) ‘Workshops or Symposiums’: Holding them to raise public awareness and to 
form public consensus. 
5) ‘Personal Relationships’: Putting pressure directly on decision-makers. 
6) ‘Media Usage’: Creating public pressure. 
7) ‘Campaigns’: Running campaigns to make the issue prominent to the public. 
Although listed individually, these seven interactions often overlap each other. For 
instance, “media usage” is able to empower workshops/symposiums and campaigns. 
The ‘personal relationship’ type of interaction contributes to building the 
‘international/domestic network’. Therefore, features drawn from the case studies can 
be used in the analysis of several interactions.   
Taking these correlations into account, the following section will analyse each of the 
above seven interaction types using observations from the previous case studies. The 
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objective here is to see whether or not a unique feature of the Japanese NGO 
community will be revealed in the Japanese political climate.   
 
8.2.1 ‘Sub-official Meeting’ interaction type 
   In the 1990s, the Japanese government had become eager to have meetings with 
NGOs to exchange opinions over issues related to its foreign aid policies. These 
meetings are considered as ‘official’ with participation of government officials. At the 
same time, however, because the meetings are ‘open’ to everyone, the value of ‘official’ 
is undercut to some extent. Therefore, the government side possess the choice of 
whether to take opinions from these meetings into account or not. NGOs are sometimes 
invited officially and other times as free participants. Through these meetings, NGOs 
have tried to exert influence on the decision-making process. Hirata (2002) notes,   
 
The success of NGOs in influencing aid policy largely depends on their ability 
to engage state officials. While easy access to officials does not guarantee 
policy impact, accelerating mutual understanding through dialogue is one of 
the most important steps of NGOs to change aid policy.1    
 
This interaction has not only favoured the NGOs side, but also the government side 
as well. Having these ‘open’ meetings to hear public opinion, the government side can 
highlight its transparency in the official decision-making process, which has often been 
criticised as ‘talking behind closed doors’ that is regarded as only benefiting a exclusive 
participating group.  
                                                   
1  Keiko Hirata, Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Role of NGOs in Tokyo’s Aid and 
Development Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 133. 
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However, this transparency does not necessarily guarantee NGO’s actual 
participation in the process. The government was able to disregard the opinions of 
NGOs in its open meetings. As Matsumoto (1997) states, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA) admitted that it did not guarantee the reflection of these ‘outside’ 
voices in policy formation.2 Later, he was criticised by the government official for 
including his personal comment in his publication.3 This shows the true attitude of 
MOFA officials towards NGOs in part.  
This is different from the experience of many Western NGOs, where NGOs are 
institutionalised and guaranteed official access to the decision-making process.4 Since 
NPO Law was established in March 1998, Japanese NGOs are eligible to be formalised 
if they wish, and if they meet criteria, in which case they are recognised as 
institutionalised entities with similar official access to the decision-making process as 
Western NGOs.5 However, in reality the criteria for formalisation are set at a high level 
which is often beyond the reach of most Japanese NGOs except for a few such as the 
Japan International Volunteer Center (JVC), the Association for Aid and Relief (AAR) 
and Oxfam. It took almost two years for JVC to be formalised. AAR was given NPO 
status in 2000, and Oxfam in 2003. Formalisation of an NGO, generally speaking, 
secures the legitimacy of their influence because its existence becomes undeniable 
                                                   
2  Satoru Matsumoto, Mekong Gawa Kaihatsu: 21 Seiki no Kaihatsu Enjyo (Mekong River 
Development: Development Assistance in 21st Century), (Tokyo: Tukiji Syokan, 1997), 177. 
3 Anonymous source, 22 April 2003.  
4 For examples of participation of Western NGOs in decision-making processes, see Smillie and 
Helmich, ed., Stakeholders:Government-NGO Partnerships for International Development (London: 
Earthscan, 1999). This book covers most to Northern NGOs including Japan.  
5 NPO Law entitles registered organisations be granted several privileges including tax deduction. 
Refer to a Cabinet Homepage. Japanese Cabinet, “NPO Law”, 3 December 2004 
<http://www.npo-homepage.go.jp/new-manual/hou.pdf>, (4 December 2005).  
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within a law-abiding society. Boris (1998) notes, “as a general rule, the more formalised 
the relationship, the more influence the nonprofit providers are able to exert, particularly 
through legal claims against the state.”6 However, in the case of Japanese NGOs, the 
problem lies in the fact that the government pays little attention to the NGO community. 
This is because although the NGO community has been regarded as important, it is still 
unable to move beyond the position of ‘outsider’ and cannot break into the established 
aid decision-making process. Even so, Japanese NGOs have used this type of 
interaction to create outside pressure through ‘disclosing records’.  
The three previous case studies have revealed that among four NGOs, three groups 
have produced results using this ‘disclosing records’ type of interaction through 
sub-official meetings and symposiums. Successful organisations in this regard are JVC, 
FoE Japan and GP Japan. JCBL has not taken part in these sub-official meetings with 
ministries, but instead it has held a number of private meetings with government 
officials and politicians (MPs) and hosted symposiums and workshops; a process which 
has worked in much the same fashion as if they had attended those meetings. 
Acknowledging that JCBL is an exception among others, the following part will discuss 
those meetings which have been open to the general public. These include NGO-MOFA 
regular meetings, NGO-MOF regular meetings, and JBIC and JICA meetings.     
   JVC has taken advantage of its good reputation in the development NGO 
community to participate actively in a series of MOFA-NGO meetings. Although these 
meetings are open to the public and anyone interested can participate, due to small staff 
numbers and the size of the organisations, opportunities to attend are usually limited to 
                                                   
6 Elizabeth T. Boris and C. Eugene Steuerle, ed., Nonprofits and Government: Collaboration and 
conflict, (Washington D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1998), 353. 
 247 
those bigger NGOs.7 As was described in Chapter 4, most records of MOFA-NGO 
meetings are disclosed to the public on the internet with cooperation between NGOs and 
related ministries. In this way, if MOFA personnel fall silent on difficult and sensitive 
questions raised by the NGOs, such as those concerning overseas dam projects that 
often cause forced emigration of local people in affected areas, it would be recorded as 
‘silence’. This allows readers of the record to get a sense that there could be something 
that MOFA staff did not want to be uncovered at the meeting. Recorded as they are, the 
disclosure of all records creates pressure on the government. Knowing the efficiency of 
disclosing records, NGOs often encourage their members to view these records online.8 
This type of interaction works effectively, but there are still many issues concerning 
the efficiency of this interaction. For instance, all records are supposed to be on the 
internet, but when looking at NGO-MOFA regular meetings in 1997 and 1998, it was 
found that they had simply disappeared from the site run jointly by NGO and MOFA. 
JVC personnel commented that the disappearance was due to ’not-very-nice events’ for 
the MOFA.9 Yet, it is undeniable that the NGO community has taken advantage of this 
means of interaction to an extent that went beyond the government’s original intention. 
The transparency of NGO selection for participation is also an important issue. Atsuko 
Isoda of JVC wrote about an unclear selection process for an ODA Reform meeting in 
2004.10   
                                                   
7 A lot of Japanese NGOs have only a small number of staff. So if one of them goes to meetings, 
that could hinder the every day running of the organisation. Therefore, many NGOs cannot afford to 
send personnel to attend meetings.  
8 For instance, JVC encourages members to read records from ODA Sogo Senryaku Kaigi for public 
awareness on this issue as well as for creating public pressure.  
9 An anonymous NGO staff, interviewed by the author, 26 November 2004.  
10 Atsuko Isoda “ODA Sogo Senryaku Kaigi de nani ga hanasarete iruka (What has been discussed 
at ODA Comprehensive Strategy Conference?),” Trial and Error 236, January-February (2004): 2.  
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8.2.2 ‘Financial Support’ interaction type     
   As long as their financial foundation is one of the Japanese NGOs’ weak points, 
donors and contributors will inevitably hold a certain power over them. With very little 
charity basis in Japan, the government has been a major donor for the NGO community 
with few exceptions.   
Therefore, compared with the ‘Sub-official meeting’ type of interaction, “Financial 
Support” interaction is more effective for the government to take control of NGOs’ 
activities. The annual report of Japan’s foreign aid, Japan’s ODA, repeatedly 
emphasises that financial instability is usually one of the weakest points of NGOs in 
Japan (See Chapter 4: 97 for more detail). By holding the power in selecting which 
NGOs receive financial support, the government succeeds in controlling NGOs’ 
activities as well. Even after application for funding being approved, those recipient 
NGOs have to carry out their activities according to the government’s preferences 
because of the ‘later payment’ system of official subsidies (see Chapter 4: 95). 
To avoid being controlled by the government, more and more NGOs have chosen 
alternative sources of receiving funds, such as individual donations and international 
institution’s subsidies. However, these alternative sources of funds are only available 
for NGOs of strong reputation. Most Japanese NGOs are small and resource-poor, and 
are likely to be passed over for official subsidies. This is creating a gap within the NGO 
community in Japan, between the “haves” and the “have nots”. This gap leads to 
competition and rivalry in the NGO community and will be discussed later in this 
section, following an analysis of the government’s method of taking control over 
NGOs.   
The official selection process of NGOs for financial support creates ‘favourite 
 249 
NGOs’ or pro-government organisations. This is dangerous for the whole NGO 
community as a ‘sweet relationship’ with the government may deprive them of their 
principles of autonomy and independence. The director of JVC, Kumaoka, answered in 
an interview referring to this potential danger as follows. “It is very hard for anyone 
who obtained power and easy access to privileges to maintain NGO spirit because NGO 
spirit requires independence from these powers”.11 
    The JVC, which has always been outspoken in its criticism of the government’s 
development policy, received less funding from the Grant for Grassroots Projects 
(GGP) scheme for advance applications in 2002.12 There are a few possible reasons to 
explain this decrease, however, since there was no transparency of the decision-making, 
it may be assumed that JVC was not the government’s ‘favourite’ NGO for funding.  
In terms of financial support, JCBL and the other two environmental NGOs have 
shown different attitudes from that of JVC. Even with its slight shift to advocacy, JVC 
has long worked as an operational development NGO that has required a huge budget 
for project implementation. Conversely, JCBL has not required such large amounts of 
money since their main objective has been to promote the total landmine ban policy 
with the government. This has made JCBL purely an advocacy NGO. The focuses of 
FoE Japan and GP Japan have been divided almost equally into project implementation 
and advocacy. However, they have enjoyed better financial bases than any other 
Japanese NGOs because of their international reputations.13 Neither JCBL, FoE Japan, 
or GP Japan receives funding from the government. They are all funded by individual 
                                                   
11 Michiya Kumaoka, interviewed by the author, 17 June 2003.  
12 Kunio Iwama, interviewed by the author, 30 June 2003.  
13 FoE Japan has been entirely funded by individual donations and membership fees. GP Japan has 
also relied on those two sources, but it has also received a subsidy from its head office.  
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donations (JCBL and FoE Japan) or support from their own head offices (GP Japan). As 
these NGOs receive no funding from the government, they are much freer from 
government interference. 
Although they receive no support from the ODA scheme for their operations, they 
are indifferent to it as they do monitor the way the government’s funding is used. JCBL 
monitors Japan’s ODA through the framework of the “Zero Victim Program” and 
provides a series of reports in its newsletters. FoE Japan and GP Japan have set their 
focus on environmental aid strategy and launched campaigns to that end.  
    These three NGOs have more freedom but their financial situation still restricts 
their activities to a certain degree. For instance, recently JCBL has shifted its focus from 
the AP landmine issue to the issue of cluster bombs, which appeared as a problem in 
recent wars. Cluster bombs are a similar issue to the landmine issue, yet the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), JCBL’s head office, has decided not 
to broaden its activities to cluster bombs reasoning that concentrating on one issue has 
brought success to the global landmine ban movement.14 Even without the full support 
of its head office, JCBL has decided to take a further step by getting involved in the 
cluster bomb issue. The “JCBL Assistance Initiative for Mine Free Asia” campaign was 
started in 200215 and a “JCBL Petition Campaign to Ban Cluster Bombs and other 
Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)” was also launched at the same time. Why did this 
shift in target occur? The biggest reason is that as the world lost its interest in the AP 
landmine issue, which was prominent in December 1997, getting wide public support 
                                                   
14Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), “ICBL Position on Cluster Bombs”, Cluster Bombs, 
11-12 September 1999, <http://www.jca.apc.org/banmines/framework/cluster/.> (4 June 2004).  
15 This is to activate landmine banning movements in other Asian countries as many states have not 
signed up to the Ottawa Treaty. 
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for the AP landmine issue started to become difficult.  
   GP Japan’s receiving of financial support from its head office in order to fill the 
deficit in its annual budget naturally binds its activities to the intentions of the mainstay. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, this is one of the aspects of the “republican” type 
structuring of Greenpeace as an organisation. Therefore, it can be said that GP Japan 
might be free from the government’s control in terms of finance, but might be restricted 
by its head office.  
   In order not to be controlled by the government or the head offices, fundraising 
strategy is becoming more and more important for many NGOs. A survey on the 
voluntary sector in Japan undertaken by Bothwell (2003) clearly shows NGOs 
themselves feel the necessity for stable finance and make much effort in terms of 
fundraising.16 However, if NGOs pour too much energy into fundraising, they would be 
more like profit-making entities. As Taylor (1996) points out, 
 
If government funding is too restrictive, there are many smaller voluntary 
agencies that survive without government money. And for larger charities, 
government funding may be a small proportion of their total income. But the 
influence of government extends beyond what it funds directly. Within the 
voluntary sector, regulations, training requirements, drives towards quality and 
more general forces to be more business-like are shaping the ‘cabbage patch’ 
within which voluntary organisations operate.17 
                                                   
16 Robert O. Bothwell, “The challenges of growing the NPO and voluntary sector in Japan”, in The 
Voluntary and Non-Profit Sector in Japan: The challenge of change, Stephen P. Osborne ed. 
(London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 142 - 145. 
17 Marilyn Taylor, “What are the Key Influences on the Work of Voluntary Agencies?” in 
Voluntary Agencies: Challenges of Organisation and Management, ed. David Billis and Margaret 
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Finding the balance between establishing stable financial resources and remaining as 
non-profit entities with voluntary status is the critical issue that Japanese NGOs are 
facing now.  
  
8.2.3 ‘International/Domestic Network’ interaction type      
   In Chapter 3, with regard to the nature of Japan’s foreign aid, it was concluded that 
Japan has been very sensitive and reactionary to trends in the international community, 
especially the United States. In other words, the government would form its foreign 
policy according to Gai-atsu (outside pressure).  
The outside pressure can be both international and domestic. The domestic pressure 
stems from the Japanese NGOs who have been trying to exert influence using a variety 
of interactions, from inside the country. In forming its foreign policy, Japan has been 
both flexible and submissive in respect to international pressure. Based on this aspect of 
the Japanese government, it is obvious that creating outside pressure to support NGO 
activities is the most efficient strategy to exert influence, either internationally or 
domestically on Japan’s foreign aid policy.  
   The importance of building coalitions is not peculiar to Japanese NGOs. Mathews 
(1997) uses the example of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and 
highlighted the “tightly closed world of trade negotiations” to describe the importance 
of forming coalitions within and beyond borders.18  
Recognising their importance, three NGOs have enjoyed support from outside 
Japan: JCBL, FoE Japan and GP Japan. JCBL, began as the national campaign of the 
                                                                                                                                                     
Harris (Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 1996), 18.  
18 Jessica T. Mathews, “Power Shift”, Foreign Affairs 76, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 1997), 54. 
 253 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and was supported fully by its 
international head office. FoE Japan and GP Japan are both national branches of 
internationally recognised NGOs. Therefore, they enjoy the benefits of the established 
reputations or ‘authority’ that their international offices have. They will be discussed in 
more detail in the later part of this section. JVC, which will be discussed now, has 
considered the drawbacks of international networking and is eager to build domestic 
collaboration among Japanese NGOs.        
Being a purely Japanese local NGO, JVC has established a domestic network with 
other NGOs.19 The term ‘Network’ here has both practical and symbolic meanings - 
sharing things together and working together. Sharing facilities is an example of 
networking. Four other NGOs have their offices in the same building where JVC has its 
Tokyo office. They are the Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL) (the fifth floor), 
Africa-Japan Forum (AJF) (the fifth floor), Mekong Watch (the first floor), and Oxfam 
Japan (the first floor). Insiders call this building an “NGO building”. Advantages of 
having offices in the same place include mutual benefits in sharing facilities which 
reduces costs, sharing information with regard to aid policy to form unified statements, 
sharing staff for filling gaps in their specialist knowledge and in mutual learning 
opportunities to improve their activities strategy. Without legal status such as being 
acknowledged under NPO Law, Japanese NGOs have difficulties in renting office space 
and securing phone lines, so this kind of cooperation helps small NGOs without this 
legal status to execute their activities smoothly. Without these networks, small NGOs 
                                                   
19 Japan International Volunteer Center (JVC), Trial & Error 239, July-August (2005): 2-8. It shows 
its network internationally and domestically. The three network schemes such as linking 
international/domestic NGOs, providing emergent relief and supporting grassroots agricultural lives 
are introduced. In this chapter, the first scheme of  the JVC network is focused on.   
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have to use an individual’s name for these daily commodities and it would incur a major 
cost to change when the individuals leave the organisations.20 
Sharing staff members and mutual learning opportunities can be considered the most 
beneficial aspects of domestic networking. As mentioned earlier, JVC and JCBL have 
some staff in common. This turns out to be efficient in ‘plugging up holes’ in the 
specialities of each NGO, especially as aid issues became more complicated. One 
example is when a symposium was held on the issue of Cambodian recovery, including 
topics such as agriculture, landmines and education, JVC, JCBL and other Japanese 
NGOs cooperated to provide specialists at each session.21 Staff members are also 
shared to improve the operation of usual activities. JVC, for example, has learnt a lot 
about the poverty situation and proliferation of HIV/AIDS in Africa thanks to an 
Africa-Japan Forum (AFJ) member who also belongs to JVC. This has helped it to 
improve various projects which JVC already operates in South Africa.  
Sharing staff members also helps to cover staff shortages in each NGO as there is a 
high staff turnover among Japanese NGOs. There are several reasons for the high 
turnover, but the biggest reason is the low wages for heavy workload nature of NGOs. 
NGO work generally starts around 9-10 in the morning but the finishing time is 
uncertain because of the heavy work loads that individual staff are allocated. 
Fundraising events are usually held on weekends so NGO staff frequently sacrifice their 
own holidays for these events. For these reasons, there are many NGO staff, especially 
males, who are hoping to change their jobs and move into other fields, especially to 
                                                   
20 Bothwell, “The challenges of growing the NPO and voluntary sector in Japan”, 172 - 173.  
21 For instance, the most recent symposium on celebrating the tenth year of the People’s Forum on 
Cambodia, 14-15 December 2003. At the conference, JCBL was in charge of a workshop on 
anti-personnel landmines in Cambodia. Michiya Kumaoka, the director of JVC, gave a key note 
speech at the opening of the conference.   
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universities, colleges and research institutions.   
Some examples of receiving benefits from the domestic and international networks 
have been discussed. However, JVC has been somewhat hesitant to contribute to 
building an international network, similar to that built by the other three NGOs. 
Although JVC has modelled itself on Oxfam International of Great Britain for its mode 
of operations, it has had a fear of losing its identity to more powerful international 
organisations. JVC has been aware that being a branch of an international NGO with an 
already established reputation would bring additional strong outside pressure to the 
Japanese government, yet at the same time, it could be in danger of losing its character 
and independence. 
Rivalry between groups can be an obstacle to building smooth networks. Each NGO 
wishes to gain a good reputation individually in order to gain more support and funding 
from the public. Edwards (2002) states that competition (for funds, but stretching into 
general agency profile), disagreements on ideology and policy, lack of a common 
vocabulary and differing priorities could obstruct alliance building among NGOs.22 As 
well as inter-ministry rivalry, there is also competition among NGOs for survival.     
The other three NGOs have shown difference preferences with regard to 
international networking. JCBL has enjoyed the benefit of collaborating with ICBL, an 
already established authority in the field, since its inception in 1997. The power of 
‘authority’ was referred to in an example from Amnesty International, the established 
authority in the human rights field, as follows: 
 
                                                   
22 Michael Edwards, “Does the doormat influence the boot?: Critical thoughts on UK NGOs and 
international advocacy,” in Development and Advocacy, ed. Deborah Eade (London: Oxfam Great 
Britain, 2002), 105.  
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That most countries of the world were willing to let Amnesty personnel visit their 
prisons indicates the tremendous authority this international organisation was already 
beginning to assume in international affairs.23  
 
JCBL’s organisational credibility and strength has been supported by ICBL as 
analysed in Chapter 6. Everything ICBL has enjoyed was also shared by JCBL such as 
media attention and praise for the Nobel Peace Prize. This international coalition has 
created a strong influence on the Japanese government, which has reacted to external 
pressure.24 
Both FoE Japan and GP Japan have also used their international networks to support 
their activities. JCBL not only enjoys sharing in the already established reputation of the 
ICBL, but also is able to use strategies which are well thought out in advance. For 
instance, FoE Japan uses ‘local government foreign policy’ which has been used by FoE 
International. The policy is to exert influence on Japanese local governments on certain 
environmental issues and move them to pressure the central government. Because local 
governments in Japan possess much influence on the central government, this strategy 
often works more effectively than if FoE was working on its own.   
The international reputations of their head offices guarantee the branches’ own 
standpoints within their respective countries. Their accountability and popularity have 
also attracted a huge number of supporters, which contributes to their activities 
financially. In terms of financial assistance, GP Japan receives subsidies from its 
                                                   
23 Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organisations in the Making of the 
Contemporary World, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 138. 
24 Motoko Mekata, Jirai Naki Chikyuu he – Yume wo Genjitsu ni shita Hitobito (The World without 
Landmines: Dream makers), (Tokyo: Iwanami Syoten, 1998), 86 - 88. 
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international office to compensate for deficits in its budget. 
8.2.4 ‘Workshop and Symposium’ interaction type  
Numerous workshops and symposiums have been held both internationally and 
domestically by NGOs. Some literatures on NGOs have already revealed the efficiency 
of these meetings.25 These occasions have many objectives such as sharing information 
and providing opportunities for people with the same interests to build relationships.26 
They are also for raising public awareness and pressuring the government through open 
discussion in the public realm.  
JVC has held a number of workshops and symposiums on a broad range of issues. 
They range from small-scale workshops to large conferences with official participation 
from the aid-related ministries. Examples of small-scale workshops include a series of 
seminars held every year by JVC on issues such as learning about NGO activities and 
issues in Japanese postal savings, and reforming Japan’s ODA. Further examples 
include returnees from regional offices who give presentations on their field 
experiences: and the use of study tours and internships. Large symposiums were held 
recently on issues in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the reform of Japan’s ODA. 
 However, one thing worth mentioning here is that these symposiums and 
conferences hosted by JVC have been somewhat academically oriented. Project-based 
workshops and seminars given by JVC staff have been quite successful but policy 
advocacy-related symposiums have been too academic in nature. Examples include a 
series of workshops on ODA reform, and, most recently, a symposium on Japan’s peace 
                                                   
25 Literature such as Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin (1998) on 
anti-personnel landmines and Wapner (1996) on environmental NGOs. The efficiency and visibility 
of conferences, workshops and demonstrations are analysed in these works.  
26 Elizabeth T. Boris and C. Eugene Stererle, Nonprofits and Government: Collaboration and 
Conflict, (Washington D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1999), 297. 
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building scheme in December 2003. This resulted in too much scholarly discourse and 
missed the actual points of the problems and what the NGO community should do.  
The academic-oriented workshops and symposiums attract people with the same 
interests, but only from certain parts of society, mainly students or journalists. On the 
other hand, they have not been appealing enough to the ‘general public’ or ‘ordinary 
people’ with a lower level of interest. FoE Japan, as a leading academic-oriented 
environmental NGO, has encountered this problem due to the difficulties with, and 
specialised nature of, the issues it handles. Therefore, a new strategy appealing to 
ordinary people is being developed by simplifying issues and encouraging general 
participation. In order to make workshops and symposiums more attractive and 
eye-catching in general, JCBL has implemented a new strategy that is the opposite to 
that of the JVC. This will be analysed in more detail in the following section on JCBL. 
   JCBL and JVC have held a number of workshops and symposiums to raise the 
general public awareness of the landmine issue and to show public support for the issue 
to the government. 27  As ICBL and other national campaigns have launched 
eye-catching demonstrations at international conferences, JCBL has also tried to make 
their own public events highly visible.   
   One example can be given of how symposiums or workshops can attract more 
attention. ICBL made an artificial minefield to make conference participants aware of 
the severity of landmine accidents and of the necessity for a global ban on AP 
landmines at the CCW Review conference in Geneva. Following this strategy, JCBL 
                                                   
27 Symposiums such as Taijin Jirai no Zennmen Kinshi wo Kangaeru: Ottawa Jyooyaku Hijyunn ni 
mukete (Total ban on anti-personnel landmines: Toward ratification of the Ottawa Treaty) in 1998, 
Jirai Mondai to Chiiki Kaihatsu (AP landmine issue and regional development), Kids Forum on 
landmine issue in 1999. 
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has also created a simulated minefield for a new AP landmine book launch function in 
July 2003 in order to raise public awareness. It was effective both in raising public 
awareness and making the issue familiar and easier to understand. However, with its 
smaller budget and limited number of staff, it was impossible for JCBL to implement 
advocacy campaigns at the same massive level as the ICBL. Even so, the intention of 
JCBL to make workshops stand out and attract more attention has made these 
prominent among other academic-oriented ones including those by JVC. 
 
8.2.5 ‘Personal Relationship’ interaction type     
   Having a philosophy of being independent from the government or any other power 
in carrying out their activities, the NGO community has tried to maintain an 
autonomous status in Japan. Supposedly, a relationship such as ‘sweet linkage’ does not 
exist between any of the players in the decision-making process. This kind of 
relationship, however, surely exists between the players of the decision-making process 
in terms of infrastructure aid projects.28  
Trying to avoid building unhealthy relationships, the NGO community has 
nevertheless understood the importance of gaining access to the decision-making 
process and it is true that each NGO has its own strategy to establish direct ties with 
decision-makers. JVC, especially in policy advocacy activities, has tried making 
contacts with Member of Parliament (MPs). As already shown in Chapter 6 and 7, 
cooperating with politicians has resulted in a remarkable change in the government’s 
course on the AP landmine issue and environmental conservation.  
Based on the facts of the previous cases, this type of interaction has shown itself to 
                                                   
28 Mitsui Heavy Industrial’s ODA scandal and the former MP Suzuki’s scandal in 2001 are the most 
recent examples of them. 
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be the most efficient means for changing the government’s policy. If NGOs can 
influence high-powered people within the decision-making process, the process would 
be obedient to their preferences. The problem here is that it is not the issue itself that 
could change decision-maker’s attitudes, but rather it is the personal relationship itself 
that moves them to change. In that case, when decision-makers leave their positions, it 
may have an effect on policy which has already been decided and may even change its 
direction. This nature of interaction also explains one aspect of the “guru syndrome” in 
Japan that NGOs are dependent on their charismatic founding leaders such as Michiya 
Kumaoka of JVC, Yasuhiro Kitagawa of JCBL and Yukiko Soma of AAR for building 
personal relationships with individual decision-makers. Despite these weak points, this 
interaction is still important for Japanese NGOs.  
One question is common to the cases of JVC and JCBL. That is, why have they 
cooperated mainly with politicians, but not so much with the business industry or 
bureaucracy? In comparison, FoE Japan and Greenpeace Japan worked closely with 
both bureaucrats and politicians in establishing a high standard of environmental 
assessment for Japan’s foreign aid policy. They have also tried to involve the business 
community to raise their awareness toward environmental issues through mentioning 
possible business opportunities in ecological products as well as pursuing them to show 
a concern for the environment, thus fulfilling their ‘social responsibility’.  
In response to the above question, the answer in JVC’s case lies in its position as a 
development NGO. There are two sides to ‘development’, one as seen by development 
NGOs such as JVC, and another as seen by the business industry. JVC considers 
development as a grassroots activity, involving local people and facilitating their 
self-help style agricultural projects. On the other hand, the business sectors often see 
development as infrastructure projects from which they receive benefit from 
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implementation. These two different viewpoints in development issues sometimes cause 
disputes.  
For contracted construction firms, Official Development Assistance (ODA) projects 
deliver huge benefits and promised income. Therefore, this can create a ‘sweet linkage’ 
or unhealthy relationships between bureaucrats who are in charge of contracting out to 
private companies. Through its overseas projects, JVC has come across a number of 
problems such as forced migration or environmental destruction, which can be caused 
by large infrastructure projects. Acknowledging these problems and working to solve 
them, JVC has viewed the business sector as opposing its idealised development, which 
views Oxfam as a model. Instead of approaching them to create better infrastructure 
projects, JVC seems to have chosen to pursue a completely different stream from them 
by implementing small-scale grassroots development assistance.   
     JVC has been critical of Japan’s traditional aid stream not only because it 
produces unhealthy relationships within the decision-making process, but also because 
it has often neglected the interests of the most needy people in its projects. This is why 
JVC has turned its back on the government and operates small-scale grassroots projects 
overseas that the Japanese government rarely covers in its official aid strategy. 
Although it appears that the government’s attitude toward the JVC is becoming 
friendlier,29 JVC nevertheless feels distant from the administrating ministries and 
bureaucrats.  
 The case of JCBL is closely related to the national security of the country and is 
considered to possess two main problems. One concerns possible disputes with related 
                                                   
29 For instance, Michiya Kumaoka was invited to give a seminar on Japan’s NGO community for 
trainee diplomats in 2003. This means that the JVC director was considered to represent the whole 
NGO community in Japan. 
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ministries such as the MOFA and the Defence Agency, which are dealing with the 
United States government over their possession of AP landmines in the US army bases 
within the borders of Japan. Because of the ministries’ unfriendly attitudes, JCBL has 
not been cooperating with bureaucrats. At the press conference for Landmine Monitor 
2004, JCBL was questioned by a journalist over not including US possession of AP 
landmines in Japan’s contribution. Yasuhiro Kitagawa, the JCBL director, answers in 
the interview that neither Japan’s Defence Agency, nor the United States army disclose  
information on AP landmines held in the US bases.30 This illustrates the degree of 
unfriendliness of Japan’s bureaucrats toward the AP landmine issue and related NGOs. 
The other point is that official policy toward landmine clearance directly benefits 
construction companies because of their new landmine clearance technology, which has 
not been entirely welcomed by the international community which is concerned about 
landmines (See Chapter 6 for more detail).  
   Yet, in comparison to JVC, creating personal relationships with high-powered 
people has been a prominent aspect of JCBL’s advocacy activities. Its strong personal 
relationships were limited to politicians rather than bureaucrats or business industry. 
Yet, because ‘politicians’ were often a coalition of MPs, foreign ministers or even 
Prime Ministers, who were considerably more powerful than ordinary politicians, these 
relationships have benefited JCBL a great deal.   
   As analysed in Chapter 6, JCBL formed close relationships with a group of MPs 
and the then Prime Ministers, Hashimoto and Obuchi. Having understood the 
importance of these personal relationships, it is important to remember that relying too 
much on particular people in power could endanger the organisation when they no 
                                                   
30  Yasuhiro Kitagawa, <kitagawayasu@nifty.com> “Shitsumon ni tsuite (Answering your 
enquiry),” 25 September 2003, personal e-mail (25 September 1998).   
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longer hold these positions.  
    The then Minister for Foreign Affairs and later Prime Minister, Obuchi, 
particularly showed a strong personal interest in landmine issues and this was 
demonstrated in his official address at the Ottawa Conference. Some of the literature on 
AP landmines has mentioned the importance of his presence.31 In order to push the 
Japanese government toward a pro-ban AP landmine policy, JCBL personnel and other 
cooperating NGO representatives held a private meeting with Obuchi.32 
   Ironically, because of the importance of his presence, it can be observed that his 
sudden death in 2000 has brought a new stream to Japan’s AP landmine ban policy. 
Against JCBL’s wishes and requests, the government has spent most of its special aid 
scheme for AP landmines in Afghanistan, in a new framework of “Peace Building”. The 
special scheme was established according to the Foreign Affairs Minister’s pledge at the 
Ottawa Conference in order to support AP landmine victims. Additionally, the 
continuation of further overseas funding for the AP landmine issue is said to be 
determined on a case by case basis. Apparently, recent winds have started blowing 
against the JCBL. 
Both FoE Japan and GP Japan are skilled in building personal relationships with 
authorities. As the environmental issues contain more academic aspects relating to 
natural science than purely developmental issues, environmental NGOs tend to employ 
professionals in these areas. Therefore, they often appear to possess more technical 
knowledge than those bureaucrats who are constantly transferring from one position to 
another. As a result, in order to share mutually beneficial information, NGOs and 
                                                   
31 Japanese AP landmine-related literature such as Mekata (1998) and Osa (2003). 
32 This information was privately given by Yasuhiro Kitagawa in personal communication during 
the author’s fieldwork from March to June 2003.  
 264 
government officials get closer to each other in comparison to other ODA areas. Ikuko 
Matsumoto, a programme director of FoE Japan, appreciated cooperation from 
government officials at the time of establishing the environmental standard in Japan’s 
foreign aid.33  
GP Japan has also increased its use of strategies for building personal relationships. 
It has made personal contacts with government delegations by taking advantage of 
official occasions such as receptions at international negotiations or interacting in the 
corridors at environmental conferences where governmental delegates are unable to 
escape.  
     The main aim of GP Japan in attending receptions is to obtain personal contact 
details from governmental officials. Once they obtain these contact details, access is 
easily established via emails or phone calls, which is far easier than trying to make 
official appointments in person. Although there is no comparison to face-to-face 
meetings in terms of making an impression and exerting influence, these attempts at 
contact are better than simply accepting the rejection of an appointment request. 
Making appointments with governmental officials in person is not easy in Japan unless 
there is a special reason such as the visit of internationally famous figures. The previous 
chapter has already analysed this difficulty using an example from GP Japan and the 
governmental officials of three different ministries (See Chapter 7: 222). Many 
international NGOs have attempted to talk directly to delegates at the COP 3 in Kyoto. 
This stems from the same reasoning that official appointments are hard to make, yet, it 
is also a more direct form of action to talk to decision-makers in the corridor rather than 
waiting for opportunities such as press conferences.  
                                                   
33 Ikuko Matsumoto, interviewed by the author, 23 January 2004. 
 265 
   The other outstanding strategy of Japan’s environmental NGOs is that they 
understand the structure of the decision-making process in Japan and learn when and 
how to act in order to get the best results. As the third case study has shown, politicians 
supported FoE lobbying of the government by giving advice from a political perspective. 
This kind of information cannot be obtained without inside support. Building personal 
relationships with decision-makers brings not only ‘direct influence’ on on-going policy, 
but also knowledge for future use by NGOs.    
There is another means of building personal relationships with decision-makers. 
NGO staff can become politicians themselves. This seems to be the quickest and easiest 
means of having access to the decision-making process because it is equivalent to being 
an insider. Even if they only become MPs of opposition parties, not a ruling party, they 
would still have many more opportunities to express their opinions and ideas such as 
during parliamentary debates. In fact, some NGO personnel have chosen this way to go 
into politics.  
   However, there is a drawback. The JVC director has made an interesting comment 
about NGO personnel becoming politicians. He stated that it would be hard for NGOs to 
maintain autonomy or independence once they become part of the power structure 
because that ’sweet smell’ of power is undeniable. He also mentioned a danger of being 
too visible when NGO staff became politicians. He cited the case of the former MP, 
referred to earlier, who lost her office following a money scandal which was leaked 
suddenly in parliament. This was despite her being well-known for accusing the former 
MP Suzuki of NGO and Official Development Assistance (ODA) scandals in 2001 (See 
Chapter 5: 142).34 Her scandal brought disgrace to the NGO that she once committed 
                                                   
34 Michiya Kumaoka, interviewed by the author, 17 June 2003.  
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herself to. Yet, Kumaoka did not fully approve of the opposite situation whereby NGOs 
should maintain an “honest poverty”, which is the usual expectation for the way a 
Japanese NGO community should be, because it could mean they were essentially 
‘powerless’. It would be impossible for NGOs to fight against the established powers if 
they remained so. Apparently JVC is now standing at a crossroads in regards to 
cooperating with powers to become more influential in the decision-making process in 
Japan.  
 
8.2.6 ‘Media Usage’ interaction type              
   Even a small organisation has its own media strategy. It is impossible to ignore the 
influence of the media on the public. Naturally, NGOs have their media strategies as 
well, however, they are not always effective.  
   JVC has experienced both the good and bad sides of the media. From a positive 
perspective, JVC has become well-known to the Japanese public by appearing in written 
media such as in newspapers and magazines, and also on air. There are a number of 
articles about and by JVC staff such as Kumaoka, Takahashi and Maki Sato who has 
been in charge of JVC’s Afghanistan projects. These media appearances have 
contributed to raising JVC’s reputation and correspondingly the donations received.35  
From a negative perspective, JVC has struggled to build personal relationships with 
journalists. Although JVC policy advocacy staff have tried to establish close networks 
with journalists, they seem to see things differently. It seems that befriending journalists 
does not mean that they will necessarily write favourable articles.  
                                                   
35 The JVC donation officer said that immediately after JVC staff talked about a situation in 
Afghanistan, the level of donations rose, but soon decreased. Mitsuko Tomiyasu, interviewed by the 
author, 19 May 2003.  
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An example from JCBL shows the reverse situation. One active journalist, who has 
a close relationship with JCBL, has written a lot of positive articles about the 
organisation and its operations. Although he experienced suffering from an AP 
landmine accident that made him personally interested in the issue, it is still possible to 
say that his close relationship with JCBL has worked to produce favourable articles. 
The question of what makes these situations different is difficult to answer. Many 
factors are involved, such as the individual’s personal character or circumstances. 
However, one explanation may be that confidence building between NGOs and the 
media owes a lot to the leadership of NGOs in Japan and both leaders of JVC and JCBL 
have strong reputations. Kumaoka of JVC has been well known for his past activities 
and statements in the media. Kitagawa, the JCBL director, has a high social standing for 
his long dedication to AP landmine issues. In January 2004, Kitagawa was even 
awarded one of the most honourable humanitarian assistance awards in Japan by the 
Asahi Newspaper (Asahi Fukushi Sho). Other staff, who have been focused on by the 
media were either eye-catching (for example, a JVC nurse, Yoshino, and a JCBL staff 
member, Mekata, for their activities as women) or topic raising (JVC staffs, Sato and 
Tanigawa, for their on-the-spot activities). The JVC policy advocacy team has not been 
given much attention because they are neither eye-catching figures nor working visibly 
in the field.    
Based on these observations, the Japanese media is shown to deal only with those 
already established authorities rather than rising young stars out of fear of a possible 
backlash. In addition, general readers or audiences are normally interested in exciting 
issues covered by on-the-spot reports. This is partly how Peace Winds Japan (PWJ) has 
become a ‘media favourite’ with its visible overseas activities. However, the media’s 
attitude carries with it a danger of Japanese NGOs suffering from “guru syndrome”, 
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which many Western NGOs have experienced. This is not only in regard to the original 
leaders being opposed to organisational change, but also in the sense that after a 
generation change in charismatic leadership, organisations lose their relationships with 
many actors including the media.   
JCBL which has the shortest history among the NGOs observed in this thesis, 
probably has the most prominent media strategy of the four this research considers. 
There have been forty-nine articles about landmine issues that have appeared in major 
newspapers, magazines and on television between 1992 and 1997.36 Fourteen of them 
were written by the journalist, Kazumoto Momose. As mentioned earlier, JCBL has a 
friendly relationship with a few journalists, including Momose, and his articles on AP 
landmine issues have favoured JCBL’s activities unintentionally. Momose has also 
written for JCBL newsletters which has increased their accountability because of the 
fact that a professional journalist has contributed. This accountability has made JCBL’s 
newsletters a strong tool for advocacy. As well as journalists, photographers have also 
held exhibitions on AP landmines. Based on this situation, a question is raised; why is 
JCBL able to establish relationships with journalists to create media favour for its 
activities?  
   One reason has already been given in the case of the Japan International Volunteer 
Centre (JVC) in terms of building confidence between NGO staff and media. It can be 
said that a mutual confidence has existed between the well-known director of JCBL and 
various journalists. The journalists have trust in the director in addition to their friendly 
personal relationship and this trust has become a driving force for them to write articles. 
The second reason could be the level of importance and the narrow focus of the AP 
                                                   
36 Data sourced from a handout from the landmine workshop at the 10th anniversary of the People’s 
Forum of Cambodia Japan (PEFOC, Japan) in 14-15 December 2003.  
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landmine issue. Needless to say that the more important and narrowly focused the topic, 
the more interesting for the media.  
There are two trends in media communication. The first is a major blurring of the 
line between news and entertainment and the second is the populism of television 
news. 37  The AP landmine issue was by no means entertainment, however its 
negotiation process has caught the media’s attention as an exciting international 
political game between major powers and NGOs. In this way, it was made an ‘exciting 
topic’. The active support of Princess Diana had always been a media favourite and has 
added a touch of colour to the issue as well. There is, however, a potential backlash 
from gaining too much media attention. For instance, the media is often criticised for 
using third world poverty imagery, which has been named ‘aid pornography’.38 Even 
so, the impact and efficiency of such images for gaining immediate sympathy from 
people cannot be denied. In the case of the AP landmine issue, pictures of the victims 
were eye-catching.  
The AP landmine issue was also a simple issue. No one would consider that AP 
landmines had a positive purpose for human society and so this topic was 
straight-forward and easy for journalists to take a side on. People’s emotions could be 
easily manipulated through reading these articles. This is also the point that 
distinguishes JVC in terms of its media relationships. Although there are a number of 
criticisms and problems, overseas development projects were supposed to be beneficial 
for receiver states and their local populations. This controversy in overseas development 
                                                   
37 Ian Smilie, The Alms Bazaar: Altruism under fire- non-profit organisations and international 
development, (London: IT Publications, 1995), 133. 
38 Much of the literature has discussed ‘aid pornography’ but see Tom Riddell, Foreign Aid 
Reconsidered (London: James Currey Ltd., 1987) for a classic debate.   
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projects divides pro- and anti- development journalism, and makes it difficult for the 
media to produce unified favourable work. 
As well as JCBL newsletters, publishing books can also be defined as promoting the 
issue through the media. This method was also used by other AP landmine-related 
NGOs in Japan. AAR, one NGO cooperating with JCBL, has published a series of 
picture books on AP landmine issues using a character called ‘Sunny the Rabbit’. It has 
a simple but powerful message: if we clear one AP landmine, we can plant one flower 
in that area. Young readers receive its message and pass it on to older readers. They 
constitute a large number of voters in Japan at the end, which is important in a 
democratic state. This series of books has sold around 550,000 copies and made a 
strong appearance in the media as well as contributing to public awareness. Tadahisa 
Fukiura, a special advisor for AAR, commented on the surprising success of this book 
by stating that, “parliamentary debate admitted that only a kids’ picture book changed 
the course of the Japanese government toward AP landmine”.39      
Publishing books is a widely used strategy by environmental NGOs. Environmental 
conservation issues often appear in Japan’s Yen Loan Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) projects. With its huge budget (Appendix 2: Figure 6), Yen Loan projects 
include infrastructure projects such as constructing public facilities. These projects 
frequently affect local people and a few of Japan’s past ODA projects are said to have 
caused forced migration and destruction of the environment. FoE Japan and GP Japan 
have both been concerned about these problems and have published a number of books 
and brochures on the issue. 
                                                   
39 Refer to AAR homepage. Tadamasa Fukiura, “Aratana Shimei – Jirai Haizetsu (New mission – 
abolishment of anti-personnel landmines)”, Footstep of Association for Aid and Relief, n.d.,   
<http://aarjapan.gr.jp/info/fukiura2.html.> (11 July 2004).  
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8.2.7 ‘Campaign’ interaction type 
    The final type of interaction to be analysed here can be considered the most 
publicly appealing and fair method and has also been broadly used by Western and 
Asian NGOs to shape public consensus. For instance, operating a global or domestic 
campaign to influence public opinion polls has become a major activity of NGOs in the 
1990s. Western NGOs such as Care, Oxfam and World Vision operate several global 
campaigns. Some Asian NGOs have also operated campaigns on various issues such as 
local development, gender, and empowerment. Occasionally, they operate in 
conjunction with their counterparts in the West. Chapman and Fisher (2002) describe 
two such campaigns: the promotion of breastfeeding and the use of child labour in the 
carpet industries in Ghana and India, and stated, “collaboration between different 
organisations can therefore help in moving the campaign forward. Even without formal 
collaboration, a variety of NGOs working with different arenas is helpful”.40 
Following this trend, Japanese NGOs have launched many campaigns. However, 
conclusions drawn from their past campaigns did not always give the same results as 
those experienced by other NGOs. This is where a unique feature of the Japanese 
political climate surrounding NGOs appears. Before discussing this, a few campaigns 
operated by the four NGOs considered will be examined.   
   JVC in pursuit of its main objectives in implementing overseas development 
projects, rather than taking political action, had not had large campaigns until the end of 
the 1980s. Acknowledging the efficiency of running campaigns in 1993 it ran a 
                                                   
40 Jennifer Chapman and Thomas Fisher, “The effectiveness of NGO campaigning: lessons from 
practice,” in Development and Advocacy, ed., Deborah Eade (London: Oxfam Great Britain, 2002), 
120 - 121.  
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campaign to stop the Japanese government from supplying unnecessary agricultural 
chemicals to Cambodia.41  
   JCBL, as can be clearly seen from its name, started as a national ‘campaign’ for a 
global ban on AP landmines. It has been continually concerned with operating 
campaigns such as signature collection, postcard sending, and poster competitions. 
Through these campaigns, JCBL has contributed to public awareness/education and 
pressured the Japanese government as already analysed in Chapter 6. Among these 
campaigns, the signature collection campaign, which was enhanced by the use of 
images of landmine victims, was successful in influencing the government.  
   Other advocacy NGOs, beginning with Amnesty International, have adopted 
signature collection in order to appeal to the public. JCBL also launched a postcard 
campaign. Its goal lies in increasing public awareness and in showing concern for 
people. With regard to the AP landmine issue, each national campaign, including the 
Cambodian campaign, had a series of signature gatherings. The work of the Cambodian 
campaign is praised as follows:  
 
The Cambodian campaigners worked hard to build public awareness and support for 
the ban and the international conference. They launched a massive signature 
campaign, gathering names at temples, markets, and schools throughout the country42      
 
JCBL implemented the first signature gathering for submission among organisations 
                                                   
41 ODA Study Group and Japan Consumers Association, ed.,Stoppu! Kiken na Nooyaku Enjyo: 
Kanbojia syakai ni ima nani ga hitsuyoo ka (Stop Hazardous Agricultural Chemical Assistance to 
Cambodia: What does Cambodian society need now?), (Tokyo: Symposium booklet, 1993).  
42 Cameron, Lawson and Tomlin, To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines, 
30.  
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with the same interest in a global ban on landmines in August, 1997. In this way, it has 
shifted its focus to a broader Japanese public. As a result of this target shift, JCBL  
collected 35,283 signatures in 1997 and they were handed to the Foreign Minister by 
Tun Channalet. His presence added more importance to the signature campaign through 
image enhancement, which will be discussed in more detail later.  
    Briefly however, ‘image improvement’ was used to create an image or icon of the 
topic in order to dramatise JCBL’s campaigns. Despite its relatively short history and 
small scale of the organisation compared with its mainstay, JCBL was unable to create 
its own icon such as Princess Diana was for ICBL, instead using Channalet from the 
ICBL. 
Princess Diana was the icon for ICBL. Her tragic death has actually worked to 
produce a favourable stream towards the global movement to ban landmines. Her 
established fame has enabled ICBL and the landmine topic to be more visual. For JCBL, 
the wheelchaired Channalet, without both legs from two landmine accidents has given 
rise to immediate sympathy from the public. His presence has also influenced the 
Foreign Minister, and his personal interest became a strong driving force to change 
Japan’s policy from anti- to pro-ban. Again, in coming together with a ‘campaign’ type 
of interaction, the submission of signatures collect by the landmine victim dramatised it 
and gave it a visual effect. 
Both FoE Japan and GP Japan operate a number of campaigns supporting actual 
projects and advocacy effort. One feature of these campaigns is that they are divided 
into international and domestic areas.  
GP Japan, strongly influenced by its head office, has participated in international 
campaigns such as anti-whaling, anti-nuclear waste and power, protecting forests and 
global warming. GP Japan has stressed advocacy campaigns through the sending of 
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postcards/emails, giving seminars and publishing reports rather than through actual 
protest activities that Greenpeace itself has been well known for.  
Because of the federal nature of its organisations, which means local branches enjoy 
more freedom, FoE Japan has launched a more grassroots type of campaign in Japan. A 
few projects are implemented outside of Japan, such as a “Tree Planting” project 
campaign in China, a campaign that supports NGOs and scientists working on 
protecting hot spots in Siberia, and doing study tours in relation to these campaigns. At 
a domestic level, FoE Japan adopts local governments’ foreign policy. Through 
working closely with local governments on various environmental issues, FoE 
indirectly pressures the central government using the authority and access of local 
governments.      
 
8.3 Conclusion: Too Much Dependence on Personal Relationship       
Based on the above analysis, the answers to the question set out earlier in this 
chapter regarding the most efficient means for Japanese NGOs to exert their influence 
are as follows: 
1. Building personal relationships with decision-makers is very effective as was 
presented in the examples of JCBL and the two environmental NGOs. However, 
because they have not influenced the policies themselves, the decisions are subject to 
the changing whims of decision-makers. 
2. The most prominent example of the first point is the case of Japan’s policy toward the 
AP landmines. After the death of Keizo Obuchi, the policy has been toned down and 
further support for AP landmine victims will be decided on a case by case basis. 
3. Coalition building with highly reputable international NGOs provides credibility and 
legitimacy for Japanese NGOs. Despite the drawback of being franchised by a head 
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office, it is undeniable that JCBL, FoE Japan and GP Japan have enjoyed certain 
benefits. Therefore, JVC has started building an international network as well as a 
domestic one.  
4. Media cooperation can be a strong tool through which Japanese NGOs can be 
influential. Not only being friendly with journalists, but also publishing independently 
can be an efficient tool for obtaining support from the public as well as raising 
awareness for the issues. However, as can be seen from the money scandal involving 
the former MP in 2001, it has to be remembered that the media can easily create a 
backlash against this NGO-turned-MP.   
As foreign aid policy was formed within the exclusive decision-making process and 
attracted no criticism from outside, there was no space for an ‘outsider’ to exert 
influence. However, in the 1990s, international criticism against Japan’s traditional 
foreign aid policy created an opportunity for NGOs to be ‘partners’ with the 
government.  
   Having tried to grow beyond the government’s expectation, the four NGOs in these 
case studies have actually influenced the decision-making processes in relation to aid 
using both official and unofficial interactions. Still, there are some issues remaining 
such as too much dependence on personal relationships with high-powered 
decision-makers, which creates a tendency for weakness in the continuity of policy. 
However, it is difficult to deny that the ‘outsider’ has made a breakthrough into the 
exclusive decision-making process and become a major challenger.  
   Has the Japanese government put up with this new and growing challenger? What is 
its reaction to the challenger? Is the Japanese political climate Western or Asian or a 
totally new type? Taking new events in international relations into account, the next 
concluding chapter will answer these questions that were first set out in this thesis. As 
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well as answering these questions, the chapter will outline the new direction that Japan 
has started heading towards in terms of its aid strategy. This discussion will lead to 
some policy recommendations for the NGO community in Japan and these will 
comprise the final conclusion to this thesis.     
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Chapter 9 
 
Conclusion: 
Although facing difficult challenges, there is hope for Japanese 
NGOs 
 
For a long time the Japanese government had a bad international reputation due to 
its ‘faceless’ foreign policy. It was so named because Japan was considered to be good 
at providing money but not human resources for international demands. Its foreign aid 
was infrastructure-concentrated with huge budgets which were said to neglect certain 
grassroots needs. International criticism reached its peak during the Gulf War in 1991 
and left Japan with “Gulf War Trauma”, a sentiment of deep humiliation due to the 
near-total lack of appreciation shown for the large amounts of money it provided for the 
Kuwaiti liberation effort. The Japanese population also demanded justification of 
Japan’s foreign aid spending of ‘taxpayers’ money’. Japan needed to create a friendly 
and efficient aid donor image domestically and internationally.  
A new aid strategy including cooperation with Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) was set up to counter international criticism. This new aid strategy was 
launched in 1989. Its aim was to fight against both domestic and international criticism 
by using NGOs as supplementary actors to the government which would provide a 
‘friendly face’ for Japan’s contributions to the international community. For more than a 
decade, this cooperative relationship has endured .    
In parallel to the growing popularity and importance of NGOs in international 
development work, the production of NGO-related research began to flourish. However, 
literature on Japanese NGOs was still scarce. Several works have discussed ideals for 
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foreign aid implementation from the viewpoint of NGOs. However, in these works, the 
main focus was on realising more effective development, not the modes of operation of 
NGOs themselves.     
Some NGO practitioners have contributed to academic works based on their 
personal experience. Most of these contributions are in English. They are most often 
about Western (Northern/European) and Asian (Southern/Asian) NGOs and few of 
them have dealt with Japanese NGOs. Even in Japanese, studies focusing on the modes 
of operation of Japanese NGOs remain scarce.  
There are several reasons for this significant lack of research, such as a language 
barrier, the closed nature of Japanese NGOs, and the lack of time available to NGO staff 
to publish accounts of their own experiences. A further important reason is the situation 
in which Japan finds itself.  
Japan identifies with both developed countries and the Asian region at the same 
time. Northern/European NGOs overlook Japan because it is an Asian state. On the 
other hand, Southern/Asian NGOs do not identify with Japan because it is in the group 
of developed, aid donor states. This double-faceted nature impacts on the political 
atmosphere surrounding the NGO community in Japan.  
Keeping in mind the nature of this situation, this thesis has revealed the mode of 
operations of Japanese NGOs using three case studies. The main focus was on their 
relationships with the Japanese government and how they exert influence on Japan’s aid 
decision-making process and aid policy. In addition to this focus, the thesis has also 
helped the gap in the international NGO research. The next section presents the findings 
of this thesis and outlines its contribution to the literature on Japanese NGOs.          
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Study Objectives Analysed in this Thesis 
   At the beginning of this thesis, four problem statements were outlined. They are all 
necessary in order to create a basis for further analysis of NGOs’ modes of operation 
and influence on official aid policy. These problem statements or questions were: 
1. What is the role of NGOs in Japan’s official aid policy?  
2. What are the actual modes of operations of Japanese NGOs which are 
influential?  
3. What has been the government-NGO relationship in Japan? 
4. What is the future direction of Japan’s foreign aid policy and what can be 
recommended?         
The above four points were all significant when analysing Japanese NGOs but the third 
statement is especially noteworthy. It was assumed that by focusing on the official and 
unofficial interactions between NGOs and the Japanese government, modes of 
behaviour would be revealed which differed from other Northern/European and 
Southern/Asian NGOs’ behaviour, as identified by previous research. Therefore, 
focusing more heavily on the third problem statement, the government-NGO 
relationship in Japan, the following three more detailed research objectives were set out 
in the thesis: 
1) How far has the government-NGO relationship changed in the foreign aid of 
Japan? 
2) How do NGOs exercise their influence over aid policy from outside the 
decision-making process? ?  
3) Where does the mode of operation of Japan’s NGOs fit in the existing NGO 
theories? 
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Answering Questions  
Before moving on to subsequent issues, it is necessary to clarify the position of the 
Japanese NGO community in Japan’s foreign aid policy as addressed by the first 
problem statement of: “What is the role of NGOs in Japan’s official aid policy?”   
Originally, NGOs were merely ‘supplementary actors’ used to legitimise the 
Japanese government’s foreign aid and provide it with a human ‘face’ to counter 
criticism of Japan’s ‘faceless’ aid policies. However, they have gradually become a 
powerful tool to reflect opinions from outside the exclusive decision-making process. 
NGOs’ growing influence has irritated the government which feels driven out of 
Japan’s official aid strategy.  
Two examples of this ‘side-lining’ have been the “South-South cooperation” and the 
new involvement of the Self Defence Force (SDF) into Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) in 2004. “South-South cooperation” has aimed to fund directly local 
NGOs in developing countries, but this also has meant bypassing Japanese NGOs at the 
same time; most are experiencing financial difficulties. In this light, it can be concluded 
that South-South Cooperation” can lead to neglect of Japanese NGOs.  
The year 2004 marked a significant turning point for the role of NGOs in Japan’s 
official aid policy. The new linkage between ODA and the SDF was created during the 
Iraq War. The Japanese Prime Minister made an official statement on 8 June 2004, in a 
phone meeting with the United States President that the SDF would be one of the two 
front wheels of Japan’s ODA in the future, along with the provision of financial 
subsidies. This indicates that JSDF could take over the role of NGOs in providing actual 
aid operations. There is yet to be any concrete evidence of this transition but one should 
bear in mind this future possibility. Previous chapters of this thesis have answered the 
following questions. 
 281 
1) How far has the government-NGO relationship changed in decision-making 
relating to the foreign aid of Japan? 
   Originally, in the provision of Japan’s “Visible Japanese Aid (VJA)”, Japanese 
NGOs were recognised as operational partners with the government. The government’s 
intention was to take advantage of their established good reputation, their long-time 
experience at the grassroots level and their skill in making official aid policy more 
efficient and more visible to the international community without spending much of the 
country’s own resources. Despite this great wealth of experience and advantageous 
attributes, NGOs remained supplementary actors to the Japanese government. 
  However, by participating in the actual official aid policy as operational partners, 
NGOs have gradually become powerful challengers to the established decision-making 
system, thus stepping beyond the government’s expectations. In order to restrict their 
growing influence, the government has used two tactics. Firstly, it set up a series of 
sub-official meetings ostensibly gain outside opinions and create ‘transparency’ in the 
aid decision-making process. Despite the government’s intention, NGOs have used 
these sub-official meetings to exert their influence by disclosing records of the meetings 
on the internet in order to create public pressure on the government.  
Secondly, the financial assistance used to control NGO activities is a complex 
arrangement of financial assistance involving project reimbursement. This ensures that 
NGOs imposed a type of ‘self-restriction’ whereby projects were limited strictly to 
government-sanctioned policy, in order to guarantee reimbursement.  
In the area of financial assistance, the government has tried to control NGOs by 
limiting funding for too many NGOs and instigating a complicated procedure for the 
approval of such funding. Although NGOs have struggled in the system, it has also 
provided opportunities for Japanese NGOs to strengthen their own organisational 
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structure while searching for new sources of financial assistance. In order to gain 
international funding, they were required to improve their standard of professionalism 
to match their powerful overseas competitors.    
2) How do NGOs exercise their influence over aid policy from outside the 
decision-making process?  
It was for a long time believed that it was impossible for outsiders to exert influence 
over the exclusive decision-making process in Japan. However, NGOs have managed to 
exercise their influence. The manner in which they were able to do so has been 
explained in this thesis. The following three types of interactions were found to be the 
most important:   
1) Building personal relationships with high-powered decision-makers  
2) Coalition building internationally/domestically  
3) Cooperation with the media. 
The first type of interaction, building personal relationships, is considered to be a 
double edged sword. As the two cases of JCBL, Greenpeace Japan and FoE Japan have 
shown, it was relatively straightforward to create policies favourable to NGOs by 
encouraging sympathetically dispositions among the power-players in the process. For 
instance, the late Prime Minister, Keizo Obuchi, was moved strongly and emotionally 
by the sight of anti-personnel (AP) landmine victims. He not only signed the Ottawa 
Treaty but also set up a new aid scheme in relation to AP landmines. In the 
environmental sector, NGOs have taken advantage of the domestic Japanese political 
system and individual personalities of decision-makers in order to encourage the 
adoption of a higher standard of environmental conservation for Japan’s Yen Loan 
projects. These interactions required substantial prior research and preparation but 
resulted in huge successes. Having considered the advantages of these personal 
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relationships, the Japan International Volunteer Centre (JVC) Policy Advocacy staff 
have started making personal approaches to politicians involved in the decision-making 
process.   
However, although great successes have been brought by this interaction, the other 
edge of the sword has shown the ‘instability’ of the tactic. The efficacy of this type of 
interaction depends largely on individual decision-makers. It can therefore be dissolved 
very rapidly when the decision makers leave their high-powered positions. The special 
aid scheme for AP landmines is now in a precarious position because its sympathetic 
patron, Obuchi, died suddenly in 2000 and the succeeding administrations have not paid 
much attention to this issue. Any further subsidies to this scheme are provided on a 
‘case by case’ basis, which means there is no concrete guarantee of future funding from 
the government.  
Environmental NGOs often face having to make a choice as to which issues are to 
be pursued in accordance with decision-makers’ personal estimations of the importance 
of various issues’. Yasuko Matsumoto, a former campaigner for Greenpeace Japan, 
states that decision-makers were less interested in ozone layer depletion than recycling 
policy because the topic did not provide a concrete visible result that can be used in 
election campaigns.1   
The second interaction which has augmented NGO influence in policy-making, 
coalition building internationally/domestically, is efficient both in terms of creating 
unified pressure on the government and in its cost effectiveness thanks to the sharing of 
facilities such as office space and utilities. Taking advantage of the sensitivity of the 
Japanese government towards ‘international concerns’, Japanese NGOs have cooperated 
                                                   
1 Yasuko Matsumoto, interviewed by the author, 20 January 2004. 
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with international NGOs to create pressure from outside the country. At the same time, 
JVC has cooperated with other Japanese development NGOs to form a strong national 
network. ODA reform campaigns have been carried out by this network, though it can 
become fragmented by involving too many actors. JCBL’s coalition with International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is a clear example of influencing local central 
governments via international collaborative networks. Greenpeace Japan and FoE Japan 
have learnt efficient operative strategies from their international head offices, and 
benefit from their experiences in other states.  
On the other hand, inherent in cooperating with bigger and stronger international 
organisations is the potential danger of ‘assimilation’. This is the possibility that 
Japanese NGOs become merely small branch-like units of their international partners. 
Japanese NGOs have to sacrifice some independent ideas in order to gain support from, 
and be a part of large scale international NGOs. JVC’s main concern with cooperating 
too closely with international NGOs lies in this point. JCBL has already experienced the 
withdrawal of ICBL from its own campaign on the cluster bomb issue. Starting as part 
of international bodies, Greenpeace Japan and FoE Japan have faced the same concern. 
However, as it provides no financial subsidies, FoE International has a more hands-off 
policy toward each national branch and FoE Japan can thus maintain more of its own 
distinct national character. Conversely, Greenpeace Japan has been strongly influenced 
by the concerns of Greenpeace International.  
As the third category of interaction, media cooperation has always been a strong 
tool for forming consensus and thus influencing policy. It has been used effectively by 
decision-makers historically and is also used by NGOs. It can be said that the AP 
landmine issue was made an international issue due in great part to the appearance of 
Princess Diana in the media as a champion of the cause. Environmental issues also 
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gained media attention during international conferences such as the Earth Summit in 
1992 in Rio de Janeiro and an earlier series of Conference of Parties (COPs). This is 
because the conferences were considered to be exciting power games between world 
leaders on the environmental topic, which divines the future of the Earth.  
All NGOs analysed in this thesis possess some form of dedicated media strategy. 
The most common tactic is to befriend journalists and write to newspapers and journals. 
Writing and publishing on the issue independently also serve to promote their activities 
and deliver their messages directly. 
Nevertheless, NGOs must be wary of backlash from the media. This thesis has 
shown the rejection of an NGO at the Afghanistan recovery conference in 2001 to be a 
point in case. The backlash from media came after the incident that media made one 
NGO a centre of the news. The NGO’s attendance to the conference got rejected by one 
MP because the MP, who had a huge impact on Japan’s foreign policy including the 
Afghanistan recovery, thought the NGO as ‘not obedient’ to him. The NGO was made 
as a hero, which defied the powerful MP. However, the situation changed after the NGO 
held a press conference about the rejection case. The director of the NGO wore an 
expensive business suit on the site, who was expected to be honest poverty. As a result, 
the NGO lost popularity very quickly and media took no time to start criticising the 
director.2  The media made the NGO a brave hero fighting against the authority one 
day but made it an arrogant figure next day. The case of Tsujimoto, a NGO 
director-turned-politician, was similar. The Japanese saying, “stand out from the crowd 
and you just invite trouble for yourself” is reflected in this phenomenon.   
The conclusion drawn from these three case studies was that building personal 
                                                   
2 An inside anonymous story, May 2003 at the JVC office.  
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relationships with decision-makers is the most effective and fastest means of creating 
policy favourable to NGOs in Japan. However, it is subject to changes in 
policy-personnel, and is thus an unstable source of influence.    
3) Where does the mode of operation of Japan’s NGOs fit in the existing NGO 
theories? 
   Another key concern of this thesis was to establish which grouping Japanese NGOs 
are closest to in terms of their mode of operations, Northern/European or 
Southern/Asian. Based on the analysis carried out, it can be concluded that Japanese 
NGOs share traits of both the Northern/European and Southern/Asian NGOs but that 
their essential nature is more similar to that of Southern/Asian NGOs. Japanese NGOs 
have tried to follow the Northern/European example, in which NGOs are important 
collaborative partners with governments and are able to exert influence via 
institutionalised means. However, they have had to operate largely more like 
Southern/Asian NGOs, preferring unofficial modes of interaction. They have had to 
seek ways of operating under the Japanese government’s control even though this 
control is more subtle and nuanced than that of other more oppressive Asian 
governments. 
   Peculiarities of Japanese NGOs can be shown in terms of their surroundings and 
mode of operations. Their circumstances show aspects of the Northern/European mode 
of operating such as declaring NGOs as partners regardless of reality, despite the fact 
that the government controls Japanese NGOs by quiet and subtle means.  
Like Western governments, the Japanese government accept that NGOs are 
important aid partners and this attitude is confirmed most often in official annual reports 
on Japan’s ODA. NGOs are eligible to receive financial subsidies and institutional 
status, most notably under the Non-Profit Organisation (NPO) Law. Importantly, there 
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is no restriction for them in accessing international funding such as from international 
organisations and donors, whereas some Asian governments strictly prohibit this, 
reasoning that NGOs can turn into agents for foreign powers.  
   At the same time, however, the Japanese government has created subtle ways of 
controlling NGOs. As stated before, in the area of financial assistance, by using a later 
payment system, the government is able to impose ‘self-restriction’ upon NGOs 
themselves. A decrease in the budget for the NGO Project Subsidy (NPS) and an 
increase in Grants for Grassroots Projects (GGP) also display the government’s 
intention to benefit aid distribution via local governments in developing countries rather 
than via Japanese NGOs. 
   The NPO Law was welcomed at first as it provided advanced support for Japanese 
NGOs, equivalent to Northern/European ones. Yet in reality, various services allowed 
for by the law are available only to those powerful and well-established NGOs which 
meet criteria set by the government. This has resulted in making the strong stronger and 
the weak weaker, which has created a division in the NGO community. This 
phenomenon has the potential to affect the development of domestic networks.  
   In this environment, the four NGOs analysed in the case studies have exhibited 
behaviours which are closer to those of Southern/Asian NGOs. They have relied on 
personal relationships to move decision-makers towards the creation of favourable 
policies, built networks with international NGOs in order to gain outside support, and 
approached journalists and newspapers reporters. Dependence on individual 
decision-makers implies that Japanese NGOs have to use the political ‘back door’ rather 
than the ‘front door’, and this clarifies that they lack the institutionalised pathways for 
accessing the official policy making process that the Japanese government has lauded 
officially. These interactions are certainly used by Northern/European NGOs as well, 
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but they also have the legitimate access to central authority through institutionalised 
means which Southern/Asian NGOs sorely lack.    
Because the central government has a reactive attitude toward Gai-atsu (outside 
pressure), it is natural for Japanese NGOs to build networks with international NGOs in 
seeking stronger support from the outside. Yet it also means that they are not able to 
move the government on their own from the inside without those external pressures. 
Without outside pressure, Japanese NGOs lack sufficient power to be adequately 
influential, even though there is a potential danger of becoming branch-like units of 
powerful international organisations.   
Other Contributions to the Field of Study 
   This thesis also makes contributions to the fields of Japanese aid and NGO research:  
(1) Highlighting the importance of Japanese NGOs in the aid decision-making 
process   
For the field of study of Japan’s aid, this thesis has emphasised the importance and 
impact of Japanese NGOs on the aid decision-making process. Although this 
decision-making process has long been popular with a number of renowned researchers, 
it was often overlooked in earlier NGO studies. Foreign aid scholars understood the 
importance of Japanese NGOs and showed their concern by referring to them in the 
foreign aid context. In addition, this thesis has provided concrete case studies to prove 
the impact. There are several reasons for the lack of work in this field but one key 
reason is the insufficient understanding of NGOs from an academic perspective. A lack 
of understanding often led to NGOs being overlooked as a possible research topic. 
Another factor is that NGOs do not have enough time to conduct academic research of 
their own, and tend to reflect a closed nature to outsiders. This thesis has overcome 
these issues by carrying out intensive fieldwork with Japanese NGOs in order to obtain 
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‘insider’ viewpoints. At the same time, political viewpoints at a macro level were 
maintained throughout to avoid a bias - a trap which many practitioner-based studies 
have fallen into. 
(2) Filling a gap in general NGO studies 
   As well as highlighting the importance of NGO activity in Japan’s foreign aid study, 
this thesis has filled a gap in general NGO studies, which is usually discussed from 
Northern/European and Southern/Asian perspectives in terms of North-South issues. 
Japan falls between North and South as well as between East and West, which has 
resulted in a gap in the whole field. By focusing on the mode of behaviour of Japanese 
NGOs, the thesis has gone some way to bridging this gap.  
   Further research is needed regarding South Korean and Chinese NGOs. South Korea 
has turned from an aid receiving state to an aid donating state, the number of NGOs is 
increasing drastically and their influence is growing.3 China, although still considered a 
‘developing country’, is set to become one of the world largest economic powers in the 
future. Therefore, it can be presumed that the modes of operation of ‘North Eastern 
NGOs’ can be revealed by examining these two cases in addition to Japanese NGOs. It 
is assumed that there are differences in the political atmosphere and international and 
domestic circumstances in these two states, but this proposition remains to be examined 
by future studies.  
(3) Practical Contribution: A Clear Strategy increasing influence on aid policy        
   By identifying the most effective interactions for influencing the Japanese 
government itself, this thesis has contributed to improving the practical strategies of the 
                                                   
3 Shinnichi Shigetomi,  Asia no Kokka to NGO: 15 ka Koku no Hikaku Kentoo (Asian States and 
NGOs: Comparative Study on 15 States) (Tokyo: Akashi Syoten, 2001). See the chapter on South 
Korea. 
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Japanese NGO community. Certainly, the findings of the thesis are not universal 
internationally, but they are at least able to give some direction to Japanese NGOs.  
Recommendation for the more effective Implementation of Japanese Foreign Aid  
   This thesis has provided an overview of Japan’s official aid policy focusing on the 
role of Japanese NGOs in its implementation, their relationship with the Japanese 
government, and methods of exerting influence over the decision-making process. It 
was concluded that although Japanese NGOs generally have a Northern/European style 
of operation on the surface, they are struggling to be influential from outside the formal 
decision-making process of the government, itself which exhibits behavioural 
characteristics typical of Asian governments, such as subtle control and suppression. 
These controls over NGOs are so subtle that they are not apparent to outsiders, but 
nonetheless force NGOs into imposing ‘self-restrictions’ to be favoured by the 
government, which is a major funding provider for their activities.   
   This thesis has also found efforts and results of creating various ways of being 
influential by some Japanese NGOs analysed in the case studies. Since the whole thesis 
has been an analysis of that aspect, no further description is given here, but that is why 
the thesis has called them a ‘challenger’ to the government. 
   Because Japan’s foreign aid is now at a crucial turning point, there are several 
recommendations to be made for improving Japanese foreign aid implementation. These 
are as follows: 
1) Breaking the possible stronger linkage between ODA and Self Defence Force 
(SDF): The potential use of the SDF in the implementation of Japanese ODA, which 
was suggested by the Japanese Prime Minister, Koizumi Jyunichiro, at a meeting with 
the United States president, George W. Bush, poses many issues, such as the 
replacement of NGOs in a new scheme for Peace Building, for example, which is of 
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particular interest to this thesis. Actually, sending the JSDF to conflict-affected areas 
became a part of the cause of the kidnapping of Japanese people in Iraq, which 
happened in April 2004. This new strategy can trigger a threat to the security of 
‘citizens’ working in these areas, especially humanitarian aid workers. Rather than 
further developing this policy, it is strongly recommended that the government maintain 
close cooperation with NGOs for its aid implementation in conflict-affected areas, as 
NGOs possess a good reputation in many circles for their humanitarian activities.  
2) Stronger cooperation with local governments by NGOs: One of the reasons that 
NGOs lose their independence is their heavy reliance on central governments for 
financial assistance and credibility. In order to maintain a high level of operational 
autonomy, NGOs need to establish stronger collaborative relationships with Jichitai 
(local governments). 
  Jichitai tend to exercise strong influence over the central government on domestic 
issues. Strong-minded leaders have clear wills in local politics and more importantly, 
their positions allow them official access to the central decision-making process. This is 
what NGOs have been struggling to obtain because the so-called “Iron Triangle” type of 
authority has hindered their ability to access the official process. Jichitai have their own 
international cooperation strategies so through cooperation with them, NGOs can put 
pressure on the government to create favourable aid policies.4 The potential limitation 
of this strategy is that a local body has its own interests, so the desires of NGOs must 
meet these interests. For instance, environmental conservation is a major interest for 
both sides but sustainable development is a concern primarily of the NGOs’ side. That 
                                                   
4 Most prefectures have international cooperation divisions at their local governments. Some 
powerful local governments, such as Tokyo, Osaka, Mie and Kanagawa, have been pursuing 
international policies beyond cultural exchange through having sister cities.  
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is because environmental issues can be considered at both the local and global levels, 
but sustainable development is discussed mainly at an international level that local 
governments consider far outside their own ambit of concern. Considering this issue, 
JVC has been trying to link Jichitai and a Thai rural village in “the local market 
project”. The aim of this project was to support a morning market for trade among 
villagers in order to create a direct link between producers and consumers, and thus 
develop a market economy within villages.5 Japanese villages’ morning markets are 
thought to be an ideal style by some local governments and that has started exchange 
relationships at local levels.   
3) Personnel Exchange: A lack of understanding between aid administrators and NGO 
staff often retards cooperation. It would be of great benefit to exchange personnel 
between governmental agencies and NGOs in order to build mutual confidence. This 
would be especially between NGOs and aid implementing bodies such as the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). 
This idea is already being trialled between governmental ministries such as the MOFA 
and the National Police Agency for their work on international criminal cases. 
   There are two immediate problems with extending this exchange programme to 
include government-NGO exchanges. The first of them is the extremely sensitive issue 
of salary which under the existing government exchange scheme, is not a crucial 
problem because they are paid by governmental agencies anyway. Japanese bureaucrats 
are guaranteed a stable income for the length of their careers. However, if they were to 
transfer to an NGO, who pays their salaries would be problematic since an NGO job is 
                                                   
5 Japan International Volunteer Center (JVC),  Activities Guideline, (Tokyo: JVC, 2002), 10. 
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not a high-paying one in Japan. If transferred bureaucrats were to be paid by the NGO, 
they would face a crucial pay cut, which would be against their original contract with 
their home governmental agencies.  
The issue of loyalty is also potentially problematic. Occasionally, retirees from 
governmental agencies have moved into private sectors including NGOs – which is 
called Amakudari – but they tend to be more focused on their loyalty to their home 
agencies than on advancing the work of their new employers. If the same were true of 
government-NGO exchange-personnel, it would certainly hinder the process of 
interchange.    
 
Looking Forward… 
   This thesis has discussed Japanese NGOs and their role in official aid policy, their 
relationship with the central government, modes of operations, and future directions. 
The viewpoints of both the government and NGOs have been presented.  
   Although Japanese NGOs are now faced with the challenge of the government’s 
intention to link ODA and the SDF, there is still a great demand for NGOs, especially in 
the provision of ‘humanitarian’ foreign aid. Under “Visible Japanese Aid” it was 
intended to utilise them to show Japan’s ‘friendly face’ to the international community, 
but NGOs have become a major challenger to the rigidity of Japan’s aid 
decision-making process, which has become more open and inclusive as a result of 
NGO efforts. Cooperating with NGOs in official aid strategies is without doubt a big 
task for the government. This is because it not only precipitates a potential challenge, 
but also requires the government to renounce vested rights such as a monopolised 
decision-making process which used to be of ‘sweet linkages’ between business 
industries. Even so, however, it brings a human ‘face’ to Japanese aid and dramatises it, 
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an outcome which the Japanese government strongly desired from the collaboration 
from the outset. Its aim was achieved along with a powerful challenger and ‘partner’.              
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Appendix 1 
 
Description of Fieldwork 
 
The First Fieldwork in Japan (March 2003 – June 2003) 
I have undertaken the first fieldwork in Japan from Match to June in 2003, working for 
two major Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Japan, Japan International 
Volunteer Center (JVC) and Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JBIC). I have also 
visited some other NGOs, which have their headquarters in Tokyo.  
 
JVC is one of the largest and most influential development NGOs in Japan and I have 
worked as Policy Advocacy team intern. JCBL is specialised on anti-personnel landmines 
issue and I have worked as a temporary interpreter for the organisation.  
 
While working for the two NGOs, I have interviewed staff and collected valuable data 
from them. The interviews were done in casual and relaxing atmosphere because I wanted 
them to talk openly. I was only taking a short note but not a formal record of the 
interviews because interviewees asked me not to, due to sensitiveness of topics. Many staff 
of JVC, JCBL and other NGOs kindly participated in the interviews although they were 
already overwhelmed with their huge amount of NGO works.  
 323 
 
From the fieldwork, a large amount of data, which are extremely valuable and important, 
has been collected. The actual interview made it possible to obtain them because they are 
not usually disclosed to the public. In addition, the two NGOs have provided their primary 
resource continuously after the completion of fieldwork via phone, fax and email.  
 
To carry out the intensive fieldwork, building mutual confidence between the NGOs was a 
major mission at first because they possess rather closed nature to outside, which is 
particular to Japanese society. Yet, I have succeeded in establishing a good relationship 
with them, and it has resulted in their strong support for this Ph.D. thesis to the end.  
 
Other than these two main NGOs which I have worked for, I have visited and done some 
data collection and interviews taking advantage of being in Tokyo, where many NGOs 
have their headquarters. As well as materials from these NGOs, I have also collected 
governmental documents, some of which could not be retrieved from official sites of 
ministries and agencies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation (JBIC).  
 
The Follow-Up Fieldwork (Second Fieldwork)  in Japan (November 2004 – 
December 2004)  
On the second fieldwork in Japan, I was employed as a fixed-term staff in Policy Advisory 
team of JVC and mainly worked on a topic of efficiency of foreign aid, which JVC was 
planning to host a symposium in early December 2004. Through working as a temporary 
staff, I have gone deeper in JVC’s operational activities and obtained supplementary data 
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in addition to the first fieldwork.  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 – Figures and Tables 
 
 
Figure 1 Staff Number in Aid in Japan 325 
   
Table 1 Comparison of Multiple and Single Aid Agency 326 
   
Figure 2  Flow of Japan Platform 327 
   
Figure 3 Subsidies to NGO Projects (1989 - 2000) 328 
   
Figure 4 Grant for Grassroot Project (1989 - 2000) 329 
   
Table 2 Staff Number of Development NGOs in Japan 330 
   
Figure 5 Japan's ODA in the Environmental Field (1992 - 2000) 331 
   
Figure 6 General Account of ODA Budget (1995 - 2001) 332 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 325 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2:  Figure 1 
 
 
Staff Number in Aid in Japan
0
500
1000
1500
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
5
Year
OECF
JICA
MOFA
 
 
(Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan’s ODA 1997: 109) 
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Appendix 2: Table 1  
 
Comparison of Multiple and Single Aid Agency 
 
 Multiple Single 
 
 
 
Advantages 
 Each part of foreign aid 
policy is looked after 
specialised ministries and 
agencies. 
 Responsibility is 
distributed among several 
entities so it reduces the 
pressure and stress if were 
a single body.  
 Clear responsibility 
of the agency. 
 Unified budget that 
ease inter-ministry 
rivalry and produce 
flexibility over 
project scale.  
 Stability of aid 
specialist staff. 
 
 
 
 
 
Downsides 
 Confusion among 
applicants in where to 
apply for aid. 
 Distributed responsibility 
over the aid policy lead to 
the fact that no one is in 
full charge. 
 Frequent staff member 
change leads to insufficient 
number of aid specialists. 
 Broadly-distributed aid 
budget leads to 
inter-ministry rivalry and 
could affect on efficiency 
 Possibility of 
strengthening the 
power of the agency 
and the parent 
ministry and it could 
lead to dictatorship in 
aid policy.  
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of administration.   
(
Source: Author) 
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Emergency Situation 
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Flow of Japan Platform 
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Appendix 2:  Figure 3 
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Appendix 2: Table 2  Staff Number of Development NGOs 
in Japan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ADRA Japan 4 
Association for Aid and Relief (AAR) 18 
Care Japan  7 
Caritus Japan 3 
The Institute of Cultural Affairs in 
Japan (ICA) 
7 
Interband 5 
Japan International Volunteer Centre 
(JVC) 
40 
World Vision Japan 32 
Name of NGO in other area  
The Japanese Red Cross Society 
(education) 
53,879 
Peace Winds Japan 290 
Source: Asia Pacific Resource Centre (Japan) (2003) 
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Appendix 2:  Figure 4 
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Appendix 2:  Figure 5 
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Appendix 2: Figure 6  
 
General Account of ODA Budget (1995 - 2001)
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